NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Logic, Scripture and Allusion: The Recontextualization of Canon in the Early Mādhyamika Thought of Nāgārjuna

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Field of Religion

By

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EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

June 1997

UMI Number: 9731360

ABSTRACT

Logic, Scripture and Allusion: The Recontextualization of Canon in the Early Mādhyamika Thought of Nāgārjuna

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This work examines the primary works of Nāgārjuna (second century), and the relationship between his logical method and his use of Buddhist scripture. Western scholarship on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* has tended to focus exclusively on the issues of its logical and philosophical constitution. So far no serious study has been done on Nāgārjuna's use of scripture. In this work, I argue that one of the primary concerns of Nāgārjuna's major work, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, is to show that the fundamental doctrine of the Mahāyāna scriptures, the doctrine of "emptiness," falls within the scope of the teachings of the Buddhist canon, and hence, can be classed as "Word of the Buddha" *(buddhavacana)*. I argue that he establishes its status as "Word of the Buddha" through a combination of logic and scriptural allusion. Further, I argue that Nāgārjuna places emptiness in the context of the canon in such a way that emptiness becomes the most fundamental category on which all other categories are based.

Hence, (contrary to much scholarship) Nāgārjuna was not against the Abhidharma, nor does he reject their system of

categorization. In fact, he includes a number of such lists in his own work (in the *Ratnāvalī* and the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*). He does, however, displace these lists in favor of the doctrine of emptiness. I trace this displacement of the canonical categories through the "four noble truths," "the twelve links of dependent origination," "the five aggregates," and "the six elements." By showing how Nāgārjuna's reading subtly shifts the interpretation of canonical passages from their usual reading I describe the exegetical genius of Nāgārjuna which, in effect, extends the doctrinal domain of the canon to include Mahāyāna doctrines such as emptiness. Such an extension was facilitated through a kind of legal fiction showing that the canonical categories themselves had always relied on emptiness. By doing so Mahāyāna can claim that the "Word of the Buddha" ***is*** empty.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all of those people without whom I could never have made it this far. First of all, I would like to thank my wife, Radha Subramanyam, a true friend and a true scholar, who supported me unfailingly through the dissertation process. To my parents, my sister, Katie, who have also been a great support, and to my cats, who helped me keep perspective, I am eternally grateful. I am also grateful for the love of my extended family, especially to my parents-in-law and Rajeev, and for the friendhip of Beth Burton and Amy Rosenbaum who were there all along the way.

The support of my dissertation committee has also been tremendous. In this regard, I would especially like to thank Dr. George Bond, who has followed my work closely and enabled me to bring it to completion, and Dr. Leslie Kawamura, who graciously agreed to read and comment on several drafts. Dr. Richard Kieckheffer and Dr. Manfred Vogel have also given me a great deal of help and encouragement through this long process.

The number of people who have offered kind and astute suggestions for the dissertation are too numerous to mention, but a few stand out. I would like to thank Dr. Isshi Yamada, for being a close mentor for many years. Dr. Katsura was kind enough to offer his insights on my translation of the

Akutobhayā, and the project could not have been completed without him. I would also like to thank Dr. Adolf Von Wuertenberg who introduced me to Sanskrit, Carol Ryzak for always being there, and the Interlibrary Loan department of Northwestern University for the many documents without which this project could not have been completed.

Finally, I would like to thank the Numata Foundation for a grant to study in Kyoto in 1993.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

Page

Chapter 1: Introduction

The field of History of Religions and the study of religious texts requires a set of methods and questions that differs significantly from non-religious literary studies. Indeed, a great deal has been written lately about religious texts as a genre in general as well as about the formal elements of Buddhist scriptures in particular. While the study of religious texts has become an important topic in History of Religions, the field still has much to learn about the phenomena of scripture from the specific religious traditions themselves. The present study emphasizes the exegetical strategies of early Mahāyāna Buddhism as practiced by one of its most ingenious scholars, Nāgārjuna. The specific findings of this study will shed light on aspects of the category of religious scripture as a whole.

This study will show that one of the important issues for early Madhyamaka is the status of certain disputed texts (the Mahāyāna scriptures) *vis-a-vis* what for lack of a better term we will call a Buddhist "canon." The term "canon," when it is applied to Buddhist scriptures, must be used with care. Steven Collins[1] (following J.P. Olivelle) suggests that there are two uses of the term canon. It may be used loosely to refer to a group of texts which are treated as being

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[1] Steven Collins, "On the Very Idea of the Pali Canon," *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 15 (1990): 90.

definitely authoritative while leaving open the possibility that others may be authoritative as well. This is what may be termed an "inclusive" sense of canon. The term canon may be used in a more strict sense to denote a group of texts which are not only treated as authoritative, but more importantly as *complete*. Such a canon denies the same authority to any other texts. This is what may be termed an "exclusive" sense of canon. Contrary to Collins, I will argue in what follows that early Buddhist use of scripture reflects a mixture of both senses of canon -- new texts were added as time went on, but only those texts which conformed to a circumscribed set of ideas.

Whatever the take of the different schools on the inclusivity and exclusivity of the canon, all concerned looked to a body of Buddhist scriptures in order to make their claims. The narrative of the canon itself informs our reading of its inclusivity or exclusivity. Indeed, the Buddhist communities which took a stand on the inclusivity or exclusivity of the canon, did so in part based on cues taken from the Buddhist scriptures themselves. Passages relating to both the authority and the completeness of the canon are woven into the scriptures. Such passages function to seal off the canon on the one hand, and to suggest ways that this closure is to be mitigated on the other.

Within the early Buddhist canon, there are two such

"myths of closure" which have historically set the standards for Buddhist orientation toward these texts. The first, of course, is the first Buddhist "council" (or better yet "recitation" *[saṃgīti]*) which allegedly took place at Rājagṛha during the first rainy season following the death of the Buddha. It was at this council that 500 Arhants or enlightened persons assembled and the Buddha's disciples Ānanda and Upāli were assigned to recite the *sūtras* (the collection of sermons) and the *vinaya* (the collection of monastic rules) respectively. Whether or not these accounts are accurate as history or not, their narrative function within the canon is to explain the status of this particular collection of texts. The phrase "Thus have I heard at one time..." ("*Evaṃ me śrutam ekasmin samaye*") at the beginning of every Buddhist *sūtra* reminds the listener of the unique circumstances of the *sutra*'s first recitation.

The accounts of the council are highly concerned to inform us of the credentials of those who were present -- the event occurred in the presence of 500 fully enlightened arhants, many of whom were the top disciples of the Buddha. The story also tells us that the primary reciter of these texts, Ānanda, had just become an arhant prior to his recitation of the sūtras. His enlightenment is attested by an act of levitation in the presence of the other assembled arhants. This lends a definite authority to any text included

in the collection. Furthermore, that Ānanda and Upāli's recitation happened only once means that no other text composed after this council could have met with the same unanimous approval. Hence, the accounts of the council (part of the canon themselves) define a kind of closure to the texts that were recited by Ānanda and Upāli at Rājagṛha.

The legend of the council at Rājagṛha implies the closure of the Buddhist canon, and yet accounts of this council disagree on exactly what the content of what was recited. Each school claims that its collection of texts was what was recited at the council.[2] The Pāli account of the first council includes a story which acknowledges that there existed scriptures other than those recited by Ānanda. The story is that of the monk Purāṇa who arrived at the council late with 500 arhants of his own. Upon hearing what had been recited by Ānanda and Upāli, he expressed reservations, claiming that he remembered these sermons differently.[3]

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[2] Étienne. Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism From the Origins to the Śaka Era*, 36, Publications de L'Institut Orientaliste De Louvain, (Louvain-Paris: Peeters Press, 1958 (English trans. 1988)), 129.

[3]text: Tena kho pana samayena āyasmā purāṇo dakkhiṇāgirismiṃ cārikaṃ carati mahatā bhikkhusaṅghena saddhiṃ pañcamattehi bhikkhusatehi. Atha kho āyasmā purāṇo therehi bhikkhūhi dhamme ca vinaye ca saṃgīte dakkhiṇāgirismiṃ yathābhirannaṃ viharitvā yena rājagahaṃ yena vephavanaṃ kalandakanivāpo yena therā bhikkhū tenupasaṅkami. Upasaṅkamitvā therehi bhikkhūhi saddhiṃ paṭisammoditvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinnaṃ kho āyasmantaṃ purāṇaṃ therā bhikkhū etadavocuṃ: therehi āvuso purāṇa, dhammo ca vinayo ca saṃgīto. Upehi taṃ saṃgītinti. Susaṃgītāvuso therehi dhammo ca vinayo ca. Api ca yatheva mayā bhagavato sammukhā sutaṃ

The inclusion of this story among the details of the first council suggests that while the Buddha's teaching ended at his death, the possibility is still open that the collection of sermons remembered by Ānanda were not all of the sermons that the Buddha preached. This leaves the way open for there to be valid sermons that were not included in the collections recited by Ānanda and Upāli.

A number of scholars have been interested in the relative openness of the early canon. Ronald Davidson suggests two factors that led to the openness of Buddhists to new scriptures. The first is that the Buddha forbade the translation of his sermons into one standard language *(candas)*. This allowed for a number of variant readings of his sermons. The second is that the Buddha taught many students over a great length of time (many of whom left for parts unknown to teach) meant that there were many sermons left unaccounted for at the time of the first council[4] --

sammukhā paṭiggahitaṃ tathevāhaṃ dhāressāmīti.

[4] Ronald Davidson credits that Buddhists attitude toward an expanding canon to the specifics of the Buddha's manner of teaching coupled with the length of his career. "…during the more than forty years of the Buddha's teaching career, there were many monks acting as authoritative teachers of the doctrine throughout the kingdom of Maghada and its border areas. They would cross paths with the master from time to time and receive new information from one another…. After forty years of their obtaining new information through such contact, we may be certain that, by the death of the Buddha, the process of receiving new "teachings of the teacher" (āśstuḥ śāsanaṃ) had become a well accepted practice. The network of instruction was thus well established, and doubtless most of the monks realized that most of what the Buddha had said during his lengthy career remained unknown to them personally.… In my opinion, this was the beginning of the continuing cross-fertilization of scripture and doctrine which was the hallmark of Indian Buddhism."

hence the story of Purāṇa.

Beyond the issue of multiple versions of There were other reasons to suggest an openness to other texts. *Buddhavacana* could come from a number of different sources. Different schools offered different ranges of what are acceptable sources of *buddhavacana*. Étienne Lamotte explains as follows:

> The Dharma… has diverse sources which tend, over time to multiply. Those of the Mahāsāṃghika… and of the Mūlasarvāstivādin… neither of them count more than two. According to the first "The law, is either that which the Buddha has said, or that which his has approved with his seal, they are the disciples, Śrāvaka and the other people who have said it and the Buddha has approved with his seal." The other Vinaya restrains itself to saying that: "The word Dharma signifies the Law which has been said by the Buddha and the Śrāvaka."
>
> The pāli Vinaya… and that of the Dharmagupta… add two new sources: "The Law, they say. is that which is said by the Buddha, the Śrāvaka, the sages *(ṛṣi)* and the gods *(deva)*." To this list, the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādin…, followed by the Śāstra…, adds

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Ronald M. Davidson, "An Introduction to the Standards of Scriptural Authenticity in Indian Buddhism," in *Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 293.

further apparitional beings *(upapāduka)*.[5]

Scholars have shown that, while the canon does include a number of texts which were not actually uttered by the Buddha, it uses certain devices to grant the Buddha's authority to these teachings. As Graeme MacQueen has shown, the most important of these devices is the approval of the Buddha.[6] In a number of places, someone other than the Buddha will expound a teaching which is later checked with the Buddha. The Buddha, then, will either approve or disapprove of the teaching. This kind of authorization of other monk's teaching makes sense in the historical context discussed by Davidson. If the teachings of the Buddha were disseminated by his students, then it is important for canonical texts to show the Buddha's approval of their interpretations of his doctrine.

In order to deal with new texts claiming to be authentic, a sermon is included in the canon where the Buddha instructs his disciples how to ascertain whether a sermon reputed to be his is actually the "word of the Buddha" or not. This is the much discussed *mahāpadesa-s*, or "great indications (of *Buddhavacana*)" which are found in the

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[5]Étienne. Lamotte, "La Critique D'Authenticité Dans Le Bouddhisme," in *India Antiqua: A Volume of Oriental Studies* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1947), 215-216.

[6]cf. Graeme. MacQueen, "Inspired Speech In Early Mahāyāna Buddhism I," *Religion* 11, no. 4 (1981): 303-319.

Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra of the *Dīgha Nīkāya* and in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*.[7] In order for a sermon to be considered "word of the Buddha," it had to meet two sets of criteria. The first is that the sermon had to come from either the lips of the Buddha, a group of elders and leaders *(sathero sapāmokkho)*, a large group of monks, or, lastly, one monk. The second set of criteria is that the sermon is to be "placed beside *sutta* and compared with *vinaya*."[8]

As an example, let us take Walshe's translation of one passage from this text:

> Suppose a monk were to say: "Friends, I heard and received this from the Lord's own lips: this is the Dhamma, this is the discipline, this is the Master's teaching," then, monks, you should neither approve nor disapprove his words. Neither approving nor disapproving, his words and expressions should be carefully noted and compared with the Suttas and reviewed in the light of the discipline. If they, on such comparison and review, are found not to conform to the Suttas or the discipline, the conclusion must be: "Assuredly this is not the word of the Buddha, it has been wrongly understood by this monk," and is

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[7]Aṅguttara II, p. 167.

[8]George D. Bond, "Two Theravāda Traditions of Meaning of "The Word of the Buddha"," *Maha-Bodhi* 83, no. 10-2 (1975): 406.

a matter to be rejected...."[9]

The same procedure is repeated three more times, substituting "a group of elders and leaders," "a large group of monks," and "one monk" for the Buddha. The qualifications stated for the "large group of monks" and for the "one monk," are that they be very learned *(bahussuto)*, ones to whom scripture has been handed down *(āgatāgamo)*, those who memorize sermons *(dhammadharo)*, monastic rules *(vinayadharo)*, and the topical lists (*mātikādharo* = Sanskrit "*mātṛkādhara*").

Lamotte claims that the notion of the *Tripitaka* does not exist as early as the *Dīgha Nikāya*, and that passages such as this one merely indicate that there was a division of labor among monastic communities. However, this passage clearly states that those who were "well learned to whom scriptures had been passed down," would be those who memorized three categories of teachings: *dhamma (=sutta)*, *vinaya*, and *mātaka*

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[9]*The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya*, (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), 255. (trans.). Text: "Idha bhikkhave bhikkhū evaṃ vadeyya: "sammukhā metaṃ āvuso bhagavato sutaṃ, sammukhā paṭiggahitaṃ, ayaṃ dhammo ayaṃ vinayo idaṃ satthusāsananti" tassa bhikkhave bhikkhuno bhāsitaṃ neva abhinanditabbaṃ na paṭikkositabbaṃ. Anabhinanditvā appaṭkkositvā tāni padabyañjanāni sādhunaṃ uggahetvā sutte otāretabbāni vinaye sandassetabbāni. Tāni ce sutte otāriyamānāṇi vinaye sandassiyamānāni na ve sutte otaranti na ca vinaye sandissanti, niṭṭhamettha gantabbaṃ: addhā idaṃ na ceva tassa bhagavato vacanaṃ. Imassa ca bhikkhuno duggahitanti. Iti hetaṃ bhikkhave chaḍḍeyyātha. Tāni ce sutte otāriyamānāni vinaye sandassiyamānāni sutte ceva otaranti vinaye ca sandissanti, niṭṭhamettha gantabbaṃ: 'addhā idaṃ tassa bhagavato vacanaṃ. Imassa ca bhikkhuno suggahita'nti. Imaṃ bhikkhave paṭhamaṃ mahāpadesaṃ dhāreyyātha." [*The Dīgha Nikāya*, vol. 2 (London: The Pali Text Society, 1890), 124.]

(=abhidharma?). It is not difficult to see in this passage at least the beginnings of the notion of a set canon defined in terms of the three baskets (though, obviously there was no fixed canon at this point).[10]

Nevertheless, this *sūtra* clearly delineates a method whereby a new text may be classified as "word of the Buddha." In order for a text to be considered as "word of the Buddha," it is be placed beside the sūtras *(sutte otāretabbāni)* and is to be compared to the monastic rules *(vinaye sandassetabbāni)*. The future passive construction indicates that the text in question is not already among the *sūtras* or *vinaya*. This method allows a degree of openness to new texts whereby a text not already known by an authoritative person or group of people is authenticated due to favorable comparison with existing texts.

Evidence that this text was used by Buddhist schools to include additional texts even at a fairly late point is found in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* and the commentary on it by Yaśomitra. At one point in the discussion Vasubandhu quotes a scripture in order to show that Vatsīputrīyas are wrong to claim that a *pudgala* (a self or pseudo-spirit) exists. The

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[10] The definition of canon as consisting of the nine or twelve "branches" (aṅgas) was also a popular definition of the canon in early Buddhism. It is not certain, however, if the canon was ever organized along these lines. These terms are merely descriptive if its contents. For a full discussion of these categorizations, see Lamotte, 1988, 143-148.

Vatsīputrīya responds that the scripture does not have authority because it is not read in their sect. To this Vasubandhu responds that this is not a valid reason because a) "all of the other sects read this *sūtra*," b) "it does not contradict the sūtras," c) "it does not contradict[11] *dharmatā*."[12] Yaśomitra's commentary runs as follows (italicized portions are quotations from Vasubandhu's text):

> *This is certainly not the word of the Buddha.* By this it is meant that these sūtras are apocryphal. *In all the sects* (means) in the sects such as Tāmraparṇīya etc. *And does not oppose the sūtra* (means it) does not oppose the heart of the *sūtra* nor does it cause contradictions to the heart of the *sūtra*. *Nor does it oppose dharmatā* (means) the *dharmatā* which is dependent-origination.[13]

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[11]This criterion for *buddhavacana* does not appear in the *Dīgha* passage or in the *Aṅguttara*. It does, however, figure prominently in most of the later discussions of *buddhavacana*. The text here says "na dharmatā bādhate." It seems, however, that there were a number of readings of this verb. The *Mahāsūtrālaṃkāra*, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjika*, and *Netti Prakāraṇa* all use "avilomati" (which in the *Netti* is synonymous for *upanikkhipitabbāni*).

[12]Vasubandhu, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu: Traduction et Annotations*, vol. 16, book 5, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, (1972; Brussels: Institut Belge Des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1980), 251-252.

[13]text: *na kilaitad buddha-vacanam* iti. kenāpi adhyāropitāny etāni sūtrāṇīti abhiprāyaḥ. *sarva-nikāyāntareṣv* iti Tāmraparṇīya-nikāy'ādiṣu. *na ca sūtraṃ bādhate*. na ca sūtrāntaraṃ bādhate. na ca sūtrāntaraṃ virodhayati. *na dharmatā bādhata* iti pratītyasamutpāda-dharmatāṃ. Yasomitra, *Sputārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā by Yaśomitra*, vol. 2, Unrai Wogihara (Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1971), 705.

All evidence presented so far suggests two factors of early Buddhist canonicity: first, that new texts could be considered authoritative if they compared favorably with existing sets of scriptures, and second, that there were existing collections of scripture with which comparisons should be made. In light of these points, we cannot say that the canon of the Buddhists was closed, nor can we claim that it was entirely open. It appears that early monks maintained an attitude toward scripture which assumed that, while the number of canon-worthy texts was theoretically finite, it was possible that the existing collections might not yet be complete. However, if a text really were new (i.e., just composed) the fight for acceptance would be an uphill battle. Notice that in Vasubandhu's discussion, the first criteria he invokes is that the text in question is read by "all the sects" *(sarvanikāya)*. Only after its common use is established does he invoke the comparisons to scripture.

In certain cases, the attitude of openness to new texts was even extended to texts that were clearly never uttered around the Buddha. Nevertheless, any text which was to be included as "word of the Buddha" had to be imported under certain legal fictions of the Buddha's authority. As the canon becomes more closed, these fictions revolve more tightly around the mythology of the Buddha himself. For instance, the Pāli canon contains texts such as the

Kathāvatthu, which by all accounts was written long after the first council. The first account of its origin was that it was recited at the Aśokan council by Moggalīputta Tissa, one of the Buddha's disciples. At a much later date, Buddhaghosa claims that despite the fact that Moggalīputta Tissa recorded it later, the ideas were composed by the Buddha himself. This discussion was instigated by the Vitaṇḍa school which objected to the inclusion of this the *Kathāvatthu* into the canon because it was "settled by Tissa Moggalī's son, two hundred and eighteen years after the Buddha's Parinibbāna[.] Hence, it is [merely] the word of his disciples. Reject it."[14]

> When the Supreme Buddha… came to the Kathāvatthu.… Now when he laid down the table of contents he foresaw that, two hundred and eighteen years after his death, Tissa, Moggalī's son, seated in the midst of one thousand bhikkhus, would elaborate the Kathāvatthu to the extent of the Dīgha Nikāya, bringing together five hundred orthodox and five hundred heterodox Suttas. So Tissa… expounded the book not by his own knowledge but according to the table of contents laid down, as well as by the method given, by the teacher. Hence the entire book

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14 James P. McDermott, "Scripture as the Word of the Buddha," *Numen* 31, no. 1 (1984): 30.

became the word of the Buddha.[15]

We can see that as time went on and the idea of the canon in Theravāda became increasingly centered around the Buddha, the strategies of legitimation became more focused on his exclusive activities. Thus, early on, there were three types of strategies of legitimation: 1) appeal to existing collections, 2) appeal to the Buddha and those whom the Buddha has authorized, 3) appeal to the Buddha alone.

The first group of Buddhists to fully utilize these strategies of legitimation were those who established the *abhidharma*. The *abhidharma* arose from what were once mere lists of topics *(mātṛkā)* on which the Buddha preached. There are a number of *mātṛkā* texts in the canon itself. One of these is the *"Saṅgīti sutta"* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*. There, Śāriputra notes the disarray that the Jain religious order is in over the teachings of their founder, so he gathers the monks together to rehearse the seminal teachings of the Buddha. Eventually the books containing such lists became a genre of their own and were given canonical status. While it appears that all Buddhists in Early India acknowledged the canon as consisting of a collection of sūtras and a collection of monastic rules, not all of the schools,

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[15]*Ibid.*

however, agreed that the *abhidharma* should be a separate collection with the status of word of the Buddha. Indeed, in the *mahāpadesas* listed above, a text could be considered as word of the Buddha if it was found in *sūtra* or *vinaya* -- no mention is made of *abhidharma* even though those who memorize *mātṛkā* are mentioned as one of the sources of authority. As Davidson has pointed out, it was not long before this third class of specialists wanted to, "enjoy the same doctrinal, monastic and social privileges as the specialists in the other two literary genres."[16]

A number of scholars have noted that those schools that utilized an *abhidharma* collection did so either with the understanding that it was compiled by one of the Buddha's top disciples, Mahākaśyapa or Kātyāyana, or with the understanding that it was taught by the Buddha himself to his mother in Tuṣita heaven immediately after his enlightenment.[17] I would like to add to these sources of legitimation that by their very nature as topical catalogues, the *abhidharma* lists could easily argue that they manifested in *sūtra* and appeared in *vinaya*.

The concern of the early *abhidharma* to demonstrate scriptural proximity can not only be seen from canonical texts such as the Saṃgīti sūtra discussed above, but also

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[16]Davidson, 303.

[17]*Ibid.* 304.

from early *abhidharma* texts such as the *Dharmaskandha*. In a manuscript which was recently unearthed at Gilgit,[18] there is a portion of a Sanskrit text concerned with the twelve links of dependent-origination. What is remarkable about this text, which Frauwallner claims is among the earliest,[19] is its method of operation. For each category, the topical term is introduced and synonyms are proffered. Following that, there is a long series of scriptural quotations illustrating the term and its connections to other *mātṛkā*. The length and number of these quotations lead the reader to believe that the *mātṛka* themselves merely serve as headings for a kind of anthology or "best of the Buddhist scriptures" collection. What is equally notable is the fact that out of the texts cited not all could be located in the Pāli canon though most could be located in the Chinese Āgamas. This indicates that while at this stage of development the scriptures took primacy over the lists themselves, not all schools of

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[18] *Fragmente des Dharmaskandha: Ein Abhidharma-Text in Sanskrit aus Gilgit*, Siglinde Dietz, ed., Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen: Philologisch-Historische Klasse, third series, no. 142, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), 24-88, *passim*.

[19]Frauwallner claims that the similarities between the Dharmaskandha and the Vibaṅga of the Pāli school are too numerous and idiosyncratic to be coincidental. Therefore, the two texts date from a time prior to the split between Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda. He concludes that it is the earliest *abhidharma* text after the *Saṃgītiparyāya*. See E. Frauwallner, *Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems*, Sophie Francis Kidd, trans., SUNY Series in Indian Thought: Texts and Studies, W. Halbfass ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 17-21.

Buddhism had the same texts.

By the same token, even the later *abhidharma* texts could not innovate without showing scriptural license. A good illustration of this point is found in the arguments made by the Sarvāstivādin school of *abhidharma* to support their contention that dharmas exist in all three times (past, present, and future). What is significant for our purposes is that of the four arguments used to support what was perhaps their most radical claim the first argument is one of scriptural support.[20]

Over time, the activity of legitimation begins to work both ways. Once *abhidharma* became commonplace, it is not too difficult to see that not only did its interpretation of the contents of the canon cease to be questioned, but its summary lists came to be a way of defining the canon in terms of its ideas. The lists, therefore, became not only devices used in meditation but also powerful tools used to define the boundaries of the canon. Since canon could only tenuously be defined by its documents, these topical lists allowed the canon to be described by a circumscribed set of ideas.

We have already seen the practice of authenticating a text on the basis of its doctrinal content in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* of Yaśomitra when he adds "not opposed

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[20]T. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1922 (reprint 1988)), 77.

to *dharmatā*" to the *mahāpadesa* criteria. Under the Śrāvakayāna interpretation of this phrase, *dharmatā* is dependent-origination. Adding non-opposition to *dharmatā* as a criterion for *buddhavacana* was an important move that enabled the Abhidharmists and the Mahāyānists to sidestep the requirement of any kind of strict conformity with already existing texts. The addition of *dharmatā* also acknowledges that while the Buddha was the source of most of what we know of the *dharma*, the *dharma* which he discovered was independent of him.[21] Theoretically, at least, anyone could discover it without the aid of scripture. Thus, the teaching of dependent-origination, which was part of the Buddha's teaching becomes an independent truth. Any speech which speaks about dependent origination is then "speech of the Buddha."

Over time in *abhidharma* literature more of these fundamental lists become defining of the Buddha's teaching. The lists in these texts vary considerably yet there are some teachings that stand out as more defining of the canon than others. In early *abhidharma* six stand out as appearing in all *abhidharma* texts: the 4 noble truths, the 12 links of

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[21]See *The Book of Kindred Sayings (Saṃyutta-Nikāya)*, vol. 2, Pāli Text Society Translation Series, Rhys Davids, C.A.F., and Woodward, F.H. trans. , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1922), 21: "Whether… there be an arising of Tathāgatas, or whether there be no such arising, in each this nature of things just stands, this causal status, this causal orderliness, the relatedness of this to that.…"

dependent-origination, the five *skandhas* (or "aggregates"), the 12 *āyatānas* (or "sense spheres"), the elements and the faculties. Indeed, the *Petakopadeśa* even goes so far as to claim: "There is no sermon, no verse, no prose which is not demonstrated in one of these six [sets of] teachings."[22]

Mahāyāna, insofar as it is the branch of Buddhism that relies on Mahāyāna scriptures, defines itself against those who advocated canonical closure. From very early on, it is clear that the Mahāyāna was aware that its scriptures were under dispute.[23] The main objection was that these texts were not *buddhavacana* because they were not said by the Buddha and they contradicted the Buddha's teachings. Whether or not the Śrāvaka sects had a rigid definition of canon within their own schools, it appears that they did have a strong sense of what was *not* canonical -- a criterion which they used against the Mahāyānists. From looking at Mahāyāna responses to these objections it appears that the *mahāpadesas* were at the center of the controversy. There are a number of examples in Mahāyāna literature where a Mahāyāna author will address the objection that *buddhavacana* is that which "manifests in *sūtra*, appears in *vinaya* and does not contradict *dharmatā*". In each case the strategy in the response is similar: 1)

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[22]Natthi taṃ suttaṃ vā gāthā vā byākaraṇaṃ vā imesuma channaṃ dhammānaṃ aññatarasmiṃ na saṃdissati. *Petakopadesa*, 98.

[23]cf. McDermott, 25.

sidestep the issue of whether or not "*sūtra*" and "*vinaya*" refer to established collections of *sūtra* and *vinaya*; and 2) show that what is in the disputed *sūtras* does not contradict *dharmatā*.

For example, Asaṅga, in his *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, has the opponent make the following objection:

> This is the characteristic of *buddhavacana*, that which manifests in *sūtra*, appears in *vinaya* and does not contradict *dharmatā*. And that is not Mahāyāna because [it] teaches that all dharmas lack essence. Hence, it is not *buddhavacana*....

To this objection Asaṅga replies:

> It does manifest -- in its own Mahāyāna *sūtra* and it appears in the *vinaya* of its own *kleśas*. The *kleśas* of bodhisattvas are spoken of in the Mahāyāna. The bodhisattvas have the *kleśas* of discrimination. and because they have great and profound characteristics. And it does not contradict *dharmatā* because *dharmatā* is for the purpose of attaining great enlightenment *(mahābodhi)*.[24]

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[24]text: "buddhavacanasyedaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ yatsūtre 'vatarati vinaye saṃdṛśyate dharmatā ca na vilomayati| na caivaṃ mahāyānam, sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvatvopadeśāt| tasmānna buddhavacanamiti… avataratyevedaṃ svasmin mahāyānasūtre svasya ca kleśasya[kleśaḥ?] vinayaḥ[vinaye]saṃdṛśyate| yo mahāyāne bodhisatvānāṃ [sic] kleśaḥ uktaḥ| vikalpakleśā hi bodhisatvāḥ [sic]| audāryagāmbhīryalakṣaṇtvācca| na dharmatāṃ vilomayatyaithava iha dharmatā mahābodhiprāptaye…|"Asaṅga,

Here Asaṅga sidesteps the canonical issue by merely assuming that there is more than one canon -- one for the Mahāyānists and one for the Śrāvakas. Having said so, the criterion for the canonicity (the *buddhavacana-ness*) of Mahāyāna scriptures shifts from specific texts to a potential to teach about enlightenment -- in this matter the onus of proof rests equally on Mahāyāna and Śrāvakayāna scriptures.

This pattern is even more clearly evident in the work of Asaṅga's brother, Vasubandhu, who also brings up the *mahāpadeśas* in his *Vyākhyāyukti*. Vasubandhu argues that appeals to *sūtra* and *vinaya* are insufficient to establish a text as *buddhavacana* due to the fact that the collections of the Śrāvakayāna sects appear to be deteriorated based on the evidence of diverse recensions of the same texts. Backed into a corner, the opponent offers a last-ditch definition of the word of the Buddha:

> [Opponent:] Well then, let us say that (the Buddha's word) is that which is not discordant with what exists in the *sūtrānta* that teach the four noble truths, with (a notion of *vinaya*) as the disciplining of the afflictions and with a notion of reality as dependent origination. (P. 124b, D.

Mahāyānasūtrālammkāra, Dr. (Mrs.) Surekha Vijay Limaye, trans. and ed., Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series, vol. 94, S. Gupta series ed. (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992), 9-10. Translation mine. Notice here that the verb *avatarati* is in the present indicative tense - indicating that the text in question actually "manifests in the *sūtras*".

107a).[25]

Once the opponent backs away from confining the *sūtra* and *vinaya* to specific texts and defines them in terms of the basic ideas they contain, Vasubandhu can assert that Mahāyāna is not incompatible with that definition.

In both the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Vyākhyāyukti*, the Śrāvakayānist disputes that the Mahāyāna *sūtras* are authentic on the ground that they do not meet the three criteria of manifesting in *sūtra*, appearing in *vinaya* and not conflicting with *dharmatā*. The Mahāyāna response in both of these texts is that the specific texts are not so important. What is ultimately determinative of *buddhavacana* is whether the content conforms to reality (and is conducive to enlightenment). If, as mentioned above, the Śrāvakayāna defines the canon in terms of texts that conform roughly to the six categories mentioned above in the *Petakopadesa*, the core teaching of Mahāyāna texts is that all things are empty (meaning that they lack essence), including these categories themselves.

While emptiness is an important term in the canon, it was never an important category in Śrāvakayāna *abhidharma* cataloging. Thus, in order for Mahāyāna to gain acceptance it had to prove that the emptiness was among the ideas of the

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[25] José I. Cabezón, "Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti* on the Authenticity of the Mahāyāna Sūtras," in *Texts in Context: Traditional Hermeneutics in South Asia* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 132.

canon and therefore that the Mahāyāna scriptures were just elaborations on the canon. In addition, they had to prove that emptiness was not contrary to *dharmatā*. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were not, however, the first to defend the authority of the Mahāyāna scriptures in the face of Śrāvakayāna opposition. The first one to take up the cause was Nāgārjuna (2nd century). His approach was entirely different.

In the following, I will argue that one of the primary concerns of Nāgārjuna's major works, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and the *Ratnāvalī*, is to show that the teachings of the Mahāyāna scriptures, namely emptiness, not only fall within the scope of the canon, but that all the canonical teachings summed up in the *abhidharma* lists themselves rely on emptiness.

Western scholarship on Nāgārjuna's main work, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, has tended to focus entirely on the issues of its logical and philosophical constitution. So far no serious study has been done on Nāgārjuna's use of scripture. The only notice of this issue has been from David Kalupahana and A.K. Warder who both questioned Nāgārjuna's scholastic affiliation because he never quotes a Mahāyāna scripture and only quotes canonical scripture.[26]

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[26]see David J. Kalupahana, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way*, (Albany: State University of New York

If the accepted standard of canonicity was that an idea had to appear in the *sūtra* and the *vinaya* to be established as the word of the Buddha, that Nāgārjuna cites non-Mahāyāna canonical texts should come as no surprise. I will show that he uses logic to show that the Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness does not contradict reality *(dharmatā)* and that he uses allusions to the (Śrāvaka) canon to show that it does not contradict scripture. If he can buttress his arguments for emptiness with quotations from the canon, he has effectively shown that the teaching of emptiness is consonant with the canon. I am arguing is that Nāgārjuna goes a step farther than this use of scriptural reference to support his logic. He places emptiness in the context of the canon in such a way that emptiness becomes the most fundamental category on which all other categories are based.

Hence, (contrary to much scholarship) Nāgārjuna was not against the *abhidharma*, nor does he reject their system of categorization. In fact, he includes a number of such lists in his own work.[27] Rather, he displaces these lists in favor of the doctrine of emptiness. The potential for translation of Śrāvakayāna ideas to Mahāyāna terms is played out in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* itself in order to show that emptiness

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Press, 1986), 5.

[27] One such list has been thoroughly studied in Yukihiro Okada and Michael Hahn, "Zur Quelle der 57 Fehler in der Ratnāvalī des Nāgārjuna," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 28, no. (1985): 123-134.

is foundational to all the fundamental canonical categories. The difference between Mahāyāna and Śrāvakayāna for Nāgārjuna seems not to have been a difference of texts but a difference of readings of same text.

Jonathan Z. Smith in his now famous article "Sacred Persistence: Toward a Redescription of Canon"[28] claims that a canon is an extension of the genre of "list." What begins with an arbitrary and open-ended accumulation of myths, stories and ideas subsequently develops into a collection organized around a principle, or set of principles, which is then a "catalogue." The final stage in this development is when the catalogue itself is held to be closed. Yet as soon as there is closure there is either a breakaway tradition or the creation of a legal fiction through exegesis. Exegesis serves the function of extending the range of readings of the canon to allow for changing religious needs without admitting the openness of the canon.

From what has been discussed above, it is clear that in early Buddhism, notions of canon cannot be limited simply by the terms "open" and "closed". Nevertheless, Smith's schema allows us to distinguish a between a *catalogue* and a *canon*. The Buddhist canon was never closed in the sense of being a

[28]cf. Jonathan. Z. Smith, "Sacred Persistence: Toward a Redescription of Canon," in *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 44-50.

completed list of texts; rather, the canon under Śrāvakayāna interpretation was more like Smith's definition of 'catalogue,' a theoretically open-ended list organized around a fixed number of categories. It is the exegetical genius of Mahāyānists like Nāgārjuna and his commentator Candrakīrti that in effect extended the domain of the canon to include Mahāyāna texts by extending the scope of the abhidharmic categories (and thereby extending the scope of scriptural categories) to include emptiness. In his use of logic and textual reference, Nāgārjuna follows an already accepted practice of scriptural legitimation to reopen the quasi-closure of the canon which was the practice of the mainstream Śrāvakayānists. This reopening was facilitated through a kind of legal fiction showing that the canonical categories themselves had always relied on emptiness. By doing so Mahāyāna can claim that the "word of the Buddha" ***is*** empty.

Hence, I argue that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is not just a philosophical text but fundamentally a text engaged in Mahāyāna exegesis as well. The claim that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is an exegetical work may come as a surprise to those familiar with scholarship on Nāgārjuna. Certainly, it does not look like any of the usual forms of interlinear commentary prevalent at the time. Nevertheless, I will argue that Nāgārjuna's unconventional method is appropriate to the problem he faced -- namely, the problem of

getting Buddhists to see that the Mahāyāna truths could also be found in the canonical texts by those who knew how to look.

With this in mind, the first three chapters will characterize Nāgārjuna's use of logic -- his method of showing that emptiness does not contradict extra-textual reality *(dharmatā)*. The first chapter establishes what kinds of logical theories were available at the time of Nāgārjuna. Chapter two discusses some of the scholarship on the nature of Nāgārjuna's logic. In chapter three, I will give my own interpretation of how Nāgārjuna's arguments describe emptiness. The next two chapters (chapters four and five) discuss the implications of this logical method *vis à vis* the Buddhist canon (the *Tripitaka*). Chapter six discusses other (non-logical) allusions to canon in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and the ways Nāgārjuna places those allusions relative to one another in the text in order to suggest a particularly Mahāyāna reading strategy. This chapter will establish that the opening verses of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* can be seen as a model for such placements in other chapters. Through these engagements with logic and scriptural allusion this study establishes how Nāgārjuna demonstrates that the Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness is Word of the Buddha.

Chapter 2: The Logical Milieu

In order for the doctrine of emptiness to satisfy the criterion of not contradicting reality *(dharmatā)*, it must be shown to be in accordance with the doctrine of dependent-origination, and this must be done apart from apeal to scripture. In the philosophical milleau of second century India, it was widely acknowledged that there were other means of proving a point. The two most important for the Buddhists were perception *(pratyākṣa)* and inference *(anumāna)*. Nāgārjuna uses the latter to make his case that emptiness does not contradict reality, and in doing so engages in a mode of discourse common to all schools of Indian philosophy -- Hindu, Buddhist and Jain. By investigating in such a manner, his resulting claims will not be merely sect specific, but universal.

By far the majority of the work that has been done today on Indian logic has been on Indian Logic after the sixth century, i.e., beginning with the works of Dignāga. Scholars of Indian logic, have therefore become comfortable with this later theory and often freely employ useful concepts from this later vintage to understand logical works prior to Dignāga. Nāgārjuna, however, lived long before Dignāga and Dharmakīrti[1] and so terms like "invariable concomitance"

[1] Here, I will take the generally accepted date of the second century

(*vyāpti*, or *avinābhāva*), and *svabhāva-sambandha* were not yet articulated. Thus, in order to talk about the nature and function of Nāgārjuna's logic, we will first have to describe the types of logical theory that existed around the time in which he wrote. This chapter will establish that pre-Dignāga century Indian logic texts were working toward producing epistemologically significant proofs through the manipulation

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for Nāgārjuna. For an anotated bibliography of works discussing Nāgārjuna's date see David S. Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhamaka School of Philosophy in India*, vol. VII, fasc. 1, A History of Indian Literature, J. Gonda ed. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), note 11, pp. 4-6. A fuller discussion of these theories can be found in K. Satchidananda. Murty, *Nāgārjuna*, National Biography Series, (Delhi: National Book Trust, 1971). In this book, Murty gives three common reasons supporting the second century date. First of all, most of the sources agree that one of the Śātavāhana kings was the friend to whom Nāgārjuna's letter, the *Ratnāvalī* is addressed. The reign of the Śātavāhana kings came to an end in 218 C.E., thus giving us one end of a bracket. Second, Murty notes that all of the sources agree that he was a great commentator of the Prajñāpāramitā literature, and was a devotee of Amitābha Buddha. In light of the fact that the earliest possible authorship and popularization of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (the first of the Prajñāpāramitā texts) and the *Mahāsukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra* (the first of the Amitābha texts) is around 100 C.E., this provides us with a lower extreme. The third piece of evidence that places Nāgārjuna in the second century is the fact that many sources attribute the renovation of the Amarāvati stupa to him. If he was indeed responsible for this, then archaeological information would confirm a date sometime in the latter half of the second century and the first half of the third, as the stupa was reconstructed then. While some of his evidence is problematic (for instance, there is no reason to assume that the Amitābha cult began with the texts devoted to him, nor can we assume based on one verse in the *Suhṛlekkha* and some late legends, that Nāgārjuna was a *devotee* of Amitābha), most scholars agree that Nāgārjuna wrote sometime in this period.

More recently, Shohei Ichimura has reexamined the evidence for the date of Nāgārjuna, and has come up with the earlier dates of 50-150 C.E. by connecting him with Rudradāman, (see Shohei Ichimura, "Re-Examining the Period of Nāgārjuna: Western India, A.D. 50-150," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 40, no. 2: 1073-1079, and *idem*, "The Period of Nāgārjuna and the *Fang-pien-hsin-lun* (or *Upāyahṛdayaśāstra*)," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 43, no. 2: 1033-1028.

and systemization of older categories that had been devised in the context of public debates. Further, these proofs fall into two types, monotonic and non-monotonic inferences. In this chapter, I will first discuss the development from the early logic texts to the later ones, and then will discuss Claus Oetke's assessment of early Nyāya as a variety of non-monotonic reasoning. Finally, I will give my own assessment of non-Nyāya theories of inference as advocating (if not actually achiving) monotonicity, and show the affinities Nāgārjuna has to this kind of logic.

The most important extant sources of logic prior to Nāgārjuna's time are two Sāṃkhya works (the *Caraka Saṃhitā*[2]

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[2] Priyavat Sharma suggests dates for Caraka sometime between 5th cent. B.C.E. and 2nd cent. C.E.. Since the *terminus ad quem* is the date that is more relavant to this study, we shall focus on it. He claims that, due to doctrinal content, the *Carakasaṃhitā* is older than both the *Nyāya Sūtra* and the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, both of which he ascribes (without discussion) to the second century C.E.. Though this date seems somewhat vague in light of some questions concerning the dates of the latter two texts, it is probably not far off.

Sharma rejects the claim of Sylvan Levi that Caraka was the court physician for Kaniṣka (*ca.* second cent.) on the grounds that 1) Kaniṣka associated only with Buddhists, 2) Caraka was (by tradition) a mendicant and would not have accepted the,"bondage of a royal court" (p. ix), and 3) Aśvaghoṣa never mentions Caraka who would have been his colleague. While it is true that Aśvaghoṣa does not mention Caraka by name, he does mention Ātreya, the author of the kārikā-s on which Caraka comments. (see Asvaghosa, "The Buddha-karita of Asvaghosha," in *Buddhist Mahâyâna Texts* (1894; New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1969), 9. Hence, our best guess is that the *Caraka Saṃhitā* and the logical theories on which it comments were extant *circa* the time of Nāgārjuna. [see, Agnivesa et. al., *Caraka Saṃhitā: Agniveśa's treatise refined and annotated by Caraka and redacted by Dṛḍhabala (text with English translation)*, Jaikrishnadas Ayurveda Series, vol 36 (Banarass: Chaukhambha Orientalia, 1981), 1:vi-viii].

and the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣagaṇya[3]), the Buddhist *Prayogasāra*[4]

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[3] There is a great deal that is not known about this work and its author. First of all, the name of the author there are a number of different versions: "Vārṣagaṇya," "Vṛṣagaṇa," "Vṛṣagaṇavīra," "Vārṣagaṇa." For a discussion of the identity of this author see, Gerald James Larson, and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, *Sāṃkhya, A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosphies, vol. 4, C. Potter ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 131-135. In this chapter, I will use the first of these spellings.

Larson also writes concerning the date of Vārṣagaṇya: "Regarding the date of Vārṣagaṇya, it would appear that Frauwallner's suggestion that he lived around 300, errs on the side of being too late. Frauwallner's reconstruction of the revised form of the *ṣaṣṭitantra* need not be the work of Vārṣagaṇya himself but may well be, rather, the work of the "followers of Vārṣagaṇya" (the *vārṣagaṇāḥ* of *Yuktidīpakā*). Vārṣagaṇya himself, then, might be placed back in the second and possible even the first century of the Common era, a date that would correlate nicely with the reference to Vārṣagaṇya in the *Mokṣadharma*. Also, an early date for Vārṣagaṇya would make plausible Vācaspati Miśra's claim in his *Tattvakaumudī* (under SK 47) that the expression "*pañcaparvā avidyā*" is attributable to Bhagavan Vārṣagaṇya, an expression that appears, interestingly as the twelfth utterance in the *Tattvasamāsasūtra*, and is quoted, even more interestingly, at XII.33 in Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* (from the first century of the Common Era)." [*ibid*., 136].

In addition to the discussion quoted above, even if Vārṣagaṇya had lived around 300, as Frauwallner claims, the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* that is attributed to him is not claimed to be an original work, but rather a redaction of the fundamental doctrines of the Sāṃkhya tradition, and thus much of its material should be ascribed an earlier date than that of its redactor.

[4] There are two possible titles of this work. In this chapter, I will be refering to it primarily as the *Prayogasāra* following Oberhammer. An alternate title is *Upāyahṛdaya*. Tucci does not give an exact date for its authorship, but notes that it was translated twice into Chinese. The first time was by Buddhabhadra of the Eastern Tsin (no longer extant), and the second time was by Ki Kia Ye during the Northern Wei [Giuseppe Tucci, *Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Gaekwad Oriental Series, (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929), xi]. The *Prayogasāra*'s claim to antiquity comes primarily from its being attributed to Nāgārjuna himself. This attribution, however, has been a matter of debate. In 1925 Ui critically edited and translated the work into Japanese, (in his *Studies in Indian Philosophy* (in Japanese)) and concluded that the work was not authored by Nāgārjuna, but by a Hīnayāna Abhidharmist. This conclusion was challanged in 1984 by Yuichi Kajiyama

and the *Nyāya-Sūtra* of Akṣapāda/Gautoma. These are the texts which are the first to lay out something like the five membered syllogism which would later become the standard.

First of all, let me define how I will use the word "syllogism." In early Indian philosophy, knowledge is secured through a defined number of "means of correct knowledge" or "*pramāṇa*". Though there is considerable debate in later literature as to the number and nature of these *pramāṇas*, all of the schools of Indian philosophy agree on two of the *pramāṇas* -- sensory perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). Loosely speaking, it is the latter of these two that, when spoken, can be a syllogism. Furthermore, by "syllogism", I mean a sequence of steps that must be taken to arrive at a proposition that was formerly in doubt from information about which one is not in doubt. Many of the modern interpreters of Indian logic have adopted the word "syllogism" for the early Indian versions of this sequence of rational establishment. I will also adopt this practice only after prescribing what is to be meant by the term in the early Indian context.

Such care needs to be taken because the English term is heavily weighted toward the Aristotelian definition. In fact, many English dictionaries define this term in exclusively Aristotelian terms. For example, the first definition

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who claimed that Nāgārjuna was indeed the author. (my source for this information is Shohei Ichimura (1995) 1033.)

according to the *American Heritage Dictionary* is "[In] *Logic*. A form of deductive reasoning consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion; for example, *All men are foolish* (major premise), *Smith is a man* (minor premise), *Therefore, Smith is foolish* (conclusion)."[5] Clearly, this is an example of the *Barbara* mode of the first figure of Aristotle's *Prior Analetics*. This, however is an example, not a definition. Aristotle himself defines the word, συλλογισος as follows:

> A syllogism is a form of words in which, when certain assumptions are made, something other than what has been assumed necessarily follows from the fact that the assumptions are such. By 'from the fact that the assumptions are such' I mean that it is because of them that the conclusion follows; and by this I mean that there is no need of any further term to render the conclusion necessary.[6]

What is central to the Aristotelian syllogism is the notion of necessity -- that certain conclusions follow apodicticly from the premises *with no additional information being required*. There are four forms that this kind of

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[5]*American Heritage Dictionary - New College Edition*, second ed., s.v. "Syllogism."

[6] Aristotle, *Aristotle I: The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics*, The Loeb Classical Library, E. H. Warmington (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 201-203.

inference can take and these are laid out in the four forms of the "first figure". These forms are represented symbolically as follows[7]:

$$\frac{Aab \cdot Abc}{Aac} \quad \frac{Aab \cdot Ebc}{Eac} \quad \frac{Iab \cdot Abc}{Iac} \quad \frac{Iab \cdot Ebc}{Oac}$$

Where the capital letter is the *quantifier*[8] and the small letters are the *terms* related either by the function of *inclusivity* (*x* belongs to *y*) or by the function of *predication* (*x* is *y*). A stock example of an Aristotelian syllogism is similar to that quoted in the *American Heritage Dictionary*:

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

∴ Socrates is mortal

Aristotelian logic requires that both the first and second sentence of this syllogism be *premises* (i.e., made up of one term predicated of another term). Furthermore, there must be at least one general term among the premises.

Whereas the understanding of the nature and function of the syllogism remained relatively unchanged in the West until the nineteenth century, the same cannot be said for the corresponding idea in India. For this reason, we must avoid

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[7] This schematic representation of the four syllogisms can be found in: J. Lear, *Aristotle and logical theory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 2.

[8] A= "all *x* are *y*", E="no *x* are *y*", I="some *x* are *y*", O= "not all *x* are *y*".

using assumptions specific to the Western definition of a syllogism, especially the specific assumption that all syllogisms involve the kind of categorical necessity that is displayed in the Greek syllogisms.

In his article, "A Contribution Toward The Indian Vāda Tradition,"[9] Gerhard Oberhammer presents a detailed textual history of pre-Dignāga Indian logic. He claims that the traditions of logic in India developed out of an earlier tradition of debate. What he is primarily interested in is the fate of the ancient debate (*vāda*) manuals. While no such manuals exist as independent texts anymore, Oberhammer claims that we can infer their existence from redactions incorporated into later texts as their dialectical categories were commandeered in order to buttress the more epistemological theories of logic.

Oberhammer claims that there were three directions in which the ancient debate categories developed. The first vāda tradition is seen in the list of categories in the *Carakasaṃhitā*[10] (*vimānasthāna* 8. 26-66) whose members were

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[9] Gerhard Oberhammer, "Ein Beitrag zu den Vāda-Tradition Indians," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 7, (1963).

[10] see Agniveśa, (1981), 359. These categories are (*ibid.*): "...*vādaḥ, dravyam, guṇāḥ, karma, sāmānyaṃ, viśeṣaḥ, samavāyaḥ, pratijnnā, sthapanā, pratiṣṭāpanā, hetu, dṛṣṭāntaḥ, upanayaḥ, nigamanam, uttaraṃ, siddhāntaḥ, śabdaḥ, pratyakṣam, anumānam, aitihyam, aupamyaṃ, saṃśayaḥ, prayojanaṃ, savyabhicāraṃ, jijñāsā, vyavasāyaḥ, arthaprāptiḥ, saṃbhavaḥ, anuyojyam, ananuyojyam, anuyogaḥ, pratyanuyogaḥ, vākyadoṣaḥ, vākyapraśaṃsā, chalam, ahetuḥ, atītakālam, upālambhaḥ, parihāraḥ,*

reduced and re-categorized into the 16 categories of *Nyāya Sūtra* chapters one and five.[11] The second branch of the *vāda* tradition broke off from what would become the Caraka tradition and ended up as the eight categories of the *Prayogasāra* (or *Upāyahṛdāya*).[12] These categories of debate were again reduced and re-categorized into the categories of the *Yogacārabhūmi* and *Abhidharmasamucchaya*. Oberhammer believes that the third branch comes from a source outside the other two. This tradition is characterized by the use of the term *tarka* to refer to argumentation, and Oberhammer claims it to have been connected with the Sāṃkhya tradition as exemplified in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, among other texts.

Whether or not Oberhammer's specific reconstruction of

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pratijñāhāniḥ, abhyanujñā, hetvantaram, arthāntaram, nigrahasthānamiti||"

11 Gautama, *The Nyāyasutras with Vātsyāyana's Bhāsya and Extracts from the Nyāyavārttika and the Tatparyatika*, 2nd ed., Mahāmahopadhyāya Gaṅgadhara Śastri Tailanga ed., Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1984), 2. (Hereafter I will refer to this work as "Gautama, *edition*, ..." to avoid confusion with the translation of this text by Jhā which was published in the same year = "Gautama, *translation*, ...") "pramāṇa prameya saṃśaya prayojana dṛṣṭānta siddhāntāvayava tarka nirṇaya vāda jalpa vitaṇḍā hetvābhāsa cchala jāti nigrahasthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niśreyasādhigamaḥ|"

12 Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Texts*, ("*Upāyahṛdāya*"), 4-5: "ato vādanayapratipādanārthaṃ prapañcocchedanārthañcaite 'ṣṭavidhā gambhīrāḥ sadvādadharmāḥ saṃkṣepato mayā kathyante| dṛṣṭāntaḥ siddhānto vākyapraśaṃsā vākyadoṣaḥ pramāṇaṃ prāptakālavākyaṃ hetvābhāso vākchalam|" "Thus in order to explain the way of discourse and in order to cut off (mental and verbal) proliferation these eight-fold profound dharmas of true speech are briefly expounded by me: example, doctrine, lauditory speech, faulty speech, means of knowledge, speech at the proper time, fallacy of reason, and fickle speech." [Translation mine.]

the development of the Indian *vāda* tradition is accurate is not important for the present purpose. What is important is that he has shown that the historically early texts (the *Carakasaṃhitā*, and a section of the *Prayogasāra*) arose out of a kernel -- a traditional list of categories used for discussing debates. Oberhammer claims that these lists are loosely organized, and that the later texts which include these categories reorganized this earlier material.

This development is significant because we know from evidence in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* that Nāgārjuna knew at least some of the *Nyāya-Sūtra*[13] and so it can be inferred that he lived sometime toward the later part of this development. While Nāgārjuna was certainly aware of the *Nyāya-Sūtra*, there is no indication that he necessarily gave his assent to any of their theories. We have to assume, as a working hypothesis, that he had all of the logical theories of his day at his disposal, and that he adopted what was useful for his purposes. Since we don't know exactly which texts were available, it is useful to look to Oberhammer for the overall patterns of development and trends which might indicate what

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[13] Oberhammer discusses this issue at length in "Ein Beitrag." This discussion is continued in: Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, ""On the Relationship between Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and the *Nyāya Sūtras*," *Journal for Indo-European Studies* 5, no. 3 (1977): 265-273, and in: Johannes Bronkhorst, "Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13, (1985): 107-132. What is important for the purposes of discussion here is only that Nāgārjuna knew chapters one and five, a fact which is agreed upon by all concerned.

was available.

In the following, I would like to re-examine some of the material that Oberhammer deals with in order to suggest that there were two main developments in syllogistic theory which can be shown in these early texts. One focuses on the "reason" member of the syllogism (*hetu*) and the other focuses on the "example" member of the syllogism (*dṛṣṭānta*).

As Oberhammer points out, the rudimentary lists of the *vāda* tradition were bent to the end of epistemological theory by reducing its dialectic categories into non-dialectical ones through the act of re-categorization. For the time being, I will call the categories dealing with the dialectical dimension of an argument (proposition, rebuttal, admission of defeat, etc.) the "macro-level," and the dimension dealing with the individual arguments used by one side of the debate (i.e., a syllogism) the "micro-level." In terms of this terminology, the restructuring that took place during this period was a reading of the the macro level categories into the micro level.

Though most of the re-categorizations that Oberhammer mentions are theoretically unimportant, there is one that seems to be pivotal -- the re-categorization of the category "rejoinder" (*uttara*) and its subcategories "similarity" and "dissimilarity." "Rejoinder" first appears in the Carakasaṃhitā's categories dealing with proof. These

categories are: thesis, establishment, counter-establishment, reason, example, correlation, conclusion, rejoinder, theory.[14] Oberhammer claims that this list is representative of the kernel debate topics its author received from tradition.

In this list, and in the commentary on its members that follows, the syllogism proper is defined in two parts. The first part is the thesis itself, and the steps used to establish this thesis is the "establishment," which has in turn four parts.

> *Sthāpanā* (establishment) is establishing the same proposition [*pratijñā*] on firm footing with the help of *hetu* (reason), *dṛṣṭānta* (instance), *upanaya* (correlation) and *nigamana* (conclusion). First there is proposition and then establishment, because what can be established in absence of proposition? For instance, 'self is eternal' - this is proposition, reason is - 'because of not being created' ["*akṛtakatvād*"]; instance is - 'as the sky' ["*yathā 'kāśam*"]; correlation is - 'as the sky is uncreated and is eternal so is 'self'; conclusion is - 'therefore, self is eternal' ["*tasmānnitya*"].[15]

Even in this most rudamentary text, there is an

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[14] "pratijñā, sthāpana, pratisthāpana, hetu, dṛṣṭāntaḥ, upanayaḥ, nigamanam, uttaraṃ, siddhāntaḥ" for full quote see above, footnote 10.

[15] Agniveśa, (1981), 360, trans. Sharma. I have inserted some important Sanskrit terms from Sharma's edited text *(ibid.)* in brackets.

understanding of the logical theory behind the syllogism. Here the syllogism establishes its thesis by appealing to a connection. The connection is appealed to in the reason. Hence, in the definition of inference in the *Carakasaṃhitā*:

> "Anumāna (inference) is the reasoning (*tarka*) relying on a logical connection[16] (*yuktyapekṣa*); just like *agni* (is known) by ability of digestion, strength by the ability to exercise, sounds etc by the grasping of words etc." [etc.]."[17]

The Sanskrit of the above passage is somewhat ambiguous in so far as the word *yukti* can mean either "reason" or "connection". The context of the examples, however, favors the latter reading as does the fact that, as a modifier of *tarka, yukti* would be redundant if it held the former meaning[18].

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[16] Sharma translates this compound "invariable concommitance." However, this is a common translation for "*vyāpti*," and hence prejudices the reading of this sentence toward a term that is yet to be established. I have chosen the translation "logical connection" playing on the ambiguity of the Sanskrit "*yukti*" meaning both to "connection" and "reason".

[17]Translation mine. Text: "Athānumānam - anumānaṃ nāma tarko yuktyapekṣaḥ; yathā - agniṃ jaraṇaśaktyā, balaṃ vyāyām aśaktyā, śrotrādīni śabdādigrahaṇenetyevamādi." *Ibid.*, 363.

[18]The problems with this definition were pointed out by Uddyotakara (*circa* sixth century) who assumes that *tarka* here is the Nyāya use of the term as an indirect proof. "Lastly those people, who hold that Hypothetical Reasoning [*tarka*] is only that Inference which depends upon yukṭi, admit by this same assertion that it is different from Inference pure and simple. '*Yukṭi*'' *[sic]* being the same as 'proof', what the assertion of these people means is that 'Hypothetical Reasoning is cognition depending on possibility of proof'; so that this involves a

The *Carakasaṃhitā* claims that, "hetu (reason/cause) is the cause (kāraṇa) of understanding (upalabdhi), it is direct perception, inference, tradition, and analogy. What is understood by these reasons/causes is reality."[19] For Caraka, the "example" functions merely to give rhetorical emphasis to the connection between the locus and the inferendum established through the reason. Caraka claims the following:

> Dṛṣṭānta (example) is that which establishes understanding (buddhi) in both the fool and the wise. It describes what is describable [yo varṇyaṃ varṇayati]. For instance: fire is hot, water is wet, earth is stable and the sun is an illuminator. Just as the sun is an illuminator, so too the Sāṅkhya is also an illuminator.[20]

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difference in names only (from our own view). If by '*yukṭi*' you do not mean 'proof', then, it behooves you to explain the exact signification of the word '*apēkṣā*', 'dependence', as occuring in the compound '*yukṭyapēkṣam*'; that is to say, you have to explain what it is upon which the Inference depends in the bringing about of the cognition of its Subject." Gautama, *The Nyāya-Sūṭras of Gauṭama with the Bhāṣya of Vāṭsyāyana and the Vārṭika of Uḍḍyoṭakara, translated into English With Notes from Vāchaspaṭi Mishra's 'Nyāya-Vārṭika-Ṭāṭparyaṭīkā', Udayana's 'Parishuḍḍhi' and Raghuttama's Bhāṣyachandra*, Mahāmahopaḍhyāya Gaṅgānāṭha Jhā trans., (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 455-456.

Uddyotakara's discussion of this term, despite what was probably a misunderstanding of the term *tarka* in the context of the *Carakasaṃhitā*, leaves open the possibility that reasoning (*tarka*) depends on *yukti* (a *sambandha* - seven of which are discussed in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*).

[19] Text: "Atha hetuḥ - hetur nāmopalabdhikāraṇaṃ; tat pratyakṣaṃ, anumānam, aitihyam, aupamyamiti; ebhir hetubhir yad upalabhyate tat tattvam. (Agniveśa, (1981), 361.) Translation mine.

[20] *Ibid.*, 361.

Compared to the exhaulted role given to the reason (i.e., "that which makes reality known"), the example seems secondary. This is further indicated by the fact that the example given is a metaphorical example and not a real case where knowledge occurs.

The *Nyāya Sūtra* gives a different role to reason. It defines the members of the syllogism as follows (Van Bijlert's translation)[21]:

> "The members [of the syllogism] are: thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion. (*Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.32)....
>
> The thesis means indicating what is to be demonstrated [sādhya] (*Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.33)....
>
> That [property, probans] which demonstrates the probandum is the logical reason [hetu] in so far as the same property [the probans] occurs in the example. (*Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.34)....
>
> [also] insofar as that property [ie the probans] does not occur [in a contrary example]....(*Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.35)
>
> A generally-accepted fact which possesses the

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[21] Vittorio A. Van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority: The Development of Epistemology and Logic in the Old Nyāya and the Buddhist School of Epistemology with an annotated Translation of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtika II (Pramāṇasiddhi) VV. 1-7*, 20, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, E. Steinkellner ed. (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wein, 1989), 21-29.

property [to be demonstrated, the probandum] of the [subject] is a [valid] example [in the syllogism] in so far as the same property [the probans being a known property] of the subject occurs [in the generally-accepted fact]. (*Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.36)....

Or the example is contrary in so far as the [the generally-accepted fact constituting the example] is contrary [ie a generally-accepted fact which does not posses the probandum is a valid contrary example in so far as the probans does not occur in it either]. (*Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.37)....

The application of the subject is [its] summing up based on the [positive and contrary] examples: either [something] is thus [the case], or it is not (*Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.38)

"After [again] pointing out the reason, the repetition of the thesis [becomes the conclusion [of the syllogism] (*Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.39).

There are a number of differences between the presentation of the five members of the syllogism in the *Nyāya Sūtra* and the similar presentation in the *Carakasaṃhitā*. First of all, the *Nyāya Sūtra* employs special terminology to account for the sub-members of each member of the syllogism[22] while the *Carakasaṃhitā* does not. Thus, the

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[22]Most of the terms that I am about to discuss exist in the *Nyāya Sūtra*

first member of the syllogism in the *Nyāya Sūtra* consists of two sub members. Pakṣilasvāmin calls these *dharma* and *dharmin*. *Dharma* (lit. "quality") is that which is to be proven. *Dharmin* is that which possesses the *dharma*; it is the locus wherein the quality to be proven is found. An alternate term for this is *sādhya* or "what is to be proven". An alternate term for the *dharmin* is *pakṣa* (lit. "wing").

The *Nyāya Sūtra* presents a more unified version of the syllogism by explaining how these sub-units cross-reference to one another. The example is a case in point. *Nyāya Sūtra* (1.1.34) states, "the reason is the means of establishing what is to be established (*sādhya*) by virtue of its similarity to the example."[23] Already this member of the syllogism is defined in terms of two other members. By the same token, the example establishes the connection between the *sādhya* and the *dharmin* (= *taddharmabhāvī*). Similarly, the application ("*upanaya*") in the *Nyāya Sūtra* like the reason is defined as a conclusion "based on the example" (*udāharaṇāpekṣa*).

The explanation of example (*dṛṣṭānta*) given in the *Nyāya Sūtra* goes on in the next two verses to describe positive and negative kinds of examples while the *Carakasaṃhitā* mentions

verses themselves. However, it would be difficult to see them without the help of the commentaries. The sub-members that I will present here, then, are terms that have come from different time periods, but the basic ideas are certainly there in the original verses.

[23] Gautama, *edition*, 40: "udāharaṇa sādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam|"

only one kind of example. Later, we will see that the change from one example to two examples changes the nature of the syllogism.

Thus, while both the *Carakasaṃhitā* and the *Nyāya Sūtra* advocate the same set of five members of a syllogism, they give different weight to different members. Caraka gives the most weight to the reason in so far as the reason provides the actual evidence originating from the four valid sources of knowledge that confirm the presence of that which is to be proved in the locus where it is said to exist. The example in the *Carakasaṃhitā* is merely a rhetorical device to reinforce the evidence of the reason. The secondary nature of the example in the *Carakasaṃhitā* is further supported by the fact that one of the examples that he gives is a metaphor ("as the sun illuminates so does Sāṃkhya). In the *Carakasaṃhitā* therefore, only one kind of example is necessary.

In the *Nyāya Sūtra*, on the other hand, the example is the main member of the argument and the other members are subordinate to it. The purpose of the example is to present a commonly accepted case where there is concommitance between two terms. For example, if I assert that there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the *udāharaṇa* (illustration) would be to state that in everyday life (such as in a kitchen) fire and smoke are known to occur together, and cases where fire never occurs (such as in a lake) smoke never

occurs.

After the brief definition of "establishment", the *Carakasaṃhitā* defines *pratiṣṭhāpana* (counter-establishment), which is essentially the counter-argument given by the opponent. Next, more detailed definitions are given for each member of the syllogism. Immediately following a definition for "correlation" and "conclusion" the next *vāda* category is introduced - "*uttara*" (rejoinder). Rejoinder is defined as follows:

> Rejoinder is the statement of dissimilarity when the reason given is similarity, or the statement of similarity when the reason given is dissimilarity.[24]

Notice that the initial list of the *Carakasaṃhitā*, in contrast to the initial list of 16 categories in the *Nyāya Sūtra* is little more than a loosely organized list of topics relevant to debate. There are terms that belong to the syllogism proper (thesis, reason, example, correlation, and conclusion) interspersed with terms used to describe the dialectical movement of a debate (establishment, counter-establishment, and rejoinder). In short, we have terms for both a micro level and terms for the macro level.

Later texts seem to distribute these macro level terms onto the micro level. For example, the *Prayogasāra* only lists

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[24] Text: Agniveśa, 361: "uttaraṃ nāma sādharmyopadiṣṭe hetau vaidharmyavacanaṃ, vaidharmyopadiṣṭe vā hetau sādharmyavacanam|" My translation.

one of the syllogism members in its initial list of *vāda* categories - example (*dṛṣṭānta*). It appears that the author of the *Prayogasāra* (or, at least, the author of its earliest strata[25]) thought that the example was the most important member of the syllogism. Later in the text, the issue of rejoinder (*uttara*) is discussed and like the *Carakasaṃhitā* it is defined in terms of similarity and dissimilarity. However, whereas in the *Carakasaṃhitā* the rejoinder was defined as similarity and dissimilarity *to the reason*, in the *Prayogasāra*, rejoinder is similarity and dissimilarity related to the example. Thus, instead of similarity and dissimilarity being the characteristics of separate arguments, the *Prayogasāra*'s arguments function by using examples of similarity and dissimilarity. In Oberhammer's words:

> Through [the observation that similarity and dissimilarity are connected to the example] the development of these concepts will be still more meaningful than in the *Caraka [Saṃhitā]* and it confirms the conjecture that for these terms it is not a question of the two aspects of the *udhāharaṇam*, but rather about an argumentation schema on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity

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[25] Oberhammer discusses the evidence which suggests that the Prayogasāra is actually a composite text. (Cf. Oberhammer, "Ein Beitrag," 75-81.)

> to an example. Exactly in this way one should also interpret the concepts of *sārūpyam* and *vairūpyam* in the *Yogācārabhūmiḥ*. Not only are they argumentation schemata occupying the same stage with the subsequently mentioned means of knowledge *[pramāṇa]*, they likewise are ennumerated as the means of *yuktivādaḥ* [debate] as well.[26]

Oberhammer notes that the members of the syllogism in the *Carakasaṃhitā* are loosely connected and seem to be virtually independent of one another. He claims that the *Nyāya Sūtra* gives an account of a stronger connection between terms by defining the reason in terms of the example. I would like to add that in the strengthening of the connections between terms, the *dṛṣṭānta* seems to have internalized the notions of similarity and dissimilarity from the rejoinder.

While Oberhammer is right in pointing out that the reason is more organically connected with the example in the *Nyāya Sūtra*, that it makes the reason subsidiary to the example makes it lean more toward the *Prayogasāra* than to the *Carakasaṃhitā*. Furthermore, that the *Nyāya-Sūtra* uses the categories of *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* on the micro-argument level (specifically in the example), while the *Carakasaṃhitā* keeps these terms on the macro-level of argument confirms this affinity. Once the categories of similarity and

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[26] Oberhammer, "Ein Beitrag," 84. My translation.

dissimilarity have been appropriated into the micro level of argument, the *Nyāya Sūtra* (characteristically) prohibits its former use by defining "*jāti*" ("fallacious argument") as "objections by means of similarity and dissimilarity."[27]

If one of the early trends in Indian logic was to distribute the terms similarity and dissimilarity into the example, there is another tradition that comes to us from this early period that seems to have not followed this trend. The other tradition is early Sāṃkhya as found in the *Ṣaṣitantra*. In it, we find that the members of the syllogism are defined much in the same way that they are in the *Carakasaṃhitā*.

> The thesis *(pratijñā)* is the assertion of what is to be proved. The reason *(hetu)* is the statement of the connection (of the assertion) with evidence *(sādhana)*. The example is the illustration *(nidarśana)* of that. The correlation *(upasamhāra)* is the uniting of what is to be proved and the example. The conclusion *(nigamana)* is the repetition of the thesis.[28]

Notice, however, that in this definition, there are no

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[27] Gautama, *edition*, 58: "sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṃ pratyavasthānaṃ jātiḥ|"

[28] Text: Agniveśa, 360: "tatra sādhyāvadhāraṇaṃ pratijñā, sādhanasamāsavacanaṃ hetuḥ, tannidarśanaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ, sādhyadṛṣṭāntayor ekakriyopasaṃhāraḥ, pratijñābhyāso nigamanam iti…" Translation mine.

macro-level categories. The *Ṣaṣitantra* seems to have removed them from its discussion without adding anything to the example member. What happens to the rejoinder? It is difficult to say for certain, because the text that has been reconstructed is merely a fragment of what was presumably a larger text. Hence, possibly it existed elsewhere, or, alternately, the text was only concerned with the micro-level.

In light of the fact that the two categories of similarity and dissimilarity were first used in the *Carakasaṃhitā* to denote characteristics of the opponents objection, it is reasonable to ask whether these terms were also recatagorized in the *Ṣāṣṭitantra*. In the *Nyāya-Sūtra*, we know the rejoinder got re-catagorized into the example because of the disappearance of the category of rejoinder and by the appearance of something that was not in the original list -- the positive and negative examples. Following this pattern, one could speculate that the appropriation of these categories of similarity and dissimilarity would be in the new categories of the direct *(vīta)* and the indirect *(āvīta)* syllogism in the *Ṣaṣitantra*. In the *Ṣaṣitantra*, direct and indirect arguments are defined in terms of whether or not the argument is based on its own thesis or whether it is based on the opposing thesis. If similarity and dissimilarity are appropriated anywhere into the logical scheme of the

Ṣaṣitantra, it seems that the argument being one's own (*svarūpa* - the term used in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* for *sādharmya*) and irrespective of another's thesis (*parapakṣam avyapekṣya*) is roughly the same as being equal to one's own argument and arguing by negating the opposite thesis, is roughly the same as being opposed to the other side.

From what has been said so far, we can conclude the following: 1) that the original *vāda* categories included terms describing arguments on both the macro-level (debate) and on the micro-level (syllogism) interspersed 2) later traditions tried to re-categorize these terms in such a way as to reduce the categories of the macro- to the micro-level 3) one variation included the categories of *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* into the category of examples, while the other, removed these categories from the macro-level and introduced two kinds of syllogisms, direct and indirect.

By defining reason and example in the same way as the *Carakasaṃhitā*, the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* allows for the emphasis of the syllogisms to be placed on the reason and example evenly. The theory that seems to be behind this articulation of the syllogism is that the heart of any inference lies a connection *(sambandha)*. In Vārṣagaṇya's compilation of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*[29] (a Sāṃkhya work) there is the most explicit in

[29] in Erich Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre Klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 2, (1958): 84-139.

its definition of inference as the employment of a connection.

> Anumāna is the establishment of what remains from direct perception due to a *(ekasmāt)* relationship *(sambandha)*.[30]

In the same passage, the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* claims that it is by this connection that one may infer what *is not* seen by appeal to a previously known connection between what *is* seen and something which is not seen but which must be there for the connection to hold.

> Concerning these (connections), inference is due to some connection the (perceptible) remainder of which is the cause of the establishment of the imperceptible thing to which it is connected.[31]

So important was the notion of logical relationships that the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* contained a list of seven possible relationships which provide the basis for inference.

> The relation *('brel pa = sambandha?)* of connected things is sevenfold: [Relation] 1) by means of the property *(dṅos po - artha[32])* of property and

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30 Ibid., 123: "saṃbandhād ekasmāt pratyakṣāc cheṣasiddhir anumānam."

31 Ibid., 240: "de dag la ji ltar <srid pa bźin> 'brel pa gcig las <mṅon sum las> lhag pa ni mṅon sum ma yin pa'i 'brel pa can grub pa'i rgyu gaṅ yin pa de rjes su dpag pa'o|| "

32 In context, we can assume, as does Frauwallner (who translates this *artha* as *Verhältnis*), that the property is a relationship.

property-owner like a king and his servant or like *Puruṣa*[33] and the *prakṛti*. 2) by means of the property of original state *(raṅ bzin =prakṛti)* and the changed thing - like milk and curd or the *prakṛti* and *Mahat* etc. 3) by means of the property of (material) cause and effect like a chariot and its parts or like the *prakṛti*[34] etc. 4) by means of the property of (efficient) cause and effect[35] like a potter and a pot or like *puruṣa* and the instigation[36] of *prakṛti*. 5) by means of the property of a totality[37] and its contents like a tree and its branches, etc. or like the great (elements) and sound, etc.. 6) by means of the property of unification like ducks[38] or like *guṇas* etc.. 7) by means of the property of the one who harms the one who is harmed, like a snake and the weasel (or

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[33] *gtso bo daṅ skyes bu*. *Gtso bo* could translate either *ātman*, *guṇa*, or *pradhāna* (= *prakṛti*). In the context, either *guṇa* or *pradhāna* would be acceptible although the latter makes more sense.

[34] *sñiṅ stobs* could mean either *prakṛti* or *guṇa*.

[35] Frauwallner reconstructs this phrase as "*nimittanaimittikabhāvaḥ*".

[36] Frauwallner has *Tätigkeit* for *'jug pa*, which is not correct in context.

[37] Reading *tsam po*, along with Frauwallner, as *mātra*.

[38] *ṅor pa*. Frauwallner reads this as *ṅor ba*, which means "the grunting of pigs"; *ṅor pa*, on the other hand means "duck" (Sanskrit *Cakravāka*). Monier-Williams explains that, "the couples are supposed to be separated and to mourn during the night." [Monier-Williams, s.v. "*Cakravāka*."]

mongoose)[39] or like parts and *prakṛti* etc. which has parts.[40]

Claus Oetke sees these seven relationships as exemplifying inferences themselves,[41] but it is clear from the discussion which follows them that these relationships are the instruments by which inferences are made. As such, when the sample syllogisms are stated the reason manipulates the connection implicit in the thesis, while the example shows what the relationship is like.

The significance of the "example-based development" as found in the *Nyāya Sūtra* has been discussed by Claus Oetke in his article, "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Non-

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[39] Chandra Das also gives the translation "stone-fox." see, Das, Sarat Chandra. *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, 1995, s.v. "Sbre."

[40] Translation mine. Text: "'brel pa rnams kyi don rnams kyi 'brel pa ni rnam pa bdun ñid de| nor daṅ bdag po'i dṅos pos daṅ| rgyal pa daṅ bran bźin daṅ| gtso bo daṅ skyes bu bźin te| raṅ bźin daṅ rnam 'gyur gyi dṅos pos ni| źo daṅ 'o ma bźin daṅ| gtso bo daṅ chen po la sogs pa bźin no|| 'bras bu daṅ rgyu'i dṅos pos ni| śiṅ rta daṅ yan lag bźin daṅ| sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa bźin te| rgyu mtshan daṅ rgyu mtshan can gyi dṅos pos ni| rdza mkhan daṅ bum pa bźin daṅ| skyes bu daṅ gtso bo'i 'jug pa bźin no|| tsam po daṅ tsam pocan gyi dṅos pos daṅ| yal ga la sogs pa daṅ śiṅ bźin daṅ| sgra la sogs pa daṅ 'byuṅ ba chen po bźin na|| lhan cig spyod pa'i dṅos pos ni| ṅur ba lta bu daṅ| sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa bźin no|| gnod bya gnod byed kyi dṅos pos ni| sbrul daṅ sbre mo bźin daṅ| yan lag daṅ yan lag can du gyur pa'i sñiṅ stobs la sogs pa bźin no||" Ibid.

[41] "The *Ṣaṣṭitantra* presents, however, the problem that he wording of the text does not make explicit what precisely has to be the initial information serving as the basis of inference and what exactly are the propositions to be inferred. If we take only the first "mundane" example exemplifying the connection of "master and his belongings" quite a large number of possibilities emerge as alternative reconstructions of the inference concerned...." Claus Oetke, "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Non-Monotonic Reasoning," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 24, (1996): 517, note 2.

Monotonic Reasoning." There, he argues that the main difference between classical (Western) syllogisms and ancient Indian syllogisms is that Western syllogisms are monotonic while Indian syllogisms are not. Oetke's use of this distinction relies on the work of R. Cartwright[42] who claims that the classical (Western) syllogism always has the qualities of reflexivity, dilution, and transitivity. It is this second criterion that he claims the Indian syllogism most noticeably lacks. Dilution is defined as follows:

> 'Dilution' amounts to the demand that if any set of sentences/propositions implies a proposition any set consisting of the propositions of the original set plus additional propositions (any superset of the original set) implies that proposition too. Formulated in terms of premises and conclusions one could also say that if any set of premises implies a conclusion the implicational relationship is preserved under any enlargement of the amount of premises.[43]

In other words, for any proposition, any expansion of the proposition to apply to the terms of its subsets is equally valid. Expanding the number of cases that apply under

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[42] Cartwright, R. 1987. *Philosophical Essays*. (The MIT Press). Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England, as cited in Oetke, 1996.

[43] Oetke, "Ancient Indian Logic," 452.

the original proposition in no way affects the truth of the original proposition. The ability to account for an expanded number of cases is referred to as the quality of "monotonicity." In the case of the classical Greek syllogism, since mortality is inherently a part of humanity, one could extend the number of additional minor terms out to infinity (Socrates is a man, Diogenes is a man, Bob is a man… etc.) and all of them would still necessarily be mortal. This is because the first premise of the syllogism explicitly states that "*All* men are mortal." The Western syllogism, then, is monotonic.

In the Indian syllogism, there is no explicit theory of quantification to give the syllogism the same monotonic character. For instance, common example of an early Indian five-membered syllogism runs as follows:

Thesis: There is fire on the mountain

Reason: Because of smoke

Example: Just like a kitchen/not like a lake

Correlation: This mountain has smoke

Conclusion: Therefore fire is on the mountain

According to Oetke, this kind of inference functions differently from a categorical proof in that it assumes certain default conditions. In the case of the syllogism above, smoke is a sign of fire under what he calls "normality conditions." In specifying these default conditions, these

logicians wanted to assume that a number of conditions were not present.

Oetke tries to show that all of the syllogisms of the earliest strata of theories concerning the nature of inference in India assume a certain number of normality conditions - conditions that, if violated, render the syllogism invalid. For instance, if I see smoke on a mountain directly after a rainfall, I might also infer the presence of wet wood - which produces smoke even if there is no longer any fire.[44] One could imagine an almost infinite number of conditions such as "absence of wet wood" which must be fulfilled before one could be sure that inferring fire from smoke were true. The fact that these syllogisms, unlike the categorical syllogisms, require default conditions that are not themselves implied in the syllogism means that the number of additional cases to which the syllogism can be extended is necessarily limited to cases covered by the default. For this reason, according to Oetke, these syllogisms are non-monotonic.[45]

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44 Indeed, the problem of how to exclude such exceptions (*upādhi*) from an inference was an abiding interest of Navya-Nyāya. Steven H. Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of "New Logic"*, (La Salle: Open Court, 1995), 142-146.

45 Phillips independently arrives at the same conclusion. In his analysis of the "fire-syllogism" he concludes the following in reference to Nyāya interpretation of it:

"The logic is deductive, although the premises are arrived at inductively. The reasoning is, then, defeasible or non-monotonic. That is to say, new information can affect the warrent of the general premise

Oetke further points out that the appendation of default conditions onto an inference also effects the transitive property of the syllogisms involved - taking them further from the realm of the classical Western syllogism. The greater the number of default conditions the less transitive the arguments become. In other words, as the number of necessary conditions increases the probability that the statement is true decreases. The truth functionality of the series of propositions becomes more a function of the combination of default conditions and less a property of what is argued.

Non-monotonicity is not necessarily a drawback. In fact, it is a strength when applied to certain situations. The "fire on the mountain" syllogism is fundamentally different from the "All men are mortal" syllogism in that it is an "argument from deficiency"; we infer that fire exists on the mountain based on one empirical fact (that I see smoke on the mountain) and one implicit assumption (that there is no reason why fire could not be on the mountain). Clearly, this kind of syllogism is more conducive to empirical reasoning or scientific inquiry than is Aristotle's. In fact, we often use inference in many cases where we cannot know all of the

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- i.e., the premise expressing invariable concommitance, or (literally) "pervasion," vyāpti, between two things x and y… Reasoning based on an assumption of vyāpti can in principle be defeated. The Naiyāyikas here as elsewhere are fallibilists; pervasions are only fallibly known." [Ibid., 55].

possibly relevant facts. These are cases of "reasoning under incomplete information"[46] as opposed to categorical claims which are reasoning under a surplus of information. In these cases, we must do the best we can with the information that we have and try in some way to make known the conditions under which we must re-evaluate the situation. In short, we do not forget that we have made certain assumptions (or "facts on loan from reality") that, if they turn out to be incorrect, change the validity of the inference.

A non-monotonic logic is one that must always be open to the possibility of its own fallibility. While Oetke claims that some of the inferences of the *Ṣāṣṭitantra* and the *Carakasaṃhitā* are prone to failure due to conceivable alternate scenarios, it is only in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* that he finds the issue specifically addressed. In *Nyāya Sūtra* 2.1.37, the opponent raises the objection that inference cannot be a means of right knowledge because that which is adduced to be the mark implying something else may be due to other causes. For example, if I see clouds upstream and I notice that the river where I am is swelling, I can infer that it rained upstream. The opponent objects that the fact that the river is swelling is not necessarily related to prior rainfall upstream; an alternate explanation is that the river downstream may be dammed. The clouds in this case

[46] Oetke, "Ancient Indian Logic," 455.

become irrelevant. The dam down stream would be a condition the absence of which is necessary in order to infer rain from the swelling stream.

Oetke sees the warrant for the default conditions (which are subject to revision) as the function of the "example" and "correlation" members of five-membered syllogism. The example, then:

> "...possesses the function of giving an empirical foundation and justification of (relevant) normality-assumptions. The fourth member [the correlation], on the other hand, can be understood as expressing the claim that the entity which is concerned in a particular case fulfills the relevant normality conditions.[47]

Oetke argues that theoretical self-understanding of inference in India changed greatly over time, and that we can understand those changes by looking at how the issue of default conditions is articulated. Oetke claims that there is a marked historical progression of theoretical understanding that occurs in three historical stages, of which two are relevant to this study.[48] He claims that these different theories of the syllogism were developed to deal with

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[47] Ibid., 479.

[48] The advent of the third stage occurs in the writings of Dharmakīrti (6th cent) who is too late to be of relevance to this study.

different kinds of problems as they arose in the history of Indian philosophy.

Type one is the theory that we have been discussing -- that the *inferendum* and the reason are related to one another under general normal conditions.

> ...the state-of-affairs constituting the evidence and the state-of-affairs forming the conclusion exhibit types such that states-of-affairs of the first type do not occur without the occurrence of state-of-affairs of the latter type under normal circumstances (or circumstances which are considered to be normal).[49]

Oetke notes that at this time, although acceptability criterion are applied, they are not explicitly formulated. As such, the acceptability criterion appear to be somewhat flexible -- demonstrating what he calls "tolerant normality" conditions insofar as the negation of a proposition claimed to be true under normal circumstances would require some abnormal state of affairs.

The second stage in the development of the theory of inference according to Oetke is characterized by an "intolerant normality [normality without exceptions]". These theories consider an inference valid if *x* is related to *y* under all cases except one (namely the case of the subject at

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[49] *Ibid.*, 488-89.

hand - whose inclusion in this relationship is yet to be established[50]). Hence, this stage is marked by an acceptability criterion that admits at most one exception. The reason he gives for the transition from stage one to stage two is that the syllogisms were used not just for everyday reason, but also to adjudicate doctrinal disputes. Such doctrinal matters need to be established with a necessity strong enough to convince someone with a different set of assumptions; hence the number of default conditions had to be reduced as much as possible.

Historically, Nāgārjuna should fit into the first stage of Oetke's scheme. By all accounts Nāgārjuna lived before Dignāga, Vasubandhu, Prāstapāda, and Pakṣilasvāmin who were the earliest writers to refer to a theory of "invariable concomitance" (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva* making them part of Oetke's type two).

If we look carefully at certain statements he makes in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, however, it is abundantly clear that he (and his opponent) held his logic up to monotonic standards. In the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, the opponent objects that if his thesis is that "all things are empty of *svabhāva*" then he is guilty of a fallacy called "discordance"[51]

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[50] Oetke defines intolerant normality as $(x)\ ((x \neq p\ \&\ Hx) \rightarrow Sx)$ [*Ibid.*, 489].

[51] "*Vaiṣamikatva*" or "discordance" seems to be a variety of *hetvābhāsa* which objects that there is an exception to the rule being invoked and

indicating that it needs a special reason *(viśeṣahetu)* to explain why the thesis itself, among all the things in the world, is not empty. Although the opponent is widely assumed to be a Nyaiyāyika, the grounds on which Nāgārjuna's opponent wishes to censor him is not listed among the faulty reasons of the Nyāya. Furthermore, *prasaṅga* arguments utilizing infinite regress are used by Nāgārjuna and are not criticized by the opponent (whereas they are criticised by Nāgārjuna). This is significant, because arguments appealing to infinite regress *were* mentioned by the Nyāyas as containing faulty reasons.[52]

Regardless of who the opponent was, the idea that, if what Nāgārjuna claims is true, then there should be no exceptions (or at least, for each exception there should be an additional reason) is implicit in their objection. That the opponent does not even allow Nāgārjuna's own thesis to be an exception to the rule means that there is an expectation of complete monotonicity. Furthermore, that Nāgārjuna claims his thesis does not require a special reason (because it is

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hence the rule does not cover all the cases that it purports to cover. This is understood from the statement that consistently comes afterwards, "…and you should state a special reason for it *(tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyaḥ)*." Significantly, this fallacy does not appear in any of the early logic texts, and yet, according to the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, this is an objection of the opponent. This may indicate that there are some sources of Indian logic from this period that have yet to surface.

[52] cf. commentaries on *Nyāya Sūtra* 5.1.9: see Gautama, translation, vol. 4, p. 1686.

not an exception, i.e., it too is empty), means that Nāgārjuna understood his own argument to be monotonic. If his logic is monotonic and it certainly is not a classical Western syllogism, what kind of theoretical context must we assume in order to understand his logic?

We should not look to Indian logic as represented by the Nyāya school to understand Nāgārjuna's logic. Indeed, suggestive as Oetke's article is, his assessment of the schools of ancient Indian logic imports Nyāya standards onto the non-Nyāya (and possibly earlier) sources. While this is tempting in light of the preponderance of later Nyāya material, we must ask whether Oetke's characterization of early Indian inference overlooks the differences between the schools. By re-examining some of the evidence that he sets forth, I suggest that early Sāṃkhya logical theory offered logical possibilities Nyāya theory did not. In the next chapter, I argue that it was these possibilities with which Nāgārjuna was most familiar.

Sāṃkhya sources offer a different picture of inference from the one Oetke derives. The *Ṣaṣṭitantra* explains inference as follows:

> Some object (*artha*) is the direct perception of some sense faculty; hence, through the knowledge from what was connected to the prior group (and) due to the object which is the direct perception of a sense

faculty now, the existence of the (previously) undistinguished object is understood. For instance, having seen the connection of flames and smoke previously, due to seeing smoke (now, one) understands that fire also exists (there).[53]

The proper way to understand this paragraph is to separate the first sentence from the next two. The first sentence is the most general description of the way that inference works: inferring what is not perceivable from a perceivable part which is connected to it. The second sentence is an example of one specific kind of inference.

The typology of inferences occurs elsewhere in the same (albeit reconstructed) text. The relations between these inferences is summarized in Table 1.

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[53] "don 'ga' źig dbaṅ po 'ga' źig gi mṅon sum du 'gyur ba| de las da ltar dbaṅ po'i mṅon sum pa'i don las snar tshogs pa la 'brel pa byas pa las blos ni khyad par du ma byas pa'i don yod pa ñid du rtogs par byed de| dper na sṅar du ba daṅ me dag gi 'brel pa mthoṅ nas du ba mthoṅ ba las me yaṅ yod pa ñid du rtogs so|" A fragment of this last sentence has been preserved in Sanskrit in *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, 240 [Frauwallner's footnote, ibid., 123] "kaścid arthaḥ kasyacid indriyasya pratyakṣo bhavati, tasmād idānām indriyapratyakṣāt … aviśiṣṭasya … agner astitvaṃ pratipadyate."




Table 1

Elsewhere, we are told that inference has two purposes -- on the one hand to examine specific cases *(viśeṣato dṛṣṭam)* and on the other hand to examine general cases *(sāmānyato dṛṣṭam)*.[54] The above example belongs to the inference of specific cases. This is clear from the fact that virtually the same example (almost *verbatim* of what is said above) is given to illustrate this kind of inference.[55] There is no question that this kind of inference is non-monotonic.

General inference occurs when, after having seen smoke and fire connected many times, one infers the concomitance of

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[54]Notice that the definition of general inference here is radically different from the more common definition given in the *Nyāya Sūtra* and elsewhere.

[55]*Ibid.*, 124. Text: "gaṅ gi tshe me daṅ du ba 'brel pa mthoṅ nas du ba de kho nas me de kho na'i yaṅ daṅ yaṅ du me de kho na'di'o źes yod pa ñid du rtogs par byed pa'o"

smoke and fire in general.[56] This concomitance can then fuel two other kinds of inference: inference prior to the fact (*pūrvavat* - inference from cause to effect) and inference after the fact (*śeṣavat* - inference from effect to cause). The former is a kind of prediction and hence subject to a number of default conditions, but the latter is a kind of analysis which is, at least in the Sāṃkhya's own view analytically true. Thus, while the Nyāya admitted that all cognitions were fallible, Sāṃkhya did not acknowledge that this particular kind of inference was fallible. This may be surprising in light of the fact that the example given for inference from effect to cause is the same example of rain falling upstream as is discussed at *Nyāya Sūtra* 2.1.37-38. This same example is in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*:

> Due to that the inference from priority *(pūrvavat)* is fallible. The inference from remainder *(śeṣavat)*, if it is well thought out, is not fallible.[57]

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[56] "rjes su dpag pa ni rnam pa gñis te| bye brag mthoṅ be daṅ spyi mthoṅ ba'o|| de la khyad par mthoṅ ba ni| gaṅ gi tshe me daṅ du ba 'brel pa mthoṅ nas du ba de kho nas me de kho na'i yaṅ daṅ yaṅ de me de kho na 'di'o źes yod pa ñid du rtogs par byed pa'o|| spyir mthoṅ ba ni gaṅ 'ga' źig tu du ba daṅ me 'brel par mthoṅ nas dus phyis du ba tsam mthoṅ ba las me spyir rjes su dpog pa'o|"

Frauwallner trans. "Davon liegt Sehen dem Besonderen nach vor, wenn man Feuer und Rauch verbunden gesehen hat und nun immer wieder durch denselben Rauch dasselbe Feuer als vorhanden erkennt, (indem man denkt:) "Das ist eben dieses Feuer". Sehen dem gemeinsamen nach liegt vor, wenn jemand einmal Rauch und Feuer verbunden gesehen hat und nun in späterer Zeit durch das Sehen des bloßen Rauches Feuer im allgemeinen erschlißt." (*Ibid.*, 128)

[57] *Ibid.*, 128. text: "de la sna ma daṅ ldan pa'i rjes su dpag pa ni

While it is easy to imagine situations (as the Nyāya opponent does in *Nyāya Sūtra* 2.1.37) which would invalidate a *śeṣavat* syllogism, the Sāṃkhya thought that if the analysis was well thought out, the syllogism would be a true case of inference,[58] hence, their explicitly stated standards were monotonic standards (i.e., not admitting exceptions).

Significantly, it is only general inference after the fact *(sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānaṃ śeṣavat)*, which, when verbalized, utilizes the five-membered syllogism. This means

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'khrul pa'o|| lhag ma daṅ ldan pa rnam par dyad [sic] pa daṅ bcas pa ni 'khrul pa med pa'o|" *rnam par dyad pa* is clearly a typographical error. The word should be *rnam par dpyad pa* = *vicāra*, (*dpyad pa* is perfect or future tense of *dpyod pa*) which would be a translation of *wohl überlegen*.

[58] Later Naiyāyikas concur. Pakṣilasvamin writes:

"…when one infers that 'the Rain-god' has rained in the regions above the river', from the fact that the river is full, he does so, not by merely percieving *a rise in the river*, but by percieving that the water previously existing in the river has become qualified (augmented) by rain-water, that the velocity of the stream has increased, and that the stream is carrying along in its course flakes of foam, fruits, leaves and logs of wood.… Thus, then, it is clear that when a person tries to infer, from the perception of an *un-qualified* thing, something that can be inferred from the perception of a *particular qualified thing*, the fault lies with the inferring person, not with the Inferrence." (Gautama, *translation*, 2:802-803.)

Implied in this discussion is the idea that while we say that we infer rain upstream from the fact that the river is swollen with excess water, what we mean is that we infer rain upstream from the presence of river-swelling *qualified as rainwater* - i.e. having a host of other features (velocity, flotsam and jetsam, etc.) which lead one to conclude that this is not damwater but rainwater. Note that still no one item is necessary and sufficient to make the inference, rather we infer based on a collocation of elements, some of which may or may not be present in any given case depending on the specific conditions.

Uddyotakara dismisses the question altogether, saying that the phrase "*anumānam apramāṇam* " is a contradiction in terms. (see Gautama, *translation*, 800.)

that according to Sāṃkhya understanding a syllogism must be necessarily true (monotonic) or else not be a valid syllogism. Whether this is actually the case or not, the two kinds of syllogism (direct *vīta* and indirect *āvīta*) are inferences not of common sense (as in *sarvatantra-siddānta*) matters, but of Sāṃkhya doctrine (a *pratitantra-siddhānta*). Thus, within a text that belongs to the first historical strata that Oetke presents, we find the same logical theory describing a doctrinal syllogism and a common sense one.

The above argument does little to disprove Oetke's claim that common sense syllogisms are non-monotonic, but it at least suggests that, even in the earliest strata of Indian history, syllogisms dealing with doctrinal matters were considered to be monotonic. Let us examine one of these syllogisms.

There are two kinds of *śeṣavat* syllogism, direct *vīta* and indirect *āvīta*. It is the verbalized forms of the direct and indirect inferrences that employ the five membered syllogism.[59] The members are defined as follows:

> The thesis *(pratijñā)* is the assertion of what is to be proved. The reason *(hetu)* is the statement of the connection (of the assertion) with evidence *(sādhana)*. The example is the illustration

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[59] "vītasya vākyabhāvaḥ pañcapradeśaḥ, pratijñā hetur dṛṣṭānta upasaṃhāro nigamanam iti." (Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre," 125.)

(nidarśana) of that. The correlation *(upasamhāra)* is the uniting of what is to be proved and the example. The conclusion *(nigamana)* is the repetition of the thesis.[60]

The illustration that this work gives for a syllogism is significant in that it is not as formulaic as later formulations as can be seen from the *Ṣaṣṭitantra's* discussion the negative syllogism:

> If the arising of the Manifest *(vyakta)* occurs in [something] non-existent, then unity results from a lack of an origin. Due to the lack of primary matter *(pradhāna)*, the Manifest, which is only a generality, is without distinctions. Why? Because of the priority of a generality to particularity. Priority of generalities are distinctions seen in the world. It is just like the prior status of milk which is the absence of curds, whey, diluted curds, fresh butter, clarified butter, buttermilk, and condensed[61] milk. When there is non-existence there is no prior thing which exists; something which is prior to particular manifestations *(vyakti)* should

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[60]Text: "tatra sādhyāvadhāraṇaṃ pratijñā, sādhanasamāsavacanaṃ hetuḥ, tannidarśanaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ, sādhyadṛṣṭāntayor ekakriyopasaṃhāraḥ, pratijñābhyāso nigamanam iti…." *Ibid.*

[61]*kilāṭa* and *kūrcikā* both seem to mean "inspissated milk". cf. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, s.v., "*kilāṭa*" and "*kūrcikā*".

> exist. Therefore, <it follows> only the generality is the Manifest which is without distinctions. This is not, however, the case. Therefore, the Manifest does not occur in the non-existent. Consequently, this Manifest occurs from primary matter.[62]

The looseness of the syllogism notwithstanding, all five members of the syllogism can be easily located, and when this paragraph is compared with that of the direct syllogism, a definite pattern of argumentation emerges. The first sentence of this paragraph, "If the arising of the Manifest *(vyakta)* occurs in [something] non-existent, then unity results from a lack of an origin," merely sets up the initial false assumption from which the negative proof will proceed, and it is not one of the five members of the syllogism itself. It is in the next sentence that we find the thesis [in *italics*]: "Due to the lack of primary matter *(pradhāna)*, *the Manifest, which is only a generality, is without distinctions*". The thesis is followed by the rhetorical question, "why?" (*kasmāt*), which introduces the reason. Next comes the reason, which asserts the connection of the thesis to the evidence.

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[62] Text: "yadi vyaktasyāsata utpattiḥ, yonyabhāvād ekatvaprasaṅgaḥ. pradhānābhāvāt sāmānyapūrvakatvād viśeṣāṇām. sāmānyapūrvakā hi loke viseṣāḥ [sic]… dṛṣṭāḥ, tadyathā kṣīrapūrvakā dadhimastudrapsanavanītagṛtāriṣṭa-kilāṭakūrcikābhāvāḥ. na tu asati bhāvaḥ kaścid asti, yat pūrvakā vyaktiviśeṣāḥ syuḥ. tasmāt sāmānyamātram idaṃ vyaktaṃ nirviśeṣam ity etat <prasajyate>. na tu idaṃ tādṛk. tasmān nedaṃ vaktam asata utpadyate. pāriśeṣyāt pradhānād evedaṃ vyatam utpadyate…." (*Ibid.*, 126.)

The reason here states that the general thing is always in a relationship of priority to the particular things. The example begins with a general statement and then a specific illustration: "Priority of generalities are distinctions seen in the world. It is just like the prior status of milk which is the absence of curds, whey, diluted curds, fresh butter, clarified butter, buttermilk, and condensed milk." The next sentence brings the issue of *nirviśeṣa* (which is what is to be proved) together with the issue of priority (from the reason and example): "When there is non-existence there is no prior thing which exists; something which is prior to particular manifestations *(vyakti)* should exist." The next sentence concludes by restating the thesis - "Therefore, <it follows> only the generality is the Manifest which is without distinctions (*nirviśeṣa*)."

The last sentence in the illustration exposes the false supposition of the syllogism ("if the Manifest occurred out of nothing") and states the positive conclusion; "However, this is not the case. Therefore, the Manifest does not occur in the non-existent. Consequently, this Manifest occurs from primary matter."

This syllogism is clearly different from the "fire on the mountain" syllogism in that the relationship *(sambandha)* between the general thing and the particular manifestation which is employed in the reason is entailed in the concept of

prakṛti. The relationship between milk and its by-products is *by definition* the distinctive aspect of the relationship between *prakṛti* and its manifestations (*a la* relationship number two listed above). This relationship is necessarily true even if we come to learn of the principle by examining a number of cases such as the one in the illustration. This leads us to suspect that some of the inferences discussed in Sāṃkhya theory might be analytical inferences and thus be necessarily true.

If this were the case, we should expect that at some time Sāṃkhya would come up with terms for analytical inferences in addition to the ones they already have for synthetic inferences. We can find some of these in the *Carakasaṃhitā*.

One difference between the *Carakasaṃhitā* and the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is that while the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* has a definite classification of inferences, it is not at all clear what the different types of inferences are in the *Carakasaṃhitā*. The three types of inference, *pūrvavat, ṣeṣavat* and *sāmānyodṛṣṭā* mentioned in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* and later mentioned in the *Nyāya Sūtra* (as well as in the *Prayogasāra*) are not found in the *Carakasaṃhitā*. Despite this, we do find two other candidates for inferences mentioned: *arthāprāpti* and *saṃbhāva*, which according to Caraka's explanation seem to be kinds of inferences. In the *Carakasaṃhitā* these terms appear somewhat

randomly among the topics, yet we know from the *Nyāya Sūtra* (2.2.1) that some considered them to be pramāṇas in their own right. While there is no reason to assume that the *Carakasaṃhitā* considers them to be *pramāṇas*,[63] the suspicion that they may be kinds of inference is strengthened by the fact that the *Nyāya Sūtra* subsumes both of them (along with absence - *abhāva*) under the *pramāṇa* of inference.[64] If they are indeed inferences, then their descriptions make them out to be analytic inferences.

We will examine each of these in turn. *Caraka* 48 says:

> The term '*arthaprāpti*' means that by the saying of one object (*artha*) there is also the establishment of another object (*artha*) which is not said.[65]

This definition is similar to that given for "*arthāpatti*" in the *Nyāya Bhāṣya* on *Nyāya Sūtra* 2.2.2.

> "*Arthāpatti*" is the 'occurrence' from the 'meaning'.

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[63]It was, in fact, the Mīmāṃsikas who considered these to be *pramāṇas*.

[64]According to Uddyotakara (Jhā, vol. 2, 890), both *arthāpatti* and *saṃbhava* are instances of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference.

[65]Sharma, *Carakasaṃhitā*, 364. "arthaprāptir nāma yatraikenārthenoktena-aparasyārthasyānuktasyāpi siddhiḥ|" This term was also important in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, but in a decidedly different sense - it is an assumption without which an object which is seen or heard cannot be understood. cf. Mīmāṃsābhāṣya 12, 4-5 (quoted in Yuichi Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣa of Mokṣākaragupta*, 10, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, vol. 10, (Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1966), 38) "*arthāpattir api dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vârtho 'nyathā nôpapadyata ity arthakalpanā*" It is in this sense that the term is taken up in Mokṣākaragupta.

Occurrence is an attainment i.e., an entailment. When one artha is being said the other concept that is entailed is "*arthāpatti*." For example when it is asserted that there is no rain when there is no clouds', what is implied is that 'there is rain when there is clouds."[66]

The meanings of the two terms are close enough for us to consider them synonymous. The example here is the inference from the negation of one thing to the presence of its opposite. Uddyotakara took the assertion of opposition as the characteristic trait of this kind of inference, and while this fits the examples given in both the *Carakasaṃhitā* and *Nyāya Sūtra*, his definition seems too restrictive for the definition given in both places. The definition in the *Carakasaṃhitā* amounts to the fact that in a given statement, a number of other propositions are entailed.

Saṃbhava, the other kind of inference found in both the *Carakasaṃhitā* and *Nyāya Sūtra*, seems to follow in this same vein, although here we run into some disagreement in definition between our two sources. In the *Carakasaṃhitā* this is an inference somewhat like a cross between *pūrvavat* and *arthāpatti* of the Nyāya.

Saṃbhava (source of origin) is that from where

[66] Translation mine. Text: Tailinga, 100 :"Arthāpatti arthādāpattirarthāpattiḥ| āpattiḥ prāptiḥ prasaṅgaḥ|| yathā 'bhidhīyamāne 'rthe yo 'nyaḥ prasajyate so'rthāpattiḥ|"

> something is originated such as the six *dhātus* of a foetus, (use of) unwholesome things of disease, and (that of) wholesome things of health.[67]

Under this interpretation, the inference here seems to be one that relies on a connection that has been empirically established. In the Pakṣilasvāmin's *Bhāṣya*, however, we get an entirely different reading:

> We have [*saṃbhava*], when the cognition of the presence of one thing arises from the cognition of another thing which is invariably concomitant with the former; e.g. when the existence of the measure of two seers and a half is deduced from the cognition of the Quarter Maund measure.[68]

He gives another definition as well:

> Similarly what happens in the case of [*saṃbhava*] is that, the Composite and the Component being related to one another by the relation of invariable concomitance (avinābhāvin), the cognition of the former gives rise to the cognition of the latter;

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[67] Translation, Sharma, *Caraka*, 364. Text [Ibid.]: "*yo yataḥ saṃbhavati sa tasya saṃbhavaḥ; yathā - ṣaḍdhātavo garbhasya, vyādherahitaṃ, hitamārogyasyeti*|" .

[68]Jhā, 882. Text, Tailinga, 100: "*sambhavo nāmāvinābhāvino 'rthasya sattāgrahaṇād anyasya sattāgrahaṇam| yathā droṇasya sattāgrahaṇādāḍhakasya sattāgrahaṇam āḍhakasya grahanātprasthasyeti*|"

and is only a case of inference.[69]

Doctrinal debates require deductive inferences more so than do common sense inferences. Clearly, by the definitions given above, *arthāprāpti* and *saṃbhava* constitute kinds of inference that deduce propositions entailed in larger concepts. They are analytically true, *a priori*.

This history of early Indian logic reveals that from the rudimentary lists of debate categories in the earliest texts two types of logical theories evolved. The first is best represented by the *Nyāya Sūtra* which uses both positive and negative examples to demonstrate the relationship between the reason and that which is to be proved. This type of syllogism is more conducive to what Oetke calls "non-monotonic" logic. The second type of syllogism places equal weight on the reason and the example (or perhaps it weighs more heavily toward the reason) and it does not use positive and negative examples. While Sāṃkhya reasoning acknowledges non-monotonic possibilities, it also claims that some inferences are error free (i.e., necessarily true or monotonic). Further, this tradition allowed for the possibility of analytic inferences *a priori*. Finally, whether or not the Sāṃkhyas actually

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[69]Translation, Jhā, 886. text: "tathā cārhāpattisambhavābhāvāḥ vākyārtha-saṃpratyayenānabhihitasyārthasya pratyanīkabhāvād grahaṇam arthāpattir anumānameva| avinābhāvavṛttyā ca sambaddhayoḥ samudāyasamudāyinoḥ samudāyenetarasya grahaṇaṃ sambhavaā tadapyanumānameva|

succeeded in their necessary inferences, we know from the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* that such expectations were put onto Nāgārjuna's logic and were the expectations that he tried to live up to.

Chapter 3: Scholarship Review

In order for an inference to be necessarily true, the inferred must be implied by the very notion of that from which it is inferred. For example, if I say that the wooden thing over there is a tree because it is an oak, the basis of my reason is that the larger category is implied by the smaller category in which it occurs. While something like this principle is at work in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, none of his inferences are quite so straightforward. In the oak tree example just referred to, if something is an oak tree that implies that it is a tree. The reverse, however, cannot be claimed. Not every tree is an oak tree. The terms that Nāgārjuna investigates are symmetrical in the way this is not. For example, in his first chapter a cause implies the existence of an effect and vise versa. Put in terms of Sāṃkhya logical theory (which, incidentally, is not a categorical logic), the relationship *(sambandha)* on which the reasons rely is a relationship of *reciprocal implication*, like that which exists between a chariot and its parts (relationship #3 in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*). It is due to this kind of relationship that Nāgārjuna feels justified in claiming that its relata are neither the same nor different.

This chapter looks at some of the scholarship that has been done on the theory that Nāgārjuna's logic involves some

kind of reciprocal implication. This review, while by no means exhaustive, will provide a representative sample of the kinds of opinions that are available in order to suggest what work needs to be done.

The idea that some kind of reciprocal implication is at the heart of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's* method is certainly not new, though the idea has gone through a number of revisions over the years. There have been three main techniques used to explain his use of reciprocal implication - with most scholars employing a combination of these techniques.

The first type of technique used to investigate Nāgārjuna's logic involves translating his arguments into Western symbolic logic and describing the way that his logic functions in Western logical terms. The reason for doing this was an understanding that discussion of Buddhist logic in Western languages allowed alien presuppositions to creep in from the Western languages themselves. For this reason, a "neutral" language was needed. The first to apply this method to Nāgārjuna was Stanislaw Schayer in 1933, who represented the logical method of the Mādhyamika as follows:

> If Nāgārjuna sets forth the thesis [in] Karikā 14.5b: *yat-pratītya ca yat, tasmād anyan nopapadyate* = that which is dependent on something, contrary to that it cannot be another, thus is that the clear

paraphrase of the symbolic formula: $(x,y).xRy.\supset.\sim(x \neq y)$ = for all values of the variable *x* and *y*, if *x* stands in relation to *y*, then it is false that *x* and *y* are not be identical with one another.[1]

Here, he asserts that there is some relationship *R* that is fundamental to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* that does not allow for any kind of differentiation between the relata. In 1958 Nakamura Hajime carried the idea farther when he published an English version of his 1954 Japanese article entitled, "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means of Symbolic Logic" where he amended Schayer's formula to exclude the possibility of related phenomena being identical:

> However, the "Mādhyamaka-śāstra" throughout asserts that two things which are mutually related to each other are not one and also at the same time not different. Thus the theory of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) that is the basic standpoint of the "Mādhyamaka-śāstra" can be expressed as follows: $(x,y).xRy.\supset.\sim(x \neq y).\sim(x=y)$.[2]

Which reads, "for all *x* and *y*; if *x* is related (R) to *y*

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[1] Stanislaw Schayer, "Über die Methode der Nyāya-Forschung," in *Festschrift Moriz Winternitz* , ed. Otto and Gampert Stein Wilhelm, (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1933), 250.

[2] Hajime Nakamura, "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means of Symbolic Logic," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 7, no. 1 (1958): 7-8.

then *x* cannot be different than *y* and *x* cannot be identical to *y*." Thereafter, quite a number of scholars adopted this type of analysis. A few scholars using the logical approach have tried to articulate what exactly "R" is using symbolic terms. One scholar who has done so is Ng Yu-Kwan. Ng reconstructs the relationship of dependent origination from 2.7:

> "If now the coming to pass which is devoid of a passed entity does not take place, then, in turn, where will the passing entity be without the coming to pass?"

Let p be the passed entity, q be the coming to pass, we can write:

$\sim p \supset \sim q$, $q \supset p$ (first half of the verse)

$\sim q \supset \sim p$, $p \supset q$ (second half of the verse)

According to the fundamental definition of the Material Implication, we can have

$p \supset q \bullet q \supset p \bullet = \bullet\ p \equiv q$

Hence the passed entity and the coming to pass are equal to each other. *This means not that both have the same contents, but rather that both have the same possibility of existence, i.e., both simultaneously exist, or do not exist.* This is the relation of dependent co-existence. This could by all means be understood in connection with the basic

> Buddhist doctrine of dependent-origination (pratītyasamutpāda). That is, all entities, as phenomena, are devoid of substance, or svabhāva, and cannot exist independently; they can only assume their existence through dependence on others. [*italics* mine][3]

In the italicized section above, Ng makes an important distinction. We are not so much concerned with the *content* of *p* or *q*, but rather the *"possibility"* of *p* or *q*. *P* is possible if and only if *q* is possible. The bi-conditional that he uses to describe the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's* method would perhaps more accurately be expressed using modal logic rather than indicative logic, thus something like:

$$\Diamond p \equiv \Diamond q \text{ or even } \Delta p \equiv \Delta q$$

where "◊" expresses "is possible" or "is self-consistent." and "Δ" is "is necessary.[4] The distinction is important; as we will see in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, a father becomes a father if and only if he has a child. But if the child dies the father does not necessarily die. Rather, it is the possibility of a child which arises *necessarily* with the

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[3] Yu Kwan Ng, "The Arguments of Nāgārjuna in the Light of Modern Logic," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 15, no. (1987): 363 - 384.

[4] Cf. Clarence Irving Langford and Cooper Harold Lewis, *Symbolic Logic*, 2nd ed., (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), 123.

For a reconstruction of some of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's* arguments by means of modal logic, see R. Ghose, *The Dialectics of Nāgārjuna*, (Allahabad: O.P Vohra Publishers and Distributors, 1987), 218-229.

possibility of the father and *vise versa*. This logical relationship or relationship of possibility underlies all of the arguments in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.

The interpretations summarized above are by no means exhaustive of those who have taken this approach. I do believe, however, that the examples I have chosen are representative of approaches using symbolic logic. What these sources express through symbolic logic is the simple fact that Nāgārjuna manipulates the fact that items that are modally and reciprocally implicated do not admit of either identity or differentiation.

The caveat to this approach is that the symbolic transcriptions still need to be grounded in the theoretical understanding of logic during Nāgārjuna's day. Without such a detailed understanding the transcription into symbolic form will not take into account subtleties of the argument that a reader at the time may have taken for granted, and hence, will not be accurate. For example, in 1957 Richard Robinson declares that, "modern logic asks a greater range of questions and hence sharpens the observation of the investigator."[5] Soon after this statement, he points out that Nāgārjuna is guilty of violating the law of contraposition,[6]

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[5] R. H. Robinson, "Some logical aspects of Nāgārjuna's system," *Philosophy East and West* 6, no. 4 (1957): 294.

[6] This fallacy is of the form: $p \supset q;\ -p;\ \therefore -q$.

which, he points out, is the fallacy which contains all other fallacies. He gives three instances of the alleged violation: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 10.7, 13.7,[7] 7.17. I will quote one of these verses here:

> 13.7 If something non-empty existed, then there might be something termed empty; there is no something non-empty, and so nowhere does there exist a non-empty thing.[8]

According to Claus Oetke, the logical problems raised by this verse can be resolved if we understand what was allowable in the logic of the day. He points out that these pragmatic rules should be taken into account when we transcribe Indian logic into notational logic.

> Do we have to conclude that Nāgārjuna in fact commits the fallacy of deriving '-p → -q' from 'p → q'… This is not necessary, because the presupposition which has been obviously shared by all authors [accusing Nāgārjuna of this fallacy], namely that the *yadi*-sentences in the above cited *kārikās* are used to represent just one thought, does not hold true. The view that the writer of the *MMK*

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[7] Nakamura pointed out the fallacy of contraposition in this verse and in verse 7.17 several years before Robinson, but unlike Robinson, was interested in what might have been left out in the transcription to notational logic.

[8] Robinson, "Some Logical Aspects," 297.

violated the law of contraposition rests on a too straightforward and naive mechanism of identifying logical form of (philosophical) arguments and of transposing statements made by the use of sentences in a natural language into a logical symbolism.[9]

The rest of Oetke's article discusses the presuppositions of Indian logic that are relevant to the interpretation of the verses in question, and concludes that we do not have to read these passages in such a way that Nāgārjuna violates the law of contraposition. While his solutions to the problem are too lengthy to be included here, the warning that can be gleaned from his article is crucial: symbolic notation can be useful to express Indian logic, but notation alone cannot substitute for a thorough understanding of ancient Indian logical theory as they articulate it.

To avoid the problems of the symbolic method described above, another technique used to investigate Nāgārjuna's logic tries to ground his method in the terminology of Indian logic generally. In modern scholarship, there are a number of Sanskrit theoretical terms that have been proposed to label the relationship between terms in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Perhaps the one that is used most often is "*pratidvandvin*,"

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[9] Claus Oetke, "Pragmatic Implicatures and Text-Interpretation: (The Alleged Logical Error of the Negation of the Antecedent in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*)," *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 16, no. (1992): 196.

which literally means "opposite."[10] This term was first introduced to Western scholarship by Stanislaw Schayer as an explanation of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 13.7ab, which he translates: "If anything were not empty, there would be something empty." Onto this verse he appends the following note:

> That is the *pratidvandvin* - the principle of Mahāyāna metalogic: if A is an unreal object, then so must its opposite, the non-A, be unreal. See *Pr[sannapadā]* 287.15: *iha yo nāsti na tasya pratidvandvī vidyate*. In the *prasaṅga*-proof the opposite plays an important role.[11]

In 1967, Richard Robinson declared *pratidvandvin* ("counter-twin") to be one of the axioms of Indian philosophy. He claims that it corresponds to the European principle of the "solidarity of opposites." Robinson is careful to note, "Nāgārjuna invokes the solidarity of opposites often in the Kārikās where, it must be remembered, he is exploiting axioms affirmed by his opponent rather than

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[10] Examples given for *pratidvandvins* in the *Prasannapadā* are light and darkness, self and other. Cf. Candrakīrti, *Mūlamadhyamikakārikās (Mādhyamikasātras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. IV, Louis de la Valée Poussin ed., (1903-1913; Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 154.10: "*pratidvandvitvāt pradīpavat tamo 'pi sva-parātma gataṃ vyāpāraṃ kariṣyati.*"

[11] Stanislaw Schayer, *Ausgewählte Kapitel Aus Der Prasannapadā (V, XII, XIII, XV, XVI) : Einleitung, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, (Krakow: Nakladem Polskiej Akademji Umiejetnosci, 1931), 36, note 29.

asserting his own belief in them."[12]

David Ruegg, on the other hand, takes the *pratidvandvin* notion to be a central principle of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's* argumentation. He invokes this principle in defense of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 13.7 where Nāgārjuna has been charged with the fallacy of contraposition.

> "if we apply here the well known Mādhyamika principle of the complementarity of binary concepts and terms, what Nāgārjuna is saying becomes clear and, in terms of his system, valid: if two opposite concepts or terms stand in a relation of complementary correlation in the framework of dichotomous conceptualization - that is, if they are *pratidvandvins* (Tib. *'gran zla* or *'gal zla*) - the negation of one necessarily involves the negation of the other, without the problem of the antecedent and the consequent in a hypothetical syllogism ever arising.… We are dealing here not with a schema intended to make possible the deduction or inference of B from A, but with a nexus of complementary terms which are conceptually, linguistically and

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[12] Richard H. Robinson, "The Classical Indian Axiomatic," *Philosophy East and West* 17, no. 1 (1967): 149.

logically, but not causally, interrelated.[13]

In a similar approach, though one not using the word "*pratidvandvin*", Peter Fenner takes Ruegg's understanding one step farther in the direction of true opposition by invoking the principle of "oppositional structure of predication"; an idea he gets from Ashok Gangadean.[14]

> Given that concepts and hence thought formation depends on predication… on what does predication depend? The insight of the Mādhyamikas… is that predication arises out of an oppositional structure. This insight… says in its general form that predicates "arise in and through a formal oppositional relation."… This means that all terms are *necessarily* defined (and hence gain their meaning) with reference to what they are logically not (i.e., their logical opposite).… A and ~A are *logically* and *reciprocally* dependent on one another. Each is defined, and so comes into being, in mutual dependence (*parasparāpekṣā*) on the other.… This is a principle of definition via logical opposites: that concepts are formed in the context of pairs of

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[13] Seyfort D. Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuṣkoṭi and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5, no. (1977): 56.

[14] see, Ashok Kumar Gangadean, "Formal Ontology and Movement Between Worlds," *Philosophy East and West* 26, no. 2 (1976): 167-188.

logical opposites.[15]

While there is certainly an element in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* that resembles the theories articulated by these scholars, the concept of "*pratidvandvin*" is perhaps not the best term to articulate this element. When we look at Candrakīrti's use of the word, it becomes clear that this term applies only to a special case of reciprocal implication and even in those cases it refers not to the reciprocity of the terms, but rather to their opposition.

Candrakīrti uses the term six times in the *Prasannapadā*: once each in chapters 2, 7, 15, 16, 19, and in chapter 20. In chapters 2, 15, and 16, it occurs in paragraphs beginning with "atrāha" meaning "here it is objected... [the following]." In other words, these uses of the term are advocated by the "opponent," and so cannot be adduced to be a part of Mādhyamika argument at all. The other three instances, however, do seem to support Candrakīrti's argument. The discussion of this term in chapter 20 runs as follows:

> That which has *svabhāva* is not some category that exists. Because of the non-existence of the opposite ("*pratidvandvī*") category the category *niḥsvabhāva* also doesn't exist. So where is the fallacy of

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[15] Peter Fenner, "A Study of the Relationship Between Analysis *(Vicāra)* and Insight *(Prajñā)* Based on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12, (1984): 147.

contradiction? For us the mirror image is neither svabhāva nor non-svabhāva because of the non-existence of these two qualities as something other than that which possesses those qualities (dharmin). Hence, the Noble Ones do not grasp a mirror image as something *niḥsvabhāva* or as *sasvabhāva*."[16]

In all of these instances the terms that are taken to be *pratidvandvins* are actually logical opposites, usually marked by negative and positive prefixes such as "a-" (or "niḥ-") or "sa-". An objection to this term as a term for reciprocal implication is that, while some of the examples of reciprocal implication found in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, are opposites in this way (light and dark, self and other being a case in point),[17] not all the relationships in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* are actually negations of one another. For example, going and staying would be, but characteristic and characterized are not necessarily *opposites* of one another; whereas they *are* reciprocally implicated.

A more pressing objection to the view of Mādhyamika

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[16] Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 404-405. "pratibimbenānaikāntikateti cet' bhava-tv-anaikāntikatā ' naiḥsvābhāvyaṃ tu siddhaṃ bhāvānāṃ ' tataśca sasvabhāvavāda-tyāgaḥ syād asmad vādānuvarṇanam eva syāt| sasvabhāvaś ca[405] na kaścit padārtho nāmāstīti pratidvandvy-abhāvān-niḥsvabhāvo 'pi padārtho nāstīti kuto 'nāikāntikatā| na hy asmākaṃ pratibimbakaṃ sasvabhāvaṃ nāpi niḥsvabhāvaṃ ' dharmiṇam antarena tad dharmayor apy abhāvāt| na hy āryāḥ pratibimbakaṃ nāma kiṃ cin niḥsvabhāvaṃ sasvabhāvaṃ vopalabhanta iti||"

[17] See Robinson, "Indian Axiomatic" for a list of instances.

method as the reciprocity of opposites (*pratidvandvins*) is a logical one; it is easy to slip into mistaking the complementary opposites for logical opposites; which can lead to misunderstandings. Claus Oetke points out the dangers of such a mistake in Ruegg's work.

> ...the phrase that "the negation of one concept involves the negation of the other" [from Ruegg, *op. cit.*] *could* mean that if it is denied that some entity falls under a concept it must also be denied that the same entity falls under the corresponding opposite, complementary concept; and if the term 'opposite and complementary concept' is taken in the sense of 'negated complement' this would amount to the theorem that for all particulars *x* and all concepts *C* it holds: if *x* does not fall under concept *C*, *x* does also not fall under the concept *not-C* (and vice versa). There is hardly any need to say that this theorem appears highly implausible.[18]

This would amount to saying that, if the long sinuous thing in front of me is not a rope, then it cannot be anything at all (i.e., it also cannot be a non-rope -- a snake). In the discussion above, Candrakīrti is careful to note that it is when the category *(padārtha)* of one side does not exist, that its corresponding opposite category does not

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[18] Oetke, "Pragmatic Implicatures," 188-189.

exist. The negation of the opposites does not affect the item under consideration because neither is other than that which is characterized. In any case, the means by which Candrakīrti can claim that the negation of one category negates its opposite is the fact that the existence of one *implies* the existence of the other, which is a thesis implicit in his use of the term *pratidvandvin*, but a thesis which, nonetheless, is not restricted to actual opposites. Hence, while the term "*pratidvandvin*" is descriptive of the relationships that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* describes, this description remains somewhat on the surface. Thus, while there are instances in Nāgārjuna's work where opposites are shown to imply one another, it would be misleading to claim that this is the entirety of his method.

Other, more successful attempts have been made to place the kinds of relationships which are emphasized in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* more directly into the framework of Buddhist soteriology by connecting them to the soteriological aspects of dependent-origination in the early canon. While the connection between reciprocal-implication and dependent-origination was briefly mentioned in the citation from Ng above, others have gone into considerably more detail connecting reciprocal implication used in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* to the traditional Buddhist teaching of dependent-origination *(pratītyasamutpāda)* as a kind of

conditionality. The most detailed discussion is given in Isshi Yamada's article, "Premises and Implications of Interdependence."[19] In it, Yamada points out that the classical articulation of dependent-origination has two sides to it: one causal (temporal) and the other logical (atemporal).

> The reciprocal relationship (aññamañña) is at the same time the relationship which does not involve time, i.e., akālika. The relationship between 'cognition' (viññāṇa), 'sense-objects' (nāmarūpa) and 'sense-organs' (saḷāyatana) is simultaneous. We cannot posit any one of them without the others or prior to the others, according to Buddhism. Apart from the relationship between viññāṇa and nāmarūpa, the Buddha did not state explicitly the reciprocal hence simultaneous relationship between other aṅgas. It is possible, however, to understand that he meant implicitly the same relationship, which is rather logical, between the other aṅgas.... Looked at from the temporal sequence, birth precedes death, hence birth is the cause of death. Looked at from the logical relationship, the process of becoming includes birth and death, hence their relationship

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19 Isshi Yamada, "Premises and Implications of Interdependence," in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula* Somaratna Balasooriya et al. eds.(London: Gordon Fraser, 1980).

is simultaneous and does not involve time.[20]

Looked at in this way, dependent-origination as a condition for the way things are is on the one hand (in a temporal sense), the way that one thing leads to another. On the other hand, dependent origination is the way that, *logically*, one thing depends on one another. To illustrate this relationship, Yamada cites the "sheaf of reeds" ("Naḷakalāpiya") sutta of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*. Yamada goes on to relate this "timeless," (= "logical") relationship of mutual dependency (which he calls alternately "*aññamañña*" or "*parasparāpekṣa*") in the sequence of dependent-origination to the Mādhyamika idea of emptiness.[21]

While the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* itself never connects the notion of emptiness to the sheaf of reeds sutta, similar analogies are not unheard of in Mādhyamika literature.[22] While

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[20] Yamada, "Premises," 274.

[21] Ibid., 276-77: "Through the investigation of the mutual interdependence *(parasparāpekṣā)*, which is the nature of how things are existing, Buddhists came to discover a new ontological principle in the order of Niḥsvabhāva, which was called Emptiness (*śūnyatā*)."

[22] One such analogy can be found in a work ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the "*Pratītyasamutpādahṛdāya Vyākhyana*". In this short work, the author speaks of the *aṅgas* as being mutually supporting and uses the image of a spear frame -- reminiscent of the sheaf of reeds sutta in the Saṃyutta Nikāya.

> "yan lag bye brag bcu gñis po 'di dag ni ñon moṅs pa daṅ| las daṅ| sdug bsnal rnams su gcig la gcig rten te mduṅ khyim gyi chu la du [sic! probably a mistake for *tshul du* = Sanskrit "ākāra"] gsum po dag tu zad par 'dus par 'gyur ro|[Peking ed. vol 95, pp. 68; T. 166b]

a distinction between logical and ontological relationships was assumed by the term *pratidvandvin* (which, in itself, is a logical relation), Yamada's articulation of the *aññamañña* relationship with regard to the 12 links of dependent-origination makes this aspect of the relationships in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* explicit.

A third technique used to interpret Nāgārjuna's method which has come up more recently is to use symbolic notation to describe assumptions of Indian logic *(nyāya)* which Nāgārjuna employs. One of the common outcomes of this technique is the interpretation that Nāgārjuna can negate both sides of an argument because reciprocal implication

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> These twelve limbs can be subsumed completely under the three -- *kleśa*, *karma*, and -- each one depending on the other; in the manner of a spear-frame. "Completely" ["*zad par*"] is what is signified as "what is wholly without remainder".

Though this work may not have been written by Nāgārjuna himself, it certainly appears to be of the Mādhyamika school. As for current opinions on the authorship of this work, the evidence seems to support either that it was written by Nāgārjuna in the second century, or that it was written by a certain Śuddhamati sometime before 537. For the full debate between Carmen Dragonetti and Christian Lindtner on this issue cf.:

Carmen Dragonetti, "The *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdāyakārikā* and the *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdāyavyākhyāna* of Śuddhamati," *Wiener Zeitschrift für Kundes Sud-Äsiens* 22, (1978): 87-93.

Christian. Lindtner, "Adversaria Buddhica," *Wiener Zeitschrift für Kundes Sud-Äsiens* 26, (1982): 167-194.

Carmen Dragonetti, "On Śuddhamati's *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdāyakārikā* and on *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*," *Wiener Zeitschrift für Kundes Sud-Äsiens* 30, (1986): 109-122.

"blurs the boundaries" between the denotations of opposite terms. Perhaps the first person to point this out was Musashi Tachikawa. In his essay, "A Logical Analysis of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā," Tachikawa focuses on the ways that *dharma* and *dharmin* are related in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.[23] He claims that based on the Buddhist principle of dependent origination, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* constructs each of its propositions in terms of pairs of factors. The arguments in each chapter consist of three features:

> 1) Either of the two entities, or the relation between them, is distributed into a sort of complementary relationship. One may call this 'the complementary distribution.' This distribution is done sometimes directly… sometimes indirectly….
>
> 2) In each verse the relation between the two entities is expressed by some kind of syntactical connection.
>
> 3) The statements comprising the content of each verse are all false.[24]

The significance of the first proposition is explained by means of set theory. The fact that each concept that is

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[23] Musashi Tachikawa, "A Logical Analysis of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā," in *Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Daniel H.H. Ingalls*, B.K. Matilal, M. Nagatomi J.M. Masson and E. Dimock eds. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979), 159-181.

[24] Ibid., 171.

investigated is distributed into complementary units means that the entire domain ruled by that concept is accounted for. That these relations are expressed in terms of syntactical structures allows Tachikawa to express the structure of each argument in a formula. For example *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 2.1 says:

> What has been traversed is not being traversed. What has not yet been traversed is not being traversed. What is being traversed, apart from what has been traversed and what is not yet traversed, is not being traversed.[25]

Tachikawa reconstructs this argument, using a combination of Sanskrit grammar and set theory as follows:

$\sim(X\text{nom } Yv) \cdot \sim(\tilde{X}\text{nom } Yv) \cdot \sim((X \cup \tilde{X})^{c}\text{nom } Yv)$

where Xnominative = "gataṃ", Yverb = "gamyate", $\tilde{X}$nominative = "agataṃ" and $(X \cup \tilde{X})^{c}$nominative = "gamyamānaṃ" through its equation with "gatāgatavinirmutaṃ." $(X \cap \tilde{X})$ is, of course $\{\varnothing\}$.[26]

The concept of going, which is grounded in everyday discursive practice, ends up producing impossibilities *vis á vis* the fact that it is a set with no members and hence, frustrates our tendency for mental proliferation *prapañca*.

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[25] The Sanskrit from the *Prasannapadā* reads: *gataṃ na gamyate tāvad agataṃ na eva gamyate/ gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyate//* see appendix.

[26] From Tachikawa, "A Logical Analysis," 178.

A number of contemporary scholars[27] have picked up on Tachikawa's analysis, and discuss Nāgārjuna's blurring of the boundaries between concepts in light of Indian syllogistic theory. These scholars note that the thesis of a syllogism is classically (Pakṣilasvāmin and after) considered to contain the presence of some property *(dharma)* in a certain locus-for-that-property *(dharmin)*, and that Nāgārjuna consistently shows that *dharma* and *dharmin* are neither the same nor different. Again, in the words of Tachikawa:

> In the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (*MMK*) the *dharma-dharmin* relation is one of the most important topics....We shall see that Nāgārjuna in the MMK tries to obscure the borderline between *dharma* and *dharmin* by asserting the invalidity of the statement, '*Dharma* resides in *dharmin*'. Nāgārjuna holds that the statement, '*Dharma* resides in *dharmin*', presupposes the clear distinction between *dharma* and *dharmin*. In other words, he assumes that, if it is possible to say that *dharma* resides in *dharmin*, *dharma* and *dharmin* are different and separate entities and accordingly the existence of one is established without depending on the existence of the other. Of course he does not admit this presupposition.[28]

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[27] Musashi Tachikawa, and Steven Phillips to name two.

[28] Musashi Tachikawa, *The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism: A*

Exactly what Tachikawa means by the statement, "obscure the borderline between *dharma* and *dharmin* " is not clear from this essay nor from his previous article. The syntactical notation he comes up with to deal with the problem is convenient but he does not explain how it is helpful to come up with a blurred *dharma-dharmin* boundary from the mere fact of a syntactical connection. In short, though he seems to be on the right track, Tachikawa does not explain the significance of this method for Nāgārjuna aside from the vague reference to ending *prapañca*.

While Tachikawa argues that there is a "blurring of the boundaries" between *dharma* and *dharmin* in the thesis statement of each syllogism, Shohei Ichimura in a series of articles,[29] argues that the blurring occurs between the

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Study of the Lakṣaṇāvalī and the Kiraṇāvalī, Studies of Classical India, vol. 4, B. K. Matilal and. J.M. Masson eds., (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981), 11.

[29] Shohei Ichimura, "A Study of the Mādhyamika Method of Refutation, Especially of its Affinity to that of *Kathāvatthu*," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 3, no. 1 (1980): 7-15.

Shohei Ichimura, "A Study on the Mādhyamika Method of Refutation and Its Influence on Buddhist Logic," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 4, no. 1 (1981): 87-95.

Shohei Ichimura, "A New Approach to the Intra-Mādhyamika Confrontation over the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Methods of Refutation," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 5, no. 2 (1982): 41-52.

Shohei Ichimura, "A Determining Factor that differentiated Indian and Chinese Mādhyamika Methods of Dialectic as *Reductio-ad-absurdum* and Paradoxical Argument respectively," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 33, no. 2 (1985): 834-841.

syllogisms. Though each of these articles addresses a slightly different issue, the underlying theory with which he addresses them is the same.

The first article of this series (Ichimura, 1980) is perhaps the most straightforward. Ichimura informs us that Indian logic is based on two principles, a) the principle of invariable concomitance *(vyāpti)* and b) the principle of positive and negative instantiation (*anvyāya* and *vyātireka*). By the latter Ichimura means that the example in Indian syllogisms must contain both positive and negative members. He claims that the manipulation of this dual instantiation is the driving force behind Nāgārjuna's dialectic. In his first article, he claims that the principle of dual instantiation was first expressed among Buddhists in the *Katthāvattu*. Ichimura supports this claim by pointing out that the debates recorded in the *Katthāvattu* are organized into sessions between two opponents. These sessions consist of five stages

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Shohei Ichimura, "An Analysis of Mādhyamika Dialectic in Terms of the Logical Principle of Anvaya-Vyātireka," in *Amala Prajñā: Aspects of Buddhist Studies - Professor P.V. Bapat Felicitation Volume*, N.H. Samtani, ed. (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1989), 325-342.

Shohei Ichimura, "Ābhidharma Logical Deadlock in *Kathāvatthu* and Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka Dialectic," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 43, no. 2 (1991): 1031-1035.

Shohei Ichimura, "The Period of Nāgārjuna and the *Fang-pien-hsin-lun* (or *Upāyahṛdāyaśāstra*)," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 43, no. 2 (1995): 1033-1028.

1) a refutation of the opponent's view, 2) a rejoinder by the opponent, 3) a counter refutation 4) and application and 4) a conclusion.

Each of these stages is an independent argument made from certain doctrinal assumptions. In the course of each stage, one side asserts two arguments. Ichimura uses as an example the first debate in the *Katthāvatthu* concerning the ontological status of a *puggala* (self). The two main assertions of the debate are "(*Puggala*) 'is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing' (*puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhenāti*)"; and "(*Puggala*) 'is known in the same way a genuinely real thing is known' (*yo saccikaṭṭho paramaṭṭho tato sa puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhenāti*)". The first of these theses, he labels "P" and the second "Q". Through a bit of logical manipulation, Ichimura reconstructs the sides of the debates as follows: "P·-Q is false because P ⊃ Q" and "P·-Q is false because -P ⊃ -Q". The justifications for the Theravāda arguments "P ⊃ Q" and "-P ⊃ -Q" are what he is labeling positive instantiations and negative instantiations respectively. Now the impasse between the Theravādin and Puggalavādin occurs because a "logical ambivalence" between the terms. This is due to the fact that the doctrinal position of Theravādin cannot entirely exclude *puggalas* without also excluding all dharmas. Hence, the separation

between positive and negative instances has been violated, and the argument cannot be maintained. Ichimura notes that each side asserts different theses and brings different arguments to support these opposing theses, and each side is stymied by a breach in the boundary between positive and negative instantiations.

Ichimura claims that the logical deadlock of the *Katthāvatthu* is parallel to the argument of the relationship between a light and darkness in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*.[30] The articulation of the principle of emptiness is Nāgārjuna's solution to this kind of logical deadlock.

> How did Nāgārjuna try to solve this logical absurdity? As I understand it he generally takes two approaches. First, in accordance with convention, which assumes both light and darkness for the fact of illumination, he points out that the only way to make this positive concomitance. "P·Q" possible is to repudiate the concept of own being (self-identifying) from these entities, so as to accept light and darkness in terms of their reciprocal exchangeability. Second, in accordance to trans-convention, he repudiates both "P·-Q" and "-P·Q," which must have justified in reference to two

[30] Ichimura elaborates on these aspects of Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* in Ichimura, "An Analysis," 1989.

contrary implications "P $\supset$ Q" and "Q $\supset$ P" in parallel to the Kathāvatthu controversy. Here may I point out the fact that "P $\supset$ Q" and "Q $\supset$ P" together express logical reciprocity.[31]

While Ichimura is astute in pointing out that a certain boundary between two terms is fuzzy in the Mādhyamika dialectic, the idea that the boundary has anything to do with positive and negative instantiations is unfounded. In order for Ichimura's thesis to be correct there would have to be something in the *Katthāvatthu* syllogism that corresponded to the "example" member of the classical Indian syllogism. Furthermore, this example would have to be two-fold, positive and negative. This is simply not the case. From what has been said in the last chapter concerning the logical function of the different members of the syllogism in a system that is essentially non-monotonic, there are distinct functional criterion that must be met in order for something to be an example. Most importantly, the example should present cases similar and dissimilar to the one which is the subject of the thesis and the reason. This requires that the examples *be different from the case under investigation*. Only in this way will the example be able to illustrate the acceptability criterion that are to be applied to the thesis and the reason.

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[31] Ichimura, "*Katthāvatthu*," 1980, 14.

In the session quoted above, there are only two statements of any kind which are presented, the thesis that "*puggala* is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing," and "*puggala* is known in the sense that a genuinely real thing is known." There are no further terms introduced showing commonly accepted outside cases where the connection between these two theses is known to exist. Hence, there is no example in the syllogisms of the *Katthāvatthu,* much less a positive and negative example. What seems to be occurring is merely that the same thesis is stated twice, once directly *(anuloma)* and once indirectly *(paṭiloma)*. If the arguments of the *Katthāvatthu* show us that there is blurring between any two terms, it is not between the terms of an instantiation, but between the subject and predicate terms of the thesis itself. This is precisely what Tachikawa has shown.

All of the theories on Nāgārjuna's method have, in certain respects, been correct. Nāgārjuna *does* manipulate relationships of reciprocal implication, he *does* use terms that are logical opposites of one another, and he does seem to be blurring the boundaries between terms of his thesis. What can be concluded from all of these studies is that the bottom line in understanding the logic of an ancient Indian thinker, is the extent to which the investigator understands the specific expectations and assumptions of the logical theory of the time. Which tools, if any, that one imports

from the modern West to aid interpretation will be entirely determined by this prior understanding. For this understanding we must return to the texts themselves.

Chapter 4: Nāgārjuna's Method In Light Of His Discussion On 'Going'

The first chapter examined some of the trends in the development of Indian logic around the time of Nāgārjuna, and indicated that early Mādhyamika logic relied on arguments that were analytically true. The second chapter considered some of the modern scholarly approaches in interpreting Nāgārjuna's methods. In this chapter, I examine why Nāgārjuna might have adopted the method that he did. This "why" can be seen from two different standpoints: the first is why this particular method made sense to Nāgārjuna logically, and the second sense is why it made sense doctrinally. In the present chapter I will answer the first question from the standpoint of the earliest commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. My analysis of Nāgārjuna's method will have three parts. First I will discuss the subject matter that he investigates. Second, I will look at his arguments on the micro level. Finally I will discuss his arguments on the macro level.

To illustrate Nāgārjuna's logic I will focus on one chapter of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* which is presented as paradigmatic of his method. From evidence that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* itself presents, the most likely candidate for this is chapter two -- the chapter

investigating motion *(gati)*. That this chapter is to be taken as paradigmatic can be seen through references to it throughout the text. Different chapters return to the statement "what has been traversed, what has not yet been traversed, and what is presently being traversed" that is a constant theme in chapter two.

There are four such references:

3.3 The example of fire is not appropriate for the proof of seeing. That which has seeing is proved by (the example of) what has been traversed, what has not yet been traversed, and what is presently being traversed.[1]

7.14 (Origination) is neither presently arising, arisen or not yet arisen. How can it not arise? It has been explained by means of "what has been traversed, what has not yet been traversed, and what is presently being traversed." [2]

10.13 Fire does not exist in fuel nor does fire come from (something) else. Here, in the case of fuel, the rest has been said by (the example of) "what has been traversed, what has not yet been traversed, and

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[1] "na paryāpto 'gnidṛṣṭānto darśanasya prasiddhaye| sadarśanaḥ sa prayukto gamyamāna-gatāgataiḥ||" Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 114.

[2] "notpadyamānaṃ notpannaṃ nānutpannaṃ kathaṃ cana| utpadyate tad ākhyātaṃ gamyamānagatāgataiḥ||" *Ibid.*, 157.

what is presently being traversed."[3]

16.7 If bonds exist prior to the bondage, they could bind freely or at will. But this is not so. The other matters have already been discussed with respect to *gamyamāna*, *gata*, and *agata*.[4]

By stating the parallels between various chapters and chapter two in this way, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* indicates that there is something about the form of the argument in chapter two which should serve as a model or a pattern for any subsequent argument. For this reason I focus on chapter 2 here and will translate it along with the *Akutobhayā* commentary in the appendix.

That the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* treats this section as a pattern could mean that the overall form of the work is not that of a 27 chapter proof -- each being a rung on a logical ladder which progresses step by step to some earth-shattering conclusion. Instead, we should expect the argumentation of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* to work something like the jeweled net of Indra -- each chapter follows a similar form, and whatever message it conveys through the form of the reasoning

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[3] "āgacchaty anyato nāgnir indhane 'gnir na vidyate|
atrendhane śeṣam uktaṃ gamyamānagatāgataiḥ||" *Ibid.*, 211.

[4] "badhnīyād bandhanaṃ kāmaṃ bandhyāt pūrvaṃ bhaved yadi|
na casti tac cheṣam uktaṃ gamyamāna gatāgataiḥ||" *Ibid.*, 291-292.
Translation of this verse is from: Nāgārjuna, *Nāgārjuna: A Translation of this Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an Introductory Essay,* Kenneth Inada, trans., Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series, vol. 127, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Press, 1993), 103.

is reflected in each chapter. Yet this is not to say that there is nothing new to be learned from each chapter, but merely that what the *form of the argument* has to offer in terms of showing us the problems of not acknowledging emptiness will manifest in each of the investigations.

The second chapter of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* examines the nature of motion in terms of its relational adjuncts. The key terms in all Sanskrit versions of this chapter are "*gata, agata, gamyamāna, gamyate, gati, gantavya, gaccati, gantṛ,*" and "*gamana*". Grammatically, all of these terms are derivatives of the verbal root √*gam* "to go". Following the Pāṇinian rules of grammar, each is formed by the addition of one or more morphemes onto the verbal stem. These affixes help to further define the word as well as to show its grammatical relationship to other words in the sentence.

The first term introduced in the chapter is *gata*. According to Pāṇini, this term is formed by adding the affix *Ktá*[5] onto the verbal stem *ga; gamL + Ktá → gaØ + tá → gatá*. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (hereafter abbreviated as "A.") 3.2.102, explains that verbal roots with affixes of this class (defined by the term '*niṣṭhā*') denote the past tense. From A. 3.4.70, 71, and 76 we are told that verbal stems in combination with this affix denote a) the direct object of the verb [A. 3.4.69-70];

[5] I will follow Kartre's system for representing Pāṇini's grammatical terms. All references to Pāṇini are from Sumitra M. Katre, *Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987).

b) an abstract action in the case of intransitive verbs [A. 3.4.69]; c) the agent when referring to the first moment of action [A. 3.4.71]; and d) a locus of the activity when denoting static activity or movement [A. 3.4.76].

Hence, strictly grammatically, the term *gata* is an adjective modifying an unsaid direct object which could be: a) something which has received the action of going,[6] b) past motion in the abstract i.e., the motion which has taken place, c) the person who has just been set in motion, and/or d) the locus (time or space) where motion occurred.[7] Because of the multiplicity of possible references of this term I have chosen to follow a number of other translators in keeping the ambiguity of the term by translating is as "what has been traversed" leaving open whether the "what" refers to the ground gone over, the action itself, the past activity of a person, or the past time/space where motion occurred. The only drawback of such a translation is that whereas the Sanskrit usage implies an intransitive use of the verb √*gam* the English "traverse" can be either transitive or

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[6] In this case, it is perhaps better to use the English verb "to traverse" which may be either transitive or intransitive rather than the verb "to go" which is intransitive.

[7] A number of these uses are pointed out by Jaques May [Candrakīrti, *Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti: Douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain, accompagnés d'une introduction, de notes et d'une édition critique de la version tibétaine*, Jacques May, trans., Collection Jean Przyluski, vol. 2, René LaLou (Paris: Libraire D'Amérique et D'Orient, 1959), 52, note 7], although he does not cite Pāṇini in his explanation.

intransitive.

Modern translations of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 2.1ab[8] take any one of these positions, usually to the exclusion of the others. May interprets it as "*le mouvement accompli*"[9] thus having the movement and not the space as direct object. Most scholars follow the lead of Candrakīrti who provides the direct object *adhvan*, "path" or "road" in his commentary.[10] In this same vein, Musashi Tachikawa puts this implied direct object in brackets; "[The distance] that has already been traversed is not being traversed."[11] Wallesser, and Robinson merely interpret it as "the gone,"[12] implying only that it

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[8] For a full translation of the verses along with the *Akutobhayā* commentary, see Appendix I.

[9] Candrakīrti, *Douze chapitres*, 52.

[10] Cf. Candrakirti, *Prasannapadā*, 92: "*yadi gamanaṃ nāma syānniyataṃ tadgate vā'dhvajāte parikalpayetāgate gamyamāne vā/*" However, Alex Wayman points out that the problem with claiming that there is an unexpressed word for road which *gataṃ* modifies is that there is no Sanskrit word for "road" (- *mārga, patha, adhvan*; or for that matter "time"; cf. *kāla, samaya*) which is not masculine. *Gata, agata, and gamyamāna* must all be neuter in this chapter, due to the fact that they all have the -*aṃ* ending and the fact that they are objects of a passive verb. For this reason, I think that it is necessary to leave its referent open. [cf. Alex Wayman, "The Gait (Gati) and the Path (Mārga) - Reflections on the Horizontal," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 105, no. 3 (1985): 584.]

[11] Musashi Tachikawa, "A Study of Buddhapālita's Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti," *Nagoya Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyū Ronshū* 63, (Dec. 9, 1974): 5.

[12] Alternate translations: "Im Gegangenen eben ist nicht Gehen..." [Max Wallesser, *Die buddhistische Philosophie in iherer geschichtlichen Entwicklung: Zweiter Teil - Die mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna*, (Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1911), 15]

"Tout d'abord, le mouvement accompli ne comporte pas mouvement..."

refers to something in the past. This is technically correct, except that it is confusing in English unless one translates it back into Sanskrit first. Probably the best translation of this term occurs in Pandeya's work[13] -- "That which is already traversed." This translation, like "the gone", leaves open the issue of referent and still is intelligible to those who don't already know the original.

The term *agata* adds the prefix *naÑ* to the past participle *gata; naÑ + gata → agata* [cf. A. 6.3.73,74]. A considerable amount has been written about the use of the particle *naÑ* in Indian logic and grammar.[14] If we take this term as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, it refers to every locus other than that which has been traversed. Hence, *agata* denotes that time/space/action/person not yet traversed in the *gata*.

Similar grammatical descriptions of the passive term *gamyate* as well as its active counterpart, *gaccati*, have already been spelled out by George Cardona in his article, "A Path Still Taken: Some Early Indian Arguments Concerning Time":

[Candrakīrti, *Douze chapitres*, 52]

"The Gone is not arrived at....": [Richard Robinson H., *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1978), 42]

13 Ram Candra Pandeya and Manju, *Nāgārjuna's Philosophy of No-Identity*, (Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers, 1991), 3.

14 For a full discussion of the nuances of this morpheme, I refer the reader to: A. Wayman, "The Negative A-/An- Prefix in Sanskrit," in *Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja Felicitation Volume* (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Center, 1982): 15-23.

"[gamyate] is derived, according to Pāṇinian rules, from *gam-laṭ*: the L-affix *laṭ* follows the verb *gam* 'go'. this L-affix is introduced here under two conditions: an object *(karman)* relative to going is to be signified and the action denoted by the verb is referred to current time (*A* 3.2.123...). The L-affix is replaced by the verb ending *ta*, whose *-a* is then replaced by *-e*: *gam-L* → *gam-ta* → *gam-te*. Once the verb is thus followed by an ending, of the sārvadhātuka class, signifying an object of going, it takes the suffix **yak**: *gam-te* → *gamyate*.[15]

Alex Wayman points out that the passive use of Sanskrit verbs can also indicate a reflexive usage, depending on context. Using as an example the sentence, "*odanaḥ svayam eva pacyate*" ("the rice cooks of itself"), he translates "*gataṃ na gamyate tāvat*" as "What has already gone does not of itself go to that extent." This English rendering is ambiguous. If something cooks of itself, this means either that it "is cooked" (in which case this rendering is no different from the normal passive sense of the verb) or that the rice does the cooking (which is absurd, and Nāgārjuna would not have had to come up with such a sophisticated argument to dispense with it). For this reason, I will stick

[15] George Cardona, "A Path Still Taken: Some Early Indian Arguments Concerning Time," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 111, no. 3 (1991): 456.

to *gata* as "what is traversed."

Cardona also explains some of the other terms used in the second chapter of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.

> An L-suffix is also introduced if an agent is to be signified, as in *gaccati* '... is going (← *gam-**laṭ***), where the parasmaipada ending *tip* replaces ***laṭ***, introduced to signify an agent. In deriving the present participle *gamyamāna*, one also begins with *gam* followed by ***laṭ***, introduced under the same conditions as [*gamyate*].... According to A 3.2.126: *lakṣaṇahetvoḥ kriyāyāḥ* (*laṭaḥ śatṛśānacau* 124), ***laṭ*** is replaced by the parasmaipada suffix **śatṛ** or the ātmanepada suffix **śānac**, if it has been introduced after a verb whose significand is spoken of as characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) or cause (*hetu*) relative to activity.[16]

From what has been argued so far, it is safe to say that the terms *gata, agata, and gamyamāna* are passive participles -- *gamyamāna* belongs to the *sarvadhātuka* class[17] while the remaining two belong to the *ardhadhātuka*[18] class. All three of these terms are the objective referents for the passive verb

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[16] *Ibid.*

[17] I.e., the class of affixes denoting the present tense; cf. A. 3.4.113.

[18] I.e., the class of affixes denoting what is other than present tense; cf. A. 3.4.114.

gamyate ("is traversed").

However, as Musashi Tachikawa points out, the Tibetan term commonly used to translate *gamyamāna*, "*bgom pa*," does not have this passive sense. He also notes that both Tsoṅ kha pa and Go ram pa gloss *bgom pa* (= *gamyamāna*) as the "action" *(las)* itself.[19]

Despite the Tibetan understanding of *gamyamāna*, it appears that many of the Sanskrit commentators took this term as Cardona describes it -- as a present passive participle. In this regard, Tachikawa makes the following observations:

> "We must not forget that Indian commentators allude or declare that "*gamyamāna*" indicates that which is being traversed. In Buddhapālita's commentary (*MMV*, ad. 2,4) a village or city is compared to the *gamyamāna* that is separate from the activity of traversing.… Avalokitavrata, a commentator on Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, explains *gamyamāna* as "the ground whereon there is movement in the form of lifting and placing down one's feet."[20]

The remaining terms -- *gantṛ*, *gati*, and *gamana* are much more straightforward in their meanings. *Gantṛ* is *gamL* + *tṛC* [A. 3.1.133] denoting the agent of the verb. *Gati* comes from

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[19] He cites Tsoṅ kha pa's *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (Peking ed.) No. 6153, 295a, 2; and Go ram pa's *Dmu ma rtsa ba'i śes rab kyi rnam par bśad pa yaṅ dag lta ba'i 'od zer* (Toyo Bunho, Tokyo 1968-69): 298,4,6.

[20] Tachikawa, "A Study," 10.

gamL + *KtiN* → *ga∅* + *ti* → *gati*. The affix *KtiN,* according to A. 3.3.94 forms "an action noun… or denote[s] a *kāraka* other than the agent… in the feminine gender."[21] The term *gamana* is slightly more problematic. It could come either from *gam* + *LyuṬ* → *gamana* or from *gam* + *yuC* → *gamana*. The meaning of these two affixes is considerably different. According to A. 3.3.115, the *Lyuṭ* affix after a verbal stem forms a neuter action noun *(bhāv-e)*. The affix *yuC* on the other hand (A. 3.2.148) is introduced to stems denoting movement or sound which are intransitive in order to denote an agent's "habitual disposition *[tác-chīla]*, duty *[tád-dharma]* , or excellence *[tat-sādhu-kārísu]*".[22]

What is Nāgārjuna doing through this procedure? Ostensibly his investigation is about going, and so he breaks the notion into its component parts. At this point he examines the components in terms of their relations *vis-á-vis* one another, but the reader already knows that the terms exist to one another in the relationship *(sambandha)* of "composite" and "component," just like the relationship between a chariot and its parts (number 3 in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* list of relationships). Composites and components do not

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[21] Katre, *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 297.

[22] *Ibid.*, 262.

exist without one another[23] hence, the notion of going *necessarily* entails motion, space/time that are crossed, and something which goes. By the same token, the presence of any of these terms necessarily entails the presence of the others. From the standpoint of Sāṃkhya logic, this procedure is similar not only to the relationship between a chariot and its parts but also to what is involved in a *saṃbhava* inference.[24]

I argue that, whereas the Sāṃkhya used this relationship to prove the existence of *prakṛti*, Nāgārjuna uses this same relationship to prove emptiness. According to the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* any inference is contingent upon a relationship which is invoked in the reason. Thus, while Western scholars have tended to focus on the aspects of mutuality or reciprocity, when we look at Nāgārjuna's arguments in the context of early Indian logic it becomes apparent the important feature of this relationship is that it is reciprocity *as a function of*

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[23] Cf. Pakṣilasvāmin's explanation of *saṃbhava*: Jhā, *Nyāya*, 886. "Similarly what happens in the case of [*saṃbhava*] is that, the Composite and the Component being related to one another by the relation of invariable concomitance *(avinābhāvin)*, the cognition of the former gives rise to the cognition of the latter; and is only a case of inference." Text: Tailinga, *Nyāya*, 101. "tathā cārhāpattisambhavābhāvāḥ vākyārtha-saṃpratyayenānabhihitasyārthasya pratyanīkabhāvād grahaṇam arthāpattir anumānameva| avinābhāvavṛttyā ca sambaddhayoḥ samudāyasamudāyinoḥ samudāyenetarasya grahaṇaṃ sambhavā tadapyanumānameva|"

[24] This is somewhat peculiar because we do not normally consider what-is being-gone-over to be a part of "going". Yet, it is still something that is necessarily entailed in the notion of going. This is perhaps more acceptable if one thinks of being in a boat on a river. From one perspective the boat is moving, but from another the shore is moving.

composition.

To move from the subject matter to the form of the arguments, this chapter next looks at the micro level of Nāgārjuna's arguments. How does each moment of Nāgārjuna's dialectic function? Though it is difficult to determine the structure of Nāgārjuna's argumentation from the verses of his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* alone, we are aided in our task by one of the earliest commentaries on it, the *Akutobhayā*.[25] A

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[25] The authorship of the *Akutobhayā* commentary has traditionally been ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself, although this attribution has been hotly debated since the time of Tsoṅ ka pa. It seems that the arguments on either side of the issue are the same today as they were for pre-modern scholars. For a full discussion of the arguments on both sides of the issue see Clair W. Huntington, "*The "Akutobhayā" and Early Indian Madhyamaka*," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1986: 124-194. The highlights of the arguments on both sides are as follows:

1) At the end of every chapter in two of the four recensions (Peking and Narthaṅ) the following statement is appended - "[Chapter title] from the *Akutobhayā*, a commentary on the *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā* by the Ācarya Ārya Nāgārjuna [Chapter # ___]". As Huntington points out there is some ambiguity as to whether this phrase means that Nāgārjuna wrote the *Akutobhayā* or merely that he is the author of the *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā* of which the *Akutobhayā* is a commentary. This same phrase appears in all of the recensions of chapter 27.

2) The attribution of this work to Nāgārjuna becomes much more explicit in the colophon (present in all four editions) where it is stated that the text of the *Akutobhayā Mūlamādhyamakavṛtti* was composed by Nāgārjuna. [*Ibid.*, 129-130.]

3) Of the three primary commentaries on the *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā* (those of Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti) none mention that Nāgārjuna wrote an auto-commentary on his verses. In the case of Candrakīrti, the absence of any mention is especially noticeable. The first mention of an auto-commentary to the *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā* is to be found in Avalokitavrata's (7th cent) *Prajñāpradīpaṭika* (*Ibid.*, 134-136). Finally, the *Akutobhayā* is mentioned by name as an auto-commentary to the *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā* in Atīsa's *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* (*Ibid.*, 137).

4) Huntington's main thesis is that the *Akutobhayā* is the *ur*-source (or one recension of the ur-source) utilized without explicit acknowledgment by both Buddhapālita and the author of the *Chun Lun* (Piṅgala, or Vimalākṣa). He demonstrates this point through an exhaustive comparison of the two texts.

> We know that the *Buddhapālitavṛtti* incorporates lines, passages, and almost entire chapters from the *Akutobhayā*. Moreover, the relationship of *Akutobhayā* to *Chung Lun* confirms the fact that the *Buddhapālitavṛtti* borrowed from the *Akutobhayā* and not the other way around. Thus the *Akutobhayā* certainly existed in the mainstream of early Madhyamaka exegesis where it was both known and used by at least one of the three great Indian commentators on the *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā*. Even if it is not an auto-commentary, it was still employed as a commentary -- and an important one at that. [*Ibid.*, 147.]

5) One of the main arguments against this text being an auto-commentary is the presence in chapter 27 (also present in the *Chun Lun* and *Buddhapālitavṛtti*) of a quotation from Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*. Tsoṅ ka pa and others have objected that the *Akutobhayā* could not have been an auto-commentary because would have been unusual for one of the only quotations in the entire work to be from the author's student.

6) Finally, Huntington translates a section from the *Bka 'bum* of Go rams pa bsod nams seṅ ge refuting the attribution of this work to Nāgārjuna. Among the other arguments previously mentioned, there is an additional argument that,"…this commentary's explanation of dependent-origination … does not quite agree with [that found in] the other commentaries, which entails the unacceptable consequence that these commentators are contradicting Nāgārjuna himself." (*Ibid.*, 156). Huntington claims that there is any difference in the interpretation of the *Akutobhayā* and the other commentaries, based on the opinion of Akira Saito (*Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti*, 1984, Ph.D. Dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra.) that there are only five verses where the *Akutobhayā* and the *Buddhapālitavṛtti* differ in their interpretations. He further claims that these five divergences are "… attributable to nothing more than a different syntactical reading of the verse in question." My findings suggest otherwise -- cf. the interpretation of *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā* chap. 2 last verse.

Another piece of evidence which, though tenuous, ought to be considered is a matter of the style of the presentation in the *Akutobhayā* as compared to a more generally accepted auto-commentary by Nāgārjuna -- the *Vigrahavyāvartānisvavṛtti*. In both of these works we find a stylistic feature in common. In both of these works a statement will be made after which the commentator will ask rhetorically, "why?" (Sanskrit: *kasmāt* or *kiṃ karaṇaṃ*, Tibetan: *ci'i phyir źes na*).

salient feature of this commentary is that its author had a penchant for restructuring Nāgārjuna's arguments into syllogisms of a certain type. In light of the doubt thrown on the authorship of this text, we will have to take the *Akutobhayā*'s reconstruction as a suggestion emanating from the earliest period of Madhyamaka, keeping in mind that the interpretations in it might be Nāgārjuna's own. In the following I will show that the syllogistic theory which featured a reason *(hetu)*-centered syllogism was a more conducive instrument for Nāgārjuna's philosophy than was the example *(dṛṣṭānta)*-centered syllogism.

In the appendix I have translated the second chapter of the *Akutobhayā*. I have highlighted the way that it reconstructs the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* verses to fit a certain syllogistic structure. The *Akutobhayā*, far from being a "simple gloss" quotes pieces of the Nāgārjuna's verses, inserting them into a kind of syllogistic structure. To indicate the reworking, I have placed in italics all of the phrases that are taken *verbatim* from the verse. In this way it becomes easier to determine what Nāgārjuna said and what is being added by the commentary.

The first verse of the second chapter of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is as follows:

> What has been traversed is not being traversed. What has not yet been traversed is not being traversed.

> What is being traversed, apart from what has been traversed and what is not yet traversed, is not being traversed.[26]

The commentary on this verse separates the argument of the verse into three sub-arguments. Each sub-argument is its own syllogism (usually only two members). The verse itself consists of three sentences which are each reproduced in the commentary below it. The commentary begins with a *verbatim* quotation from the first sentence, "What has been traversed is not being traversed." The next two phrases are entirely the contribution of the commentator. The first, "because of completed going," is a dependent clause governed by the word "because" *(phyi)* which is subordinate to the quoted sentence. This phrase is followed by another "because" phrase, "because an action is not admitted to be what is devoid of action." This phrase ends with the particle, "'o" which denotes the end of a thought. Evidently, *Akutobhayā* places the first sentence of the verse in the position of the thesis, and allowed the commentary to provide the reason for that thesis.

Why then are there two reasons? The *Akutobhayā* is not as strict as the *Carakasaṃhitā* and *Nyāya Sūtra* in the structure of its syllogisms. It often allows for extraneous sentences. The second reason in this syllogism is merely a restatement

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[26] See appendix, verse 1.

of the first; the second sentence of the verse is treated much the same as the first. However, this is not the case with the third sentence of the verse. Here, the commentary provides a thesis statement which was not present in the verse itself: "there is no going in what is being traversed. "The commentary inserts a "because" in front of the quoted third sentence. This arrangement of quotation and comment effectively makes the third sentence of the verse the reason for an unstated thesis. The commentary on this verse ends with an example *(dṛṣṭānta)* -- "just like lamp and illumination."

In the commentary, arguments one and two can be taken as a unit; together they constitute all non-present-tense referents. Since "*gamyate*" is in the present tense, the first two arguments are correct insofar as they point out a temporal contradiction between the subject and the predicate. A past thing isn't traversed in the present (otherwise it would be a present thing). Likewise, a future thing is not traversed in the present. The third argument assumes the previous two arguments. Past and future have been put in binary opposition by the use of the negative prefix *naÑ* . When put in these terms, the law of excluded middle comes into play -- there can be no such thing as something presently traversed, because it would be a third other than the already traversed *(gata)* and the not yet traversed

(agata).

In the terms of the syllogism, the *sādhya* is said to occur in the *pakṣa* due to the commonly accepted relationship between *hetu* and *sādhya*. In the case of the first thesis, the *pakṣa* is that which has been traversed which is maintained to be the locus of the absence of going. This is established by the relationship between present absence of action and action completed in the past. The relationship is one of a certain kind of entailment from the meaning of a term. In the *Carakasaṃhitā* this would be a case of *arthāprāpti*. Just as one can infer that if someone doesn't eat at night that they eat during the day[27] one can infer that if going is complete in the past, that it is not still going now.

After a similar line of reasoning that shows what is yet to be traversed is not traversed, the commentary moves to the last sentence. Here, the *pakṣa* is what is presently being traversed which is the locus for the absence of going. The reason given for this thesis is that, apart from what has been traversed and what has not, there is no third. The reason here seems to be a complex inference in itself[28]; all passage is either traversed or not traversed, a third possibility is excluded. This syllogism is contingent on the

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[27] This is the example given in both the *Carakasaṃhitā* and the *Nyāya Sūtra*.

[28] An inference can be a valid reason according to the *Carakasaṃhitā*.

relationship of mutual entailment between going and what is gone over. Either both are present or neither, but one cannot exist without the other.[29] Finally, the commentary ends with a brief example to illustrate the entire sequence. For the first verse, the example is of a lamp and its illumination -- illustrating the kind of dependency that exists between the terms.

The *Akutobhayā*, therefore, is much more than just a simple gloss. Its method is to repeat *verbatim* each verse and to insert logical indicators in between quoted fragments in order to give each verse of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* the look of a full fledged syllogism. Where the argument is already complete, the *Akutobhayā* stands aside and may only add an example after a verse.

This, in general, is the procedure that the *Akutobhayā* follows in chapter two. This aspect of the commentary has been overlooked by Western scholars, perhaps because the syllogisms that are presented in the text do not look like those they are used to seeing.

The *Akutobhayā's* syllogisms differ from those of the *Nyāya Sūtra* in that former adds extraneous sentences into the proof that do not function as members of the syllogism but serve other rhetorical functions. For instance, there are a number of instances (as in the syllogism above) where the

[29] See also Pakṣilasvāmin's definition for *saṃbhava* in chapter one.

Akutobhayā will state the thesis or reason and will then add another phrase to further clarify the point. Often (as in the commentary on verse four), the first reason will be excerpted from Nāgārjuna's verse and the second will be a restatement or an interpretation of that reason.

Even though the *Akutobhayā's* syllogisms have only three members, the forms of these syllogisms have more in common with those of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* than those of the *Nyāya Sūtra*. Like the *Akutobhayā*, the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* inserts extraneous sentences into its syllogisms. This comparison is strengthened by another idiosyncratic feature -- the *Akutobhayā*, just like the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, often separates the thesis from the reason by asking the question, "why?" Both these features also appear in the two example syllogisms of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* discussed in chapter 1.

The obvious difference between these syllogisms and those of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is that these syllogisms have only three members where the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*'s have five. While, later, Dignāga and Vasubandhu did suggest that only the thesis, reason, and example were necessary for a syllogism, their syllogisms strongly emphasize the role of positive and negative instantiation like Nyāya, whereas those of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* and *Akutobhayā* do not. Further, the syllogisms of the *Akutobhayā* place Nāgārjuna's words into the thesis or the reason and only tack on a brief (sometimes one word) example

at the end of a series of reasons and examples. This suggests that the examples in the *Akutobhayā* are primarily ornamental.

This concern about the "examples" in the *Akutobhayā* is echoed in the work of Huntington. The problem, as Huntington sees it, lies in the fact that in the sections of the *Buddhapālitavṛtti* and the *Chung-lun* that seem to have been lifted *verbatim* from the *Akutobhayā*, the examples are missing. Huntington writes:

> Short summary illustrations… are extremely common in ABh, and conspicuously absent from BP and CL. The fact that both BP and CL consistently omit just these examples from passages (or entire chapters) that are otherwise lifted verbatim suggests that the text of the ABh was not absolutely fixed during the first several hundred years of its circulation; rather, we may quite reasonably assume that both BP and CL utilized an earlier (or simply different) recension of the Indic source of ABh -- one that did not include these illustrations.[30]

The illustrations presented in the *Akutobhayā* tend to be stock Mādhyamika examples of non-existents (such as "son of a barren woman" etc.) which seem to have little bearing on what is being said. The examples might therefore be a later addition. Hence, functionally speaking, the argument is

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[30] Huntington, *Akutobhayā*, 23.

carried by the first two members of the syllogism even where the example is present.

On the other hand, there is some evidence suggesting that Nāgārjuna and (by extension) the *Akutobhayā* knew about and used examples as a formal member of the syllogism. Using the same technique as I have in translating *Akutobhayā* chapter two, I will translate the commentary on verse 31 of chapter seven.[31]

> [verse] The cessation of a non-existent thing is also not possible. Just like a second head is not decapitated.
>
> [commentary:]
>
> [Thesis:] *The cessation of a non-existent thing is also not possible.* Why?
>
> [Reason:] Because it doesn't exist.
>
> [Example:] *Just like a second head is not decapitated.*

Here, Nāgārjuna's verse itself presents what appears to be a thesis statement and an example. The reason is assumed. This reading is supported by the *Akutobhayā* reconstruction of the verse, which provides the missing reason, and places the last two *pādas* in the place of the example. Even if we accept Huntington's hypothesis that the examples were added at a

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[31] Just as in the appendix, italicized words are those which are quoted verbatim from the verse itself. Unitalicized words represent insertions of the commentary.

later time, this example must have been in the original commentary because it is a part of the verse. In short, the *Akutobhayā's* interpretation of Nāgārjuna's logic is that it operates with a three-membered syllogism, in which the example is optional (hence, stressing the role of the *reason*).

One more aspect needs to be covered concerning the nature of Nāgārjuna's arguments. Nāgārjuna seems to lean toward constructing arguments that either produce an infinite regress (*Nyāya Sūtra* 5.1.9, "*prasaṅga-pratidṛṣṭānta-saman*"), or toward arguments that establish the impossibility of something in the past, present, or future (*Nyāya Sūtra* 5.1.18 "*traikālyāsiddhiḥ*"). Both of these types of arguments are present in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter two (see appendix). Both types of reasoning are listed in the *Nyāya Sūtra* as varieties of *jāti*, or specious argument. While the reasons why the Nyāya considered these arguments to be specious is not important here, it should be noted that these two types of reasoning are only listed as *jātis* in the *Nyāya Sūtra* and not in the *Carakasaṃhitā*.

In his *Madhyamaka Schools in India*, Peter Della Santina's speculates about the origin of Indian logic. He claims that the first kind of syllogism only had two members -- a thesis and a reason. More elaborate syllogisms were devised later, first with three members and then with five.

Santina claims that while Nāgārjuna must have been aware of the three membered syllogism, "which was in common use at his time... [he] singularly refrains from using it in any of his major works."[32] On the other hand, Santina does find quite a number of "proto-syllogisms" (two-membered) in Nāgārjuna's work.

While the *Akutobhayā's* representation of Nāgārjuna's logic supports Santina's claim that Nāgārjuna felt quite free using a two-membered syllogism, it does not support his claim that Nāgārjuna *never* used a three-membered syllogism (as in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 7.31, quoted above). In fact, if the claim that the *Akutobhayā* was written by Nāgārjuna is true, then we can strengthen this claim to, "Nāgārjuna used the three-membered syllogism freely." Secondly, the historical claim that Santina makes concerning the development of the syllogism in India is mistaken. In light of the arguments made in chapter one, it seems likely that the five-membered syllogism came first, and that one of the later traditions reduced the number of members to either two or three.[33] Furthermore, if Nāgārjuna used a three membered syllogism, it

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[32] Peter Della Santina, *Madhyamaka Schools in India: A Study of the Madhyamaka Philosophy and of the Division of the System into the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Schools*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), 54.

[33] Kunst credits the Buddhists in general and Nāgārjuna in particular for the trend of reducing the number of members of the syllogism. cf. A. Kunst, "The two-membered syllogism," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* 15, (1939-1940): 72-83.

was of a variety that does not seem to have been used elsewhere.[34] Indeed, the fact that the particular form of syllogism used in the *Akutobhayā* bears a number of resemblances to the one used by Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti[35] suggests that this kind of syllogism might have been favored by Nāgārjuna and later adopted as a feature of the school.

So far we have discussed the individual arguments in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. The most striking feature of the combined effect of the arguments in each chapter is that they each prove a negative thesis. There are two explanations for this. The earliest two commentators seem to take one view while the later commentators take another.

For the early commentators, the principle feature of the

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[34] There is also some indication that Mīmāṃsā had a three membered syllogism. Uddyotakara's comment on *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.32, says: "*daśāvayavā iti ke cit naiyāyikāḥ| trayo 'vayavā iti mīmāṃsakāḥ|*" Tailinga, 39, note. For some reason, Jhā translates this passage completely ignoring the nouns "*naiyāyikāḥ*" and *mīmāṃsakāḥ*". cf. Jhā, *Nyāya*, 358.

[35] Despite his protests about their uselessness, Candrakīrti produces a number of three membered syllogisms in the first chapter of his *Prasannapadā*. Kajiyama, however, says emphatically that, "Bhāvaviveka's indebtedness to Dignāga in the field of logic is evident and complete." This is because, apparently, Bhāvaviveka quotes Dignāga. [cf. Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhavāviveka, Sthiramati, and Dharmapāla," in *Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens: Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner*, Gerhard Oberhammer ed., (Leiden: Kommissionsverlag E.J. Brill, 1968), 200.] Kajiyama has done a considerable amount of work on Nāgārjuna's logic in relation to the other schools of Indian logic. Unfortunately, I have not been able to access this work because it is in Japanese. One very important article that he wrote in this regard is Kajiyama, Yuichi. "The Logical Structure of Mādhyamika Philosophy," *Tetsugaku Kenkyū* (Philosophical Studies) 35, no. 5-6 (1950): 343-393. The reader should note that some of my work may duplicate his.

Akutobhayā reconstruction of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is the way that it presents dilemmas. The individual syllogisms of the *Akutobhayā*, following the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* itself, are arguments supporting a negative thesis. As tempting as it is to assume that these are *prasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum)* arguments, they are nothing like the indirect *(āvīta)* arguments of Sāṃkhya or the hypothetical *(tarka)* arguments of the Nyāya. First of all, its arguments are different from *Nyāya Sūtra's tarka* arguments in that the former arguments have a syllogistic structure. More importantly, the indirect arguments in both the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* and the *Nyāya Sūtra* are used to prove one thesis correct by proving its opposite incorrect. It is not clear that Nāgārjuna is doing this. Each chapter of the *Akutobhayā*, following the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, presents a syllogism negating a given thesis and then presents another syllogism negating its opposite. This process continues until all apparent alternative theses are negated. This is not a *reductio ad absurdum* argument by any non-Mādhyamika definition of the term.[36] Though Candrakīrti uses the word *prasaṅga* to describe the arguments in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, it is clear that

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[36] Even Bhāvaviveka makes a point to contrast Nāgārjuna's type of argumentation with a *prasaṅga* argument which is assumed to imply its opposite. see William Ames, "Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa: a Translation of Chapter Two: 'Examination of the Traversed, The Untraversed, And That Which is Being Traversed'," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 23, (1995): 322-323.

he means something very different by it. Thus while "*prasaṅga*"/"*tarka*" of the *tīrthika* traditions was meant to establish a certain thesis, it is not clear that the Mādhyamika negative argument establishes any thesis at all.

A more accurate way of describing the overall effect of the syllogisms employed by the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and highlighted in the *Akutobhayā* of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is that it generates *dilemmas*. Each thesis statement contains a relationship between two terms. These relationships are then examined in terms of pairs of contradictory connectives (such as before/after, same/different, with/without, is/is not, etc.) with the result that no such connection is found to be possible. To the extent that the reader cannot see through the dilemma, argument ends in an apparent paradox. Going does not occur for what has been traversed, what is being traversed, or in what is yet to be traversed. The existence of these three preclude the existence of going and yet without going the existence of these three is impossible.

This has led to the sticky question in Mādhyamika scholarship of whether or not Nāgārjuna violates the law of excluded middle. Either he negates a number of possible propositions in order to establish one of his own or he willingly negates propositions and their logical opposites and thereby, violates the law of excluded middle. The former would be, of course the more desirable alternative, but the

Mādhyamika tradition itself, over time leans toward the later. In early Madhyamaka the question was raised in terms of what kind of negation the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* advocated. Borrowing (and perhaps altering) a distinction from the Mīmāṃsakas,[37] Bhāvaviveka claims that Nāgārjuna's argument in the first verse of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter 1 ("Things do not arise from themselves, from another, from both or from no cause") does not imply its opposite but is simply negated.

> The negation, "not from themselves," *(na svataḥ)* should be regarded as having the meaning of a simple negation *(prasajya-pratiṣedha)*, because it is predominantly *(gtso che ba*, perhaps *prādhānya)*, negation. [This is so] because [Nāgārjuna's] intention is to establish nonconceptual wisdom *(nirvikalpaka-jñāna)* which is endowed with all cognizable objects *(jñeya-viṣaya)*, by negating the net of all conceptual constructions *(kalpanā)*.
>
> If it is taken to be an implicative negation *(paryudāsa-pratiṣedha)*, [then] because that is predominantly affirmation *(vidhi)*, it would be distinct from our doctrine *(kṛtānta)*. [This is so] because [that implicative negation] would teach

[37] For a discussion of the early history of this distinction see J.F. Staal, "Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought: a Comparative Study," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London* 25, (1962): 52-71.

> nonorigination by affirming that dharmas are unoriginated. For it is said in scripture that if one practices (*spyod*, root *car*) the nonorigination of matter (*rūpa*), one does not practice the perfection of discernment.[38]

If I deny A, then I affirm 'not A'. How is *prasajya-pratiṣedha* different from this? Apparently, in *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, I do not participate in the activity of affirming either.

Early Indian Mādhyamika interpretation of Nāgārjuna's negation falls into two camps. I will begin with later interpretations. Bhāvaviveka explicitly claims that the Mādhyamika negates arising-from-itself while not affirming arising-from-not-self, Candrakīrti takes him to task for not going far enough. Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita for not being explicit about his own theory and for not giving an explicit syllogism.[39] In response, Candrakīrti claims that, by setting forth an independent inference (*svatantrānumāna*), or by demanding that Buddhapālita should be explicit about the thesis he upholds, Bhāvaviveka is assuming that the

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[38] William Ames, "Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa, A translation of chapter one: 'Examination of Causal Conditions' (Pratyāya) - part one," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 21, no. 3 (1993): 221.

[39] See Ames, "Chapter One Part One," 222-223; and *idem*, "Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa, A translation of chapter one: 'Examination of Causal Conditions' (Pratyāya) - part two," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 22, (1994): 115.

Madhyamaka school has a thesis of its own. According to Candrakīrti, this goes against the teachings of Nāgārjuna himself in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*:

> 29. If I had any proposition (*pratijñā* - thesis), then this defect… would be mine. I have, however, no proposition…. Therefore, there is no defect that is mine.
>
> 30. If I apprehended anything with the help of perception, etc., then I would either affirm or deny. But since that thing does not exist, I am not to blame….[40]

For Candrakīrti, the ultimate truth cannot be expressed in language and therefore is only expressed through the *tūṣṇīṃbhāva* of the Buddha.[41] What, then, does the Mādhyamika do with words? For Bhāvaviveka they are conventionally useful to negate the opponent's argument. For Candrakīrti even this is too much. He gives a lengthy description of what he takes

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[40] Bhattacharya, *Vigrahavartanī*, 113-114.

[41] Cf. Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 57: "kiṃ khalvāryāṇāmupapattirnāsti| kenaitaduktamasti vā nāsti veti| paramārtho hyāry[āṇāṃ] tūṣṇīṃbhāvaḥ ' tataḥ kutas tatra prapañcasaṃbhavo yadupapattir anupapattir vā syāt|" for the correction of Poussin's text of this passage āry[āṇāṃ] = āryās. cf. J. W. de Jong, "Textcritical Notes on the *Prasannapadā*," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 20, nos. 1-4 (1978): 33. Translation: "Is there then no reasoned argument *(upapatti)* for the wise? How could we say whether there is or there is not? The higher truth, for the wise, is a matter of silence…. How then would everyday language, reasoned or unreasoned, be possible in that realm?" [Candrakīrti, *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters of the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979): 50.]

to be the Mādhyamika method:

> Of course anyone making a positive assertion must establish his argument with his adversary and the latter should be persuaded to accept it. But the Mādhyamika brings no reason *against* his adversary; he makes no use of reasons and examples but pursues his own thesis only until the adversary gives up his. He proceeds on assumptions which are not provable claims; he goes so far as to contradict himself and is not capable of convincing his opponent. This is, surely a clearer refutation that one's own thesis is not adequately established. In such a situation, what would be the purpose of attempting a refutation by superior counter-argument?[42]

Candrakīrti then gives a quasi-theoretical justification for such behavior.

> Words are not like policemen on the prowl: we are not subject to their independence. On the contrary, their truth lies in their efficacy *(śakti)*; they take their meaning from the intention of the one using them. It follows that we have merely invalidated our adversary's thesis. We need not accept the antithesis of the logical fault we have

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[42] Candrakīrti, *Lucid Exposition*, 37-38.

exposed.[43]

Statements such as these have bewildered and frustrated those of a Western Analytic bent.[44] Nevertheless, the idea of negating a thesis and not assenting to its contrary was an idea that was not only held by Candrakīrti (and Buddhapālita, as he is interpreted by Candrakīrti), but also by Āryadeva[45] and Bhāvaviveka as well. Thus, Bhāvaviveka quotes with approval the following passage from Devaśarman's commentary on the MMūlamadhyamakakārikā.

> In the Madhyamaka teaching, the lack of intrinsic nature [in things] should be shown by following a method [in which] one does not set up a doctrine (gźuṅ) [of one's own]. In that [Madhyamaka] teaching, there are two objects of negation: attachment to the [verbal] expression and attachment to what is expressed.[46]

In the matter of whether the Madhyamaka negates both sides of the argument, Bhāvaviveka is in agreement with

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[43] *Ibid.*, 38.

[44] Cf. T. E. Wood, *Nāgārjunian Disputations: A Philosophical Journey through an Indian Looking-Glass*, 11, Monographs of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), *passim*.

[45] Cf. Āryadeva, "Sataśāstra," in *Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, G. Tucci trans. (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929), 83.

[46] Ames, "Chapter One Part Two," 110.

Candrakīrti in arguing that a Mādhyamika should not assert an independent thesis. Where he and Candrakīrti disagree is on the matter of whether a syllogism is necessary to convince the opponent that both the thesis and the antithesis are incorrect.

If the later commentators understood Nāgārjuna's logic to be an example of *prasajya pratiṣedha*, then what of the early commentators? There is enough evidence, both within the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and in the *Akutobhayā* to suggest that Nāgārjuna's arguments can be read as implicative negations. Candrakīrti's primary justification for saying that the Mādhyamika does not have a thesis is Nāgārjuna's statement that he has no thesis in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. There is certainly evidence to support an alternate reading of those passages.

Verses 29 and 30 of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* have been discussed by many scholars regarding the issue of Nāgārjuna's sense of negation. At issue is the question of whether or not Nāgārjuna has a position that he advocates. The most recent discussion of these verses in support of a Mādhyamika thesis is that of Ian Mabbett.[47] While this is not the space to go into all of his arguments in detail, I will summarize his discussion. He argues that if we look at verses 29 and 30 in

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[47] See Ian Mabbett, "Is There a Devadatta in the House? Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and the Liar Paradox," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 24, (1996): 295-320.

the context of the whole *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, the reading that Nāgārjuna has no thesis becomes untenable. Such a claim throws Nāgārjuna into the "liars paradox," which is exactly where the opponent wants him. On the contrary, the context of the discussion is that the opponent is concerned about the *ontological status* of Nāgārjuna's argument. The assumption on the part of the opponent is that in order for something to be efficacious, it must be an independently *(svabhāvatas)* existing thing (i.e., it must be a *bhāva*). If an argument is empty of essence, it can have no efficacy to establish knowledge. This may sound odd to our ears, but in early Indian philosophy ideas are objects of the sense of mind in exactly the same way as physical objects are objects to the sense of touch. If one has these two assumptions then the statement "all things are empty" is paradoxical because it can only be true if at least one thing (the sentence itself) is not empty. Hence, the opponent accuses Nāgārjuna of the fallacy of not stating a "special reason" *(viśeṣa-hetu)*, i.e., a special explanation why his arguments should be the only thing in the universe that exist and have efficacy.

In light of this objection, Nāgārjuna responds in the verses in question, that his thesis is included among "all things" (which have no intrinsic existence) and therefore he does not require a special reason. In saying that he has no thesis, he means that the ontological status of his thesis is

empty of *svabhāva*. We might wish that he had been more precise in his use of the words non-existent and empty, but there is no question that in these verses the thesis being non-existent means that the thesis is empty (and therefore to be included among "all things"). This reading is further justified by the commentary on verse 29:

> If I had any proposition, then the defect previously stated by you would be mine, because it would affect the specific character of my proposition (*mama pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt*). [But] I have no proposition. Thus [we observe:] When all things are void, perfectly appeased and by nature isolated, how can there be a proposition? How can something affect the specific character of a proposition (*kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptiḥ*)?[48]

The false assumption on the part of the opponent is that emptiness implies ineffectivity. Nāgārjuna has two responses to this. First of all, the statement "all things are empty" does not make something true, it just makes something known. He makes the analogy to the statement "there is no Devadatta in the house,"[49] which describes something that is already the case - it does not remove Devadatta from the house. The second response is that things are efficient *if and only if*

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[48] Bhattacharya, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, 113.

[49] *Ibid.*, 132.

they are empty. Verse seventy asserts:

> All things prevail for him for whom prevails this voidness (*prabhavati ca śūnyateyaṃ yasya prabhavati tasya sarvārthāḥ*). Nothing prevails for him for whom voidness does not prevail (*prabhavati na tasya kiṃcin na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya*).[50]

Thus, not only does Nāgārjuna's thesis not have ontological existence, but neither does the opponent's. Nāgārjuna is not guilty of a Liar's Paradox just because his statement applies to itself. Nor do we have to assume that Nāgārjuna's statement works on some "meta-level" standing outside language to describe language. Rather, Nāgārjuna is arguing that the reflexive import of the statement "all things are empty of *svabhāva*" is not paradoxical, it is just true. As Arvind Rai points out, not all self-referential statements are paradoxical, and not all of them require the invention of meta-levels.[51] He gives the example of "the present sentence consists of seven words." The statement applies to itself, but accurately so.

If we take *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29 and 30 as claiming that Nāgārjuna's thesis is ontologically empty of essence, and not

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[50] *Ibid.*, 137.

[51] For a lengthy discussion of this issue, see Arvind Kumar Rai, "Non-Tenability of Metalanguage in the Context of the Paradox of Nāgārjuna's Logic," in *Amalā Prajñā: Aspects of Buddhist Studies - Professor P.V. Bapat Felicitation Volume,* N.H. Samtani ed., (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1989), 344.

that it is assertorically devoid of information, then we are free to ask what his (ontologically empty) thesis is. Another look at the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* will show that the opponent is attacking Nāgārjuna by claiming that the thesis that "all things are empty of their own nature" needs a special reason. It will also show that Nāgārjuna nullifies this attack by showing how this statement is true of itself, and so does not need a special reason. He never says that "all things are empty of their own nature" is not true.

If the statement in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* can be interpreted differently than Candrakīrti does, then the way is open to interpret negation in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* differently. The syllogisms presented in the *Akutobhayā* do have enough similarity to the indirect syllogism of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* to warrant asking what is the hypothetical assumption (the *abhyupāgama siddhānta*) which is to be proven false by the indirect method. I will demonstrate this by examining its commentary and specifically focusing on the interpretations it introduces into the chapter. This will show that the false hypothesis, at least as far as the *Akutobhayā* is concerned, is that any of the component terms raised in the chapter have an independent existence. Independent existence of terms implies that the terms must exist as either identical or differentiated. The dilemmas of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* merely point out the contradictions

that ensue from this problematic assumption.

The possibility of reading the Madhyamaka philosophy as employing a variety of implicative negation is supported by two commentaries on chapter two of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. For the *Akutobhayā* commentator, the issue of the dilemma and its implications for the variables comes to a head in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 18-21. Here, "goer" and "going" are shown to be neither the same thing *(ekībhāva)* nor different *(nānābhāva)*. The implication is that every dilemma in the chapter was derived from the attempt to treat two terms as either the same or different. This is most noticeably true in the verses where the dilemma ended in either the infinite regress (the two terms were treated as the same) or the contradiction of the predicate (the two terms were treated as different). On the other hand, the solution to the dilemma is to *somehow* treat going in a way such that its relations are neither the same nor different.

The *Akutobhayā* gives us some clues as to how to deal with the issue. Verse 2.4 points out that if one posits a going, then the implied counterpart (i.e., "what-is-presently-being-traversed") of that going itself would be devoid of going. The *Akutobhayā* commentary on this verse gives a rather surprising explanation. Instead of explaining the first half of the thesis (i.e., why it follows that there is "non-going" in "what-is-presently-being-traversed") the

commentator explains that the attribution of going to its corresponding counterpart would indicate that going and its counterpart were *independent* of one another. The addition of the 'independence' interpretation onto the thesis indicates that the commentator thought that independence had been unintentionally assumed in the act of attributing "going" to "what-is-presently-being-traversed" when, in fact, this attribution is really just a judgment implicit in the equation of a subject with a predicate. The commentary gives two reasons for how this hypostatization comes about. On the one hand, one really understands what-is-presently-being-traversed (e.g., as I am moving, I am aware of the floor which is stationary). On the other hand, there is the sentence that gives expression to that fact of cognition; a sentence in which "going" is attributed to "what-is-presently-being-traversed." The two sources of knowledge produce contradictory responses.

The terms that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* investigates are neither the same nor different. The commentator sets out this thesis explicitly before verse 18[52] and lets the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s own verses (18-21) stand in for the reason *(hetu)*. It concludes with an example which is one of the stock examples in Mādhyamika for two mutually related

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[52] See Appendix: "[Thesis:] Now, going and goers are neither the same nor different. How? It is explained: '*yadeva gamanaṃ*....'"

entities: "father and son." Beyond the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s own arguments the *Akutobhayā* commentator gives a further argument which is somewhat cryptic but nevertheless suggestive:

[Thesis:] Going is not possible *(mi srid pa)*.

[Reason:] Because of that [going] itself.

In light of the preceding argument (that goer and going are neither the same nor different because they are mutually related like a father and son) the thrust of the argument here seems to be that going in whatever of its manifestations is not possible as long as it is treated as something existing in itself (non-dependently).

The last piece of evidence I would like to consider is the commentary on the last two verses of the chapter. Here the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* claims that a "real" *(sadbhūtaḥ)* goer and going do not traverse the three passages, nor do an "unreal" *(asadbhūtaḥ)* goer and going. This would normally be considered to be exhaustive of all options, but the commentary does not interpret it so. The commentary claims that "*sadbhūtaḥ*" means "established as independent" *(anapekṣa)* and that "*asadbhūtaḥ*" means "non-existent" *(nāsti)*. The obvious middle position between the two would be to simply say that a dependent *(apekṣa)* going and goer goes, i.e., to say that goer and the three passages exist in a relation of mutual-conditionality. On this reading, it is

the independent or the non-existent passages that do not exist. They only appear to be independent just like the circle of fire created by whirling a torch on the end of a rope appears as an independently existing thing.

The *Akutobhayā* author was not the only commentator to pinpoint the problem underlying the dilemma in verse four as lying in the independence of goer and going. The *Chung-Lun*, a commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* by a monk named Piṅgala,[53] approaches the problem from the other direction.

> If someone says that in the already-gone and the not-yet-gone there is no going, but that a going really exists in the moment-of-going, this person is in error. *If the moment of going existed independently of the dharma of going, then they would not be interdependent*. Why is this? If you assert that there is a going in the moment-of-going, this implies two operations, but this is not so in reality. Therefore you cannot say that there is a moment-of-going separate from going.[italics mine][54]

Clearly, from the italicized portion of this passage the

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[53] Brian Bocking argues that a better rendering of "pin-lo-chia" is Vimalākṣa "who was Kumārajīva's vinaya-master in Kucha..." For a full discussion of the author of this treatise see B. Bocking, *Nāgārjuna in China: A Translation of the Middle Treatise*, Studies in Asian Thought and Religion, vol 18, P. Williams ed. (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995), 395-405.

[54] Bocking, *Nāgārjuna in China*, 121.

Chung-Lun commentator assumes that goer and going are interdependent. Although the *Chung-Lun* does not seem to have the same penchant for syllogisms as does the *Akutobhayā*, it nevertheless does share a number of interpretations which are not shared by the later commentaries. A notable similarity is the definitions for "*sadbhūta*" and "*asadbhūta*." in the last verse, which is roughly equivalent to those given in the *Akutobhayā*.

> "Definitely fixed" means having real existence from the beginning and not arising on account of a dharma of going."… "Not definitely fixed" means really non-existent from the beginning."[55]

The contrast between these (presumably) early commentaries on this verse and that of the later ones, is telling. The later commentators, starting with Buddhapālita read Nāgārjuna's arguments as a *prasajya-pratiṣedha*. This can be seen in the way they deal with the last verse of chapter two. Buddhapālita defines the terms as follows:

> "'The existent goer,' means a goer possessing going. 'The non-existent goer' *(asadbhūtaḥ gantā)*, means a goer devoid of going."[56]

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[55] Bocking, *Nāgārjuna in China*, 130. In his footnotes he gives the Chinese. for "Definitely-fixed" and "Not definitely fixed": 決定

[56] "'gro po yin par gyur pa źes bya ba ni 'gro po gaṅ 'gro ba daṅ ldan pa'o|| de ma yin par gyur pa yaṅ źes bya ba ni 'gro ba po gaṅ 'gro ba daṅ bral ba'o||" Buddhapālita, *Madhyamakavrtti* - *Dbu ma rtsa baḥi ḥgrel ba bu ddha pā li ta*, Peking ed. vol. 95, no. 5242, p. 196b l. 6-7.

Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti, also define "*sadbhūta*" as "conjoined with going-action," and "*asadbhūta*" as "separate from going-action."[57] One possible significance of this difference in interpretations is that while the *Akutobhayā* and *Chung-Lun* thought it important to stress that the answer to the paradoxes lay in the middle of the extremes of either independence or in nihilism, the three latter commentators stressed the importance of not allowing the affirmation of any position - thus keeping the dilemma. In other words, by defining "*sadbhūta*" as "independent" and "*asadbhūta*" as "not-existing," the first set of commentators wish to show the reader that the way out of the dilemma lies in the third possibility: in a mutual dependence between goer and going. The three later commentators, on the other hand, by defining "*sadbhūta*" and "*asadbhūta*" as diametrical opposites do not leave the reader any option for escaping the dilemma at this point.

The difference is perhaps not so much one of

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[57] "*Tatra sadbhūto gantā yo gamikriyāyuktaḥ| asadbhūto gantā yo gamikriyārahitaḥ|*" Candrakīrti,*Prasannapadā*, 107.

Bhāvaviveka repeats Buddhapālita almost *verbatim* except that the order of the definitions is changed: "*'gro po yin par gyur pa źes bya ba ni 'gro pa po gaṅ 'gro ba daṅ ldan pa* ste| 'grod pa yod pa źes bya ba'i tha tshig go| 'gro'o źes bya ba ni bgrod par bya'o| rnam gsum du źes bya ba ni soṅ ba daṅ| ma soṅ ba daṅ| bgom par ro| *de ma yin par gyur pa yaṅ źes bya ba ni 'gro ba po gaṅ 'gro ba daṅ bral ba'o||* The italicized portions are exactly the same as Buddhapālita's wording. (Bhāvaviveka, *Madhyamakahrdayavrttitarkajvālā - Dbu ma'i sñiṅ po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba*, Peking ed. vol. 96, no. 5256, p. 90a l. 1-3.)

understanding of the text, but one of strategy -- what is the best way to get the reader to come to the appropriate realization? The first two commentaries stress the positive realization that all things are mutually implicated, while the latter commentaries stress the demonstration that entitical thinking of any sort leads to dilemma.

In some senses, the latter approach suggests a deeper awareness of the extent to which hypostatization pervades all of our cognitive activity, and yet the arguments can be interpreted trivially if we lose sight of the more positive thesis of mutual relation. Indeed, if the commentaries show us anything, it is that, the dilemma only "works" if the terms of our analysis are ones that exist in a relationship of part and whole, or of supporter and supported. Only then, will the hypostasizing activity of our conceptualization be painfully evident. Of all the authors, the one that was most aware of this point was Bhāvaviveka. He comments on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's* verses that negate both sameness and difference of going and the goer. The opponent objects that the Nāgārjuna's argument is "counterbalanced" (i.e., he argues for two contradictory theses). To this Bhāvaviveka responds:

> Even if [our reason] did suffer from the fault of being counterbalanced, [we] do not believe *('chel ba)* in the two extremes *(anta)* of sameness and

> difference. Since [we] wish to show that these two extremes are not established in ultimate reality, what [we] maintain is established. If [you are trying] to prove that [the cutter and the cut] are the same conventionally, [that thesis] will be in conflict with common knowledge.[58]

In his commentary on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter 2 verse 20cd, Bhāvaviveka points out that there cannot be a goer without a going, because they are not different owing to their intrinsic relation. To this point the opponent objects that, while this argument may be true for goer and going, not everything exists in such a relationship (i.e., there are dissimilar examples).

> *Objection:* [Mutual] dependence is not established for [things] for which the relation of support and supported is not established. Therefore [your reason] does not pervade one part of the subject.
> *Answer:* Even for those [things], finally there is undoubtedly the use of the particular expression, "This is one [thing]; this is another." Therefore, since they are [mutually] dependent, there is no fault [in our reason].
> *Objection:* [Things] are different [from each other] because of a discrimination *(vyavaccheda)* that one

[58] Ames, "Bhāvaviveka Chapter Two," 323-324.

is not the other or because they possess [the quality *(guṇa)* of] difference.

Answer: Even for those [things], the use of the particular expression, "this is one thing; this is another," undoubtedly exists in dependence on that [discrimination or that quality]. Therefore since they are dependent, it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is unestablished.[59]

In other words, while one can avoid the problem by saying that pot and cloth are always different and can never be mutually related, according to Bhāvaviveka, to see it thus is merely to avoid the issue of how they *are* related (i.e., they are discriminated *from* one another), and hence, we should see them as the "same *as*" or "different *from*" one another. To say "pot" and "cloth" already presupposes sameness or difference. The Mādhyamika merely makes this explicit.[60] Prior to the examination, we must see the relata in the way that they *are* related.

Perhaps a clearer example could be drawn from

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[59] *Ibid*, 325. Ames points out in a footnote to this section that Bhāvaviveka's line of argument here has warrant in light of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 14.5: "*Anyad anyat pratītyānyan nānyad anyad ṛte 'nyaḥ/ yat pratītya ca yat tasmāt tad anyan nopapadyate//*" which Inada translates as, "Differentiation comes about by the relational conditions of different (entities) and it does not exist removed from them. And yet by virtue of the relational factor, there cannot be a differentiation between the entities involved."

[60] For a similar argument also cf. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter 14.

Nāgārjuna's argument in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. If I say that Devadatta goes, this expression does not imply that Devadatta is in any way dependent *qua* (what we normally conceive as) *Devadatta* on the fact of motion. But this merely avoids the issue by obscuring the mutual relation that *is* there whenever Devadatta goes, namely that Devadatta *qua* goer who goes.

A similar objection has been raised recently in articles that look at this chapter from the standpoint of Pāṇini's grammar. For example, in George Cardona's investigation of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's* second chapter he points out that, grammatically speaking, there is no problem with saying, "the goer stays" or "what-is-presently-being-traversed is traversed," because, in the grammatical schools, a verbal noun can be the locus of the *possibility* of a certain action while not necessarily the locus of an actually occurring action.

> To be sure, āsana- signifies a locus relative to sitting and śayana- signifies a locus relative to lying, but the very use of these derivatives does not require that they play the role of locus at that moment. On the contrary, these terms refer to entities that are apt to be used as loci.[61]

Pakṣilasvāmin expresses this same objection in his commentary on *Nyāya Sūtra*. He responds to the objection

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[61] Cardona, "A Path Still Taken," 460.

(*Nyāya Sūtra* 2.1.10) that an object of knowledge cannot exist as such before it is known. To this objection he responds that things are designated according to their function in either the past, present, or future. Furthermore:

> ...if [the connection of the designation with] the three times is not accepted, ordinary usage will not be possible. For him who does not accept this, ordinary usages like 'bring the cook, he will do the cooking', and 'bring the cutter, he will do the cutting' will not be possible.[62]

Though there are a number of ways to look at the issue from a grammatical standpoint[63] (which, to his credit, Cardona does later in the article), such considerations skirt the issue. One *can* "get out" of the dilemma by changing the terms so that it looks different. But, for the Mādhyamika, this is like solving a puzzle by putting it back in its box and walking away. The problem remains that examinations assuming identity or difference of mutually related concepts end up in dilemma. In addition to chapter 2 verses 19-20, this fact is also explicitly stated at *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 18.10:

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[62] translated in Johannes Bronkhorst, "Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13, (1985): 117.

[63] For another excellent treatment of this issue cf. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, "Nāgārjuna's Arguments Against Motion: Their Grammatical Basis," in *A Corpus of Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Professor Gaurinath Sastri* (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1980), 90.

> That which is dependent on (something else) is neither identical to that nor is it other (than that). Therefore, it is neither momentary *(ucchinna)* nor eternal *(śāśvata)*.[64]

At the beginning of this chapter, I argued that the pattern set forth in the second chapter of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* was representative of the logical method in the rest of the text. The hypothesis that Nāgārjuna's logic is based on the fact that items in a relationship of reciprocal implication do not admit of either identity or differentiation can be seen from the verse quoted above. That such a relationship is at the heart of other investigations finds another example in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter 8 verses 12-13.

> The action is dependent on the agent and the agent is dependent on it (the action). Action occurs (and) we do not see another cause for its establishment. Thus, due to knowledge which (comes from) abandoning the basis of actor and action, the remaining entities of action and agent should be understood.[65]

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64 "pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat|
na cānyad api tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam||"Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 375.

65 "pratītya kārakaḥ karma taṃ pratītya ca kārakam|
karma pravartate nānyat paśyāmaḥ siddhikāraṇam||…
evaṃ vidyād upādānaṃ vyutsargād iti karmaṇaḥ|…
kartuś ca karma-kartṛbhāṃ śeṣān bhāvān vibhāvayet||" Candrakīrti,

Here Nāgārjuna is writing explicitly that just as action and agent are investigated in terms of the possible identity or difference involved in their reciprocal implication so other things should be understood in a similar manner. What he is indicating here is not a simplistic formulation, but rather a paradigm by which we may construct our own investigations in terms of mutually related aspects of the same thing. We must keep the terms of the investigation tightly bound to one another implying one another reciprocally.

What then is the significance of Nāgārjuna's style of argumentation for his philosophical agenda? The first set of commentators (the *Akutobhayā* and the *Chung-Lun*) argue that in the relationship between two such things, their independent existence is impossible. The second set of commentators (Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti) argue that even their dependent existence is impossible, because there are no such things (Bhāvaviveka would add "in ultimate reality").

Going back to the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Nāgārjuna claims that not only are all things empty, but that this thesis itself is also empty. Far from being a mere serendipitous fact, I will argue that Nāgārjuna relies on this fact in making his arguments. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 24.18 and the end of the auto-commentary on the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* both equate

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Prasannapadā, 189-190.

emptiness with dependent-origination.[66] If we take dependent-origination as the reciprocal implication composite and component parts, then the identity of things seen in that light will no longer be fixed. Nāgārjuna, himself gives explains this in the example of the relationship between father and son.

> Of that father and that son… which is the son and which other the father? Both of them as producers *(utpādakatva)*, bear the mark of the father, and, as produced *(utpādyatva)*, the mark of a son. We have doubt here: which of these is the father and which of these is the son?[67]

Normally we think of a father and a son as two distinct beings (e.g., Bob and Robert Jr.). Nāgārjuna redefines these two in terms of the function of production. Once there is activity then there is implied an agent and an object. But this relationship is mutual. Thus either one can be producer and either one can be produced. The dilemmas merely play on the reciprocal implication implicit in every thesis. In other words, Nāgārjuna demonstrates the reciprocal implication that

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[66] Alex Wayman disagrees with the interpretation of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 24.18 as stating that dependent-origination = emptiness. Rather, he says that this verse and the one in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* tell us that emptiness and dependent origination have the same purpose. On the other hand, he also points out that the two *are* identified in Nāgārjuna's *Acintyastava* verse 40. see Wayman, Alex. "Nāgārjuna's Secret," 87-88.

[67] Bhattacharya, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, 123.

is the nature of all things by forcing the reader to see the contradictions that would ensue if a certain member of the class of all things (namely "theses") were not empty. When this hypothesis is proven false, the implication *(arthāprāpti)* is that terms do not have *svabhāva* and hence are empty.

According to Nāgārjuna, the position of the Mādhyamika is unassailable because any objection to it merely demonstrates the thesis that it attempts to disprove. The outcome of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* is that the thesis "all things are empty of *svabhāva*" is true absolutely. There are no exceptions. This being the case, the truth of emptiness can be illumined from any conceivable scenario, including the debates of the scholars themselves. Thus in chapter four verses 8 and 9, Nāgārjuna claims that any objection to *śūnyatā* will involve the fault of *sādhyasāma* (being the same as that which is to be proven)[68] B.K. Matilal explains this fallacy as follows:

> It is assumed in this theory of inference that the statement called 'reason' *hetu (sādhana…)* must be

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[68] For a lengthy discussion of this term and its relation to the Nyāya fallacy of the same name, see K. Bhattacharya, "A Note on the Interpretation of the term Sādhyasama in Madhyamaka Texts," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2, (1974): 225-230; and Bimal Krishna Matilal, "A Note on the Nyāya Fallacy Sādhyasama and *Petitio Principii*," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2, (1974): 211-224. Though these two disagree on whether the Mādhyamika use of the term is the same as the Naiyāyika use, the difference in their interpretations is not great enough to take up the argument further.

> established beyond doubt (i.e., its validity must be established) before it can warrant the transition from it to the conclusion. In other words, the reason should not have the same dubious status (as far as its validity is concerned) as the *sādhya* 'proposition to be proved'.… When this is… the case (i.e., when the reason adduced is less certain than the proposition it tries to prove or establish) the fallacy called *sādhyasama* arises.[69]

Nāgārjuna's use of this term is, on the one hand, a criticism of the opponent's (and student's) arguments, but on the other hand, it is a statement of how and where to look for emptiness. The *prasaṅga* arguments are merely there to show the interlocutors the ground beneath their feet, as it were. In a way, it is the self-referentiality achieved through the negation of mutually contradictory positions which results in the realization that all such arguments are guilty of *sādhyasama*. This realization is the realization of emptiness. In chapter 24, Nāgārjuna uses the metaphor of a rider and a horse.

> 24.15 You shift your own faults onto us. Just like the one mounted on a horse who forgets the actual horse.

Candrakīrti explains this verse as follows:

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[69] Matilal, "A Note," 214.

> Just as someone who is mounted on the horse, who having forgotten (that fact), places blame for stealing on somebody else, so too you, sir, are mounted on the horse of the theory of emptiness (that has) the characteristic of dependent-origination, [and] you, by not recognizing that, due to a greatly disturbed mind,[70] are accusing[71] us. From not having understood [the emptiness and dependent-origination], blame is placed onto us *Śūnyatāvādins*.[72]

In sum, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's* dialectic consists of three functional elements. The first element is the *relationship of reciprocal implication* itself -- wherein ideas are examined as they are in relationships of composite and component (like a chariot and its parts). This relationship is a necessary *a priori* fact, and it is the basis on which the arguments function. In short, this relationship is *what* is being investigated. The second element consists of the *connectives* which are applied to the subject matter being investigated. In *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*

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[70] An alternate reading: "projection of extremes" [Sanskrit = *atyantavikṣepa*.]

[71] The Sanskrit has "*parivadati*" = "to speak about"; Tibetan has "*khoṅs su brtsod pa*" = "to speak crookedly," but this could easily be a mistake for "*yoṅs su brtsod pa*" which would be the requisite "*parivadati*".

[72] Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 502.

chapter two, for each instance of reciprocal implication (i.e., goer/going, traversing/what is being traversed), the relationship is investigated by means of certain types of relationships -- identity/difference, before/after, subject/predicate, and so on. None of these pairs of opposites are applicable to items in the aforesaid relationship, and so both the thesis and its antithesis must be denied. The third element is the fact that, hidden in the text, there are self-referential clues pointing the reader as to how to understand the first two elements. The remaining chapters demonstrate how these self referential clues allude to canonical doctrines.

Chapter 5: Allusions to *Dharmatā*

In the preceding chapters I have shown how Nāgārjuna's method of argumentation enables him to establish, without having to appeal to scripture, that the Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness does not contradict the way that things are *(dharmatā)*. The term *dharmatā*, however, does not just denote the essence of reality (as dependent-origination), but also that part of reality with soteriological import. It is, as Asaṅga says, "…for the purpose of attaining *mahābodhi*."[1] To establish that emptiness does not contradict *dharmatā*, Nāgārjuna must show that the Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness lies within the scope of canonical discussions of both nirvāṇa and dependent-origination. He makes his case by subverting the canonical teachings most directly related to the events occuring under the Bodhi tree in favor of the doctrine of emptiness.

Nāgārjuna's method of subversion is most evident in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter 24 - Examination of the Four Noble Truths. The four Noble truths are 1) there is suffering, 2) that suffering has an origin 3) that suffering can cease 4) there is a path to its cessation. In chapter *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter 24, the opponent contrasts the Mahāyāna teaching of emptiness against the canonical teaching

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[1]Asaṅga, 10.

of the four noble truths by arguing that if Nāgārjuna advocates that everything is empty, then the four noble truths are also empty and by implication, Buddhism itself is empty. In verses five and six, the opponent claims that Nāgārjuna, by teaching emptiness, will destroy Buddhism, notions of right and wrong, and common sense *(vyavahāra)*.

To these objections, Nāgārjuna responds that the opponent has not understood emptiness, its meaning *(artha)*, or its purpose *(prayojana)*. The opponent is under the impression that emptiness means non-being. On the contrary, Nāgārjuna claims that emptiness is (quote) "dependent-origination" (one of the Abhidharmic categories) by which he means the mere fact that things arise by virtue of causes and conditions generally. In other words, emptiness for Nāgārjuna does not mean non-existence -- it means that all entities occur solely as a function of causes and conditions and that there is no essence apart from those causes and conditions. Nāgārjuna continues in verse 19 that since there is no *dharma* that is not dependently originated, there is no *dharma* that is not empty. Nāgārjuna goes on to demonstrate how emptiness manifests in the canonical teaching on suffering. In verse 21 he says:

> How will suffering that is non-dependently-arisen occur? Indeed, what is impermanent has been said to be suffering and it does not exist in that which has

its own nature.

When Nāgārjuna says that "what is impermanent has been said to be suffering," he means "has been said *by the Buddha*" as the commentaries make clear. Nāgārjuna alludes to numerous sūtras throughout the canon that explicitly make this connection. There is a standard formula in the canon that links impermanence with suffering. The formula runs as follows:

> Bhikkhus what do you think? Is x permanent or impermanent? - "Impermanent, Venerable sir" - "Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?" - "Suffering, venerable sir?" - "Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: 'This is mine, this I am, this is my self?" - "No, venerable sir."[2]

Once suffering has been shown to be commensurable with emptiness, the other noble truths are similarly restored. If suffering occurs then it must have an origin. If it has an origin it must have an end, and so forth. In other words, the four noble truths still have the same significance they did under other readings of the canon; only, in light of Nāgārjuna's analysis, they are established on the foundation

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[2]For instance, see *Majjhima Nikāya* 22.26,35.20,109.15,146.6ff,147.3ff.

of emptiness. (M. 1. 191)

Just as the four noble truths have a separate chapter devoted to them, there are chapters devoted to the abhidharmic categories of the twelve links of dependent-origination, the aggregates, the elements, the faculties and so forth, in which Nāgārjuna logically analyses these doctrines. The problem is that the rest of these chapters have a different tone than chapter 24. They begin with the doctrine after which they are named and are reduced logically to absurdity, without any explicit mention of emptiness or dependent origination. It is this *reductio ad absurdum* style resulting in a tetralemma for which Nāgārjuna has become most famous. Yet in these chapters the *form* of the argument implicitly alludes to the canon's teachings about nirvāṇa and dependent origination.

The logical structure of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's* arguments has a number of elements. The element which I would like to examine first is that of the *dilemmas* he sets up. It has been demonstrated that when two phenomena stand in a relationship of reciprocal implication, nothing may be predicated of them that would imply independence of the terms in any way, due to the fact that any such predication would be equally in need of establishment. The apparent paradox of the situation highlighted in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* stems from trying to apply mutually exclusive predicates (such as

"*x exists*" or "*x does not exist*") to phenomena so related. The present chapter will investigate the different types of dichotomies used to inquire into the relationships of reciprocal implication, in order to discover their significance in alluding to aspects of *dharmatā* within the canon. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the significance of this aspect of Nāgārjuna's work in light of Buddhist canonical notions of conceptuality and, by implication, soteriology.

I pointed out in chapter two that Musashi Tachikawa has looked extensively at the kinds of dichotomies that are analysed in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. He catalogues them in his article, "A Logical Analysis of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*."[3] In the following section, I would like to re-examine these dichotomies to see what kinds of categorization of them is possible.

As I argued with regard to *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter two, the most fundamental dichotomy for Mādhyamika analysis is that of "unity" and "differentiation." What holds for chapter two holds for the other chapters as well. In the following I will show that the most of the dichotomies used in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* are somehow derivative of identification or differentiation.

This is not immediately obvious. The only chapter where

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[3]Tachikawa, "Logical Analysis," 1979.

Nāgārjuna uses anything close to the English equivalents of "identity" and "difference" is in the *nāmaskāra* and in chapter six. In chapter six, we don't have *ekārthaṃ* and *nānārthaṃ,* (as in the *nāmaskāra*), but rather *ekatvā* and *pṛthaktvā* -- terms whose canonical significance will be discussed in the next chapter. Despite the fact that terms for unity and differentiation are used so seldom in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,* the functions of unification and differentiation pervade it in a number of guises. For example, the issue of identity and difference is brought up explicitly in chapter 2 verses 18 and 19 using the terms *eva* and *anya.*[4] Here, the two terms could be translated as "is" (*eva* being an emphatic stressing identity) and "other". While the term *eva* is most often used pleonasticly, here its restatement in verse 19 with its consequence being "*ekībhāva*"[5] along with its juxtaposition to the "*anya*/ablative" compound clearly makes the two a mutually exclusive pair (= "same as"/"different than").

The use of *eva* and *anya* in this manner occurs elsewhere as well. Another example occurs at *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*

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[4] "yadeva gamanaṃ gantā sa eveti na yujyate| anya eva punargantā gateriti na yujyate||" Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 104.

[5] "yadeva gamanaṃ gantā sa eva hi bhavedyadi| ekībhāvaḥ prasajyeta kartuḥ karmaṇa eva ca||" *Ibid.*

chapter 27 verse 8[6] and 7.28.

> 27.8 Indeed, *ātman* is neither the same as clinging nor is it different. Nor is there certainty that there is no clinging or no *ātman*.[7]
> 7.28 From this state, the same state does not cease. Nor from another state does this state cease.[8]

By the same token, identity and difference are often represented by the use of "*anya*" alone; using the prefix *naÑ* in order to make the binary: "different/non-different" *(anya/ananya)*.

> 14.7 Difference does not exist in the different nor does it exist in the non-different. And when difference doesn't exist, difference and identity also do not exist.[9]

So far I have only mentioned examples where the kind of "unification" was "identity" in the strict sense of the word.

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[6] Hereafter, I will abbreviate the chapter and verse from the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. E.g. "*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter 27 verse 8" = "27.8."

[7] "evaṃ nānya upādānam eva saḥ| ātmā nāsty anupādānaḥ nāpi nāsty eṣa niścayaḥ||" *Ibid.*, 577-578.

[8] "tayāivāvasthayāvasthā na hi sāiva nirudhyate| anyayāvasthayāvasthā na cānyāiva nirudhyate||" *Ibid.*, 169.

[9] "nānyasmin vidyate 'nyatvam ananyasmin na vidyate| avidyamāne cānyatve nāstyanyadvā tadeva vā||" *Ibid.*, 254-255.

Most of the relations in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* imply relationships that are not "identity" *per se* but rather a mere (vague) relatedness. For instance, there are a number of examples of relations between a subject of a sentence and its predicate. This includes many of the relationships of chapter two:

> 2.8 First of all the non-goer doesn't go, then the goer doesn't go. Apart from goer and non-goer, what third does go?[10]
>
> Or:
>
> 3.5 Seeing certainly does not see, nor does non-seeing see. It must be admitted that the seer as what sees is explained.[11]

In most of the arguments of chapter two and three (excluding verses 18 onward) one does not necessarily have to assume that the relationships being investigated constitute either identity or difference. For example, "the goer going" is not a statement about the identity or the difference between goer and going; "identity" and "differentiation" would be merely one of the many possible attributes of the relationship between these two terms. We can, however, say

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[10] "gantā na gaccati tāvad agantā naiva gaccati|
anyo gantur agantuś kas tṛtīyo hi gaccati||" *Ibid.*, 97.

[11] "paśyati darśanaṃ nāiva nāiva paśyaty-adarśanaṃ|
vyākhyāto darśanenāiva draṣṭā cāpy-upagamyatāṃ||" *Ibid.*, 116-117.

that the relations which *do* obtain between any pair of reciprocally implicating terms *imply* a relation of identity or difference between the terms. For instance, the statement "what is being traversed is traversed," does not explicitly posit but *presupposes* that the action and its host are either separate or the same. When it is not possible to determine identity and difference between these terms, any further predication is thrown into question.

Often when the relationships are vague the terms of inquiry are equally non-committal. For example, frequently the implied term is said to be either "with" or "without" its implicand. The chapter where this is most emphasized is chapter 21.

> 21.1 Dissolution is neither with nor without occurrence. Occurrence is neither with nor without dissolution.[12]

This kind of investigation pervades the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. More often than not one of a number of synonyms for "without" are used. A few of these are, "*ṛta*", "*vinirmukta*" (used in chapter 4), "*tiraskṛta*" (chapters 2,3,6,10,27). An example of such use can already be seen in chapter 2 verses 1,4,6,7, and 20 above. The reason that what

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[12] "vinā vā saha vā nāsti vibhavaḥ saṃbhavena vai|
vinā vā saha vā nāsti saṃbhavo vibhavena vai||" *Ibid.*, 410.

is presently being traversed is not traversed is because (verse 4) a going of what is being traversed implies that they are separate (that one is *without "ṛte"* the other, leading to the absurdity of a *gamyamāna* separated from going).

On the other hand, there are many verses in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* that indicate some kind of conjunction or disjunction without the use of any specific word. For instance, 2.5 points out that if it is admitted that "there is a going *of* what is being traversed" (the genitive case here implying a going which is "not-separate" or "identical with" what is being traversed), then there would have to be two goings which would lead to an infinite regress. In these two examples, the word "without" carries the sense of "difference," while the genitive case signifying possession functions as identification.

Probably the most common form in which identity and difference appears in the early chapters of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is in terms of positive and negative constructions of nouns. The opening arguments of chapter two provide an excellent example. For instance, verse three[13] of

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[13] "gamyamānasya gamanaṃ kathaṃ nāmopapatsyate| gamyamānaṃ hy a(vi)gamanaṃ yadā naivopapadyate||" *Ibid.*, 94.

"How is a going attributed of what is gone through to occur? When a lack of going for *gamyamāna* does not occur."

chapter two, the phrases "*gamyamānasya gamanaṃ*" and "*gamyamānaṃ hy agamanaṃ*" represent the *identity* and *difference* of the mutually implicated terms respectively. Similarly, the binary pair "being/non-being" is represented by "*sati/asati*".

More frequently, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* simply uses a negative and a positive prefix to denote sameness and difference -- as in 5.3.

> The occurrence of the characteristic is neither in that which (already) has a characteristic, nor in what does not (already) have a characteristic.[14]

Here the subject of the sentence is the occurrence of the characteristic *(lakṣaṇasya pravṛtti)*. A characteristic necessarily implies some substratum which is "characterized"; the "characteristic/characterized" relationship is thus the fundamental binarism of this chapter. In verse 3, the term "characteristic" is used with and without the *naÑ* prefix. This means it is not used absolutely (as in the *lakṣaṇa* does or does not exist) but relationally (as the substratum with or without a characteristic). To carry this one step further, if the characteristic is related to its substratum, how could one not say that they were identical? On the other hand, if

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[14] "nālakṣaṇe lakṣaṇasya pravṛttir na salakṣaṇe| salakṣaṇālakṣaṇābhyāṃ nāpy anyatra pravartate||" *Ibid.*, 130.

the characteristic were in any way *not* related to its substratum, how could one claim that they were not different?

So far we have dealt with identity and difference as they relate to *things*. A different manner of investigation takes place when *activity* is at stake. The first activity that appears in the entire work (arising) is set out in the first verse after the *nāmaskāra*:

> 1.1 Nowhere and at no time is a produced-thing arisen from itself, from another, from both, or from no cause.[15]

Here we have a theme that is common in the early canonical accounts of the teaching of dependent-origination -- the distinction between origination from oneself or origination from another. Most often in the canon, "from ones' self" means that the effect is self-produced. From another means that there is complete discontinuity between the cause and effect. Often when this issue is brought up the example of a seed and sprout *(bīja/aṅkūra)* is used to

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[15] "na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ|
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana||" *Ibid.*, 12.

There are two parallel verses later in the work:

21.13 "na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato nāiva jāyate| na svataḥ parataścāiva jāyate kutaḥ||" *Ibid.*, 421.

23.20 "na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato nâiva jāyate| na svataḥ parataśceti viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ||" *Ibid.*, 468.

illustrate the point[16]; indicating that "self" and "other" are merely two different moments in the same life-stream *(saṃtāna)*. Regardless, origination from itself, is ruled out as impossible (something like trying to pull one's self up by the bootstraps). In addition to chapter one, this kind of relationship is investigated in chapters 3,7,12,13,14, and 15,21, 23.

Parallel to this notion is the important role played by the dichotomy of "*svabhāva/parabhāva*". While the term "*svabhāva*" has a number of definitions through the history of Indian philosophy, only two are relevant for the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Candrakīrti gives the following definition:

> Here, the etymology of "*svabhāva*" is "self-being". The category of something made *[kṛtaka]* is explained not to be *svabhāva* 'according to common knowledge' *[loke]*. Just as warm water by (is made by) the effort of the demonic element [? *sic* "*dhātu piśāca*"][17] and (the appearance as) a ruby for what is

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[16] In the *Śalistambha* Sūtra, seed and sprout is used as an example of objective dependent origination, as opposed to the usual twelve *aṅgas* which are interior dependent origination. See N. R. Reat, *The Sālistambha Sūtra: Tibetan original, Sanskrit reconstruction, English translation, critical notes (including Pāli parallels, Chinese version and ancient Tibetan fragments)*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Ltd., 1993), 35-42.

[17] The Tibetan differs somewhat here. Poussin notes: "*nor sgyur mkhan gyi ḥbad pas - «habile dans la transformation des pierres* (*nor bu*)*»*" *Ibid.*, 260, ftn. 4.

> originally quartz. On the other hand, that which is not made is "*svabhāva*." Just as the heat of fire or the original ruby nature of rubies. For these (examples), due to not being born from a mixture of other categorical things it is said to be *svabhāva*.[18]

In this definition we see the two aspects of "*svabhāva*" -- its causative aspect (that which is not produced from something else) and its identification aspect. That aspect of a thing which is *sui generis* is the essence of that thing (i.e., non-accidental). *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter one is where the argument against *sva*- and *para-bhāva* first appears. A brief explanation for verse one is given in verse three:

> A *svabhāva* of entities does not exist when there are conditions. When *svabhāva* is non-existent, *parabhāva* does not occur.[19]

A fuller argument making the same point can be found in the first few verses of chapter 15.

> 1. The origination of *svabhāva* by way of causes and conditions is not reasonable. (Then) *svabhāva* would

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[18] *Ibid.*, 260. Text: "iha hi svo bhāvaḥ svabhāva iti vyutpatter yaḥ kṛtakaḥ padārthaḥ sa loke nāiva svabhāva iti vyapadiśyate tadyathā apāmauṣṇyaṃ dhātupiśācaprayatniṣpāditaḥ karkeṭanādīnāṃ pajharāgādibhāvaśca| yastvakṛtakaḥ sa svabhāvastadyathā agrerauṣṇyaṃ jātānāṃ pajharāgādīnāṃ pajharāgādisvabhāvaśca sa hi teṣāṃ padārthāntarasaṃparkājanitatvātsvabhāva ityucyate||"

[19] "na hi svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ pratyayādiṣu vidyate| avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate|| *Ibid.*, 94.

be (something) produced by causes and conditions and (thus would be) made.[20]

Verse one states that origination of *svabhāva* does not occur by means of conditions, by definition.

2. How will a made *svabhāva* exist again? (Because) *svabhāva* is not made and not dependent on another.[21]

Thus the possibility of origination and dependence is explicitly ruled out in verse two. The *svabhāva* doesn't exist because it doesn't arise. All of this is the preamble to 15.3 which is parallel to 1.3.

3. How, when there is non-existence of *svabhāva* will *parabhāva* exist? (When) *parabhāva* for something *parabhāva* is said to be (that thing's) *svabhāva*.[22]

Svabhāva functions as a kind of identity insofar as it represents continuity or a carrying on of an essence from one moment to the next. By the same token, *parabhāva* functions as a kind of difference insofar as it implies discontinuity between the cause and the effect.

Another relational pair that plays a significant role in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, is the binarism *sadbhūta/asadbhūta*.

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20 "na saṃbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ| hetupratyayasaṃbhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet||" *Ibid.*, 259.

21 "svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ kathaṃ| akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca||" *Ibid.*, 260-262.

22 "kutaḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati| svabhāvaḥ parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate||" *Ibid.*, 265-266.

These terms are used only four places -- at the end of chapter two, 7.29, throughout chapter eight, and in verse 21 of chapter 20. As the issue of *sadbhūta/asadbhūta* was discussed at length in the last chapter, I will not repeat myself here. Suffice it to say that, at least in the interpretation of Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti *sadbhūta* and *asadbhūta* are the most general terms for the presence or absence of a relationship (*yukta,* literally, "connection").

before/after/during

Another important set of relationships in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* are those constituted by temporal relations. This set is comprised of the relationships "prior to...", "posterior to...", "simultaneous with...."[23] These relationships play an important role in the investigation of virtually every chapter, but chapters 2,5,6,9,11,19 are of special note. Functionally, however, these relationships also work as a relationship of sameness/difference. In these relations, "before" and "after" constitute "difference," or more specifically, "disjunction" from the present. When the

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[23] In Western philosophy this corresponds to Mactaggart's B series (which is articulated in terms of "past, present, and future"; cf. J. E. McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time," in *Philosophical Studies by the late J. McT. Ellis McTaggart* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1934), 110-131). Comparison with the work of MacTaggart reminds us that these three terms are the subjective counterparts to the objective, "event" series (or "A" series). This suggests a close relationship between the "before" "during" and "after," and "arising" "staying" and "ceasing."

argument moves to the present, a new set of reciprocally implicating terms is introduced where identity and difference again prevail. Since we have examined this procedure in the investigation of chapter two, let us now examine *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter 6, the "*Rāgarakta Parīkṣā*."

The main features of the argument are presented in the first four verses:

> 6.1 If the impassioned one which is separate from passion should exist prior to that passion, then the passion would exist dependent on that (impassioned one). [But] when there is an impassioned one a passion should exist.
>
> 6.2 Again, when there is no impassioned one, where will there be passion? Whether passion is existent or non-existent in the impassioned one, these are also [treated in] the same manner.[24]

In these two verses we see the reciprocal implication of three sets of binaries -- present/absent, sameness/difference, and existence/non-existence. The opposition between these terms is brought to a head by contrasting temporal relations. Chapter six opens with this

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[24] 6.1 "rāgād yadi bhavet pūrvaṃ rakto rāga tiraskṛtaḥ|
tam pratītya bhaved rāgo rakte rāgo bhavet sati||" *Ibid.*, 138.

6.2 "rakte 'sati punā rāgaḥ kuta eva bhaviṣyati|
sati vāsati vā rāge rakte 'py eṣa samaḥ kramaḥ||" *Ibid.*, 138-139.

issue of temporality. If the impassioned one exists before the passion, then there is no problem for the passion -- it has a substrate on which to be dependent. There is, however, a problem in that the impassioned one is left without an association to passion. There is a moment before the relationship when the impassioned one will be without passion because that passion does not exist yet. Hence, priority implies a difference (a *being-cut-off-from*) via an absence of the not-yet-existent. Verse two merely carries out the consequences of verse one; the impassioned one cannot exist in the absence of passion, but neither can the passion exist in the absence of the impassioned one. The same process appears in 5.1.

The obvious way to dodge the problem is to posit that the pair (passion and the impassioned one) occur simultaneously. This is posited in verse 3.

> Again, even concomitant manifestation is not reasonable for passion and the impassioned one because the passion and impassioned one would exist independent of one another.[25]

Thus, by positing simultaneity, the opponent merely shifts the problem, because when the two terms are simultaneous they will still exist independently of one

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[25] 6.3 "sahāiva punar udbhūtir na yuktā rāga-raktayoḥ| bhavetāṃ rāga-raktau hi nirapekṣau parasparaṃ||" *Ibid.*, 139.

another (*ex hypothesi*, see verse 1 -- "*yadi… rakto rāgatiraskṛtaḥ*"). In such a situation, the two cannot constitute a unity because two separate things cannot be combined in such a way as to become identical. Difference is equally untenable because, in that case there is still no relationship.

> Concomitance does not exist in unity, because this is not together with that. Concomitance does not exist in isolation, thus, where will it occur?[26]

Difference in this chapter is constituted in two ways. In verses one and two, it is constituted by one thing being absent of another, insofar as one of the things does not exist (yet). In verses three and four, both things exist, but are taken to be distinct, co-existing things. Insofar as they are distinct, they are taken to be different from one another.

It should be noted that there is a close relationship between "prior to," "concomitant with," and "after" on the one hand, and the "three characteristics of reality": "arising," "staying," and "ceasing,"[27] on the other. When the Nāgārjuna uses the term "before *x*" what is implied is ontological, i.e., "before the *arising* of *x*." Similarly, in

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[26] 6.4 "naikatve sahabhāvo 'sti na tenaiva hi tat saha|
pṛthaktve sahabhāvo 'tha kuta eva bhaviṣyati|| *Ibid.*, 139-140.

[27] On the three characteristics, see Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*, vol. 1, 222.

chapter six, the "staying" ("*sthiti*") of *rāga* and *rakta* is implied when they are in the epistemological relationship of *sahabhāva*. So we are justified in claiming a connection between the three characteristics of reality and the functions of identity and difference.

Thus far we have discussed the way that identification and differentiation function in the specific arguments of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Since it is my contention that this function is applied to reciprocally implicating phenomena, it remains to be demonstrated that this is not just an accidental observation.

Such confirmation is not difficult to find. For instance, at 18.10

> The dependence of one thing on another does not, therefore, (mean) that the one thing *is* the other nor that it is different. Hence, they are neither annihilated nor eternal.[28]

The statement made in the *Akutobhayā* commentary on 2.4 that the contradiction arises from treating the terms as independent, also receives confirmation elsewhere in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. 6.3 quoted above is one such example. Both in the discussion of 2.4 as well as in the discussion of 6.4, the reciprocal relationship is only possible if the

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[28] "pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat|
na cānyad api tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvataṃ||" *Ibid.*, 375.

phenomena involved are not independent of one another. In short, the terms must exist in a relationship of "dependence" *(apekṣa)*.

There are three chapters that seem to refute the thesis that things must be dependent on their counterparts; chapters 10, 14, and 20. In chapter 10, the "Fire and Fuel," verses 8-12 refute the possibility of dependence of one thing on another or visa versa.

> 10.8 If fire is dependent on wood and if wood is dependent on fire, then which one must be completed before fire is dependent on wood.
>
> 10.9 If fire is dependent on wood then there (would be) the establishment of an (already established) fire. If so wood would also be without anything relating to fire.
>
> 10.10 The thing which is established in dependence that is established dependent on that. If that which is to be relied on is (already) established, then what relies on what?
>
> 10.11 That entity which is established depending on (something) how can it depend on something not already established? Though something is established in dependence, it is not possible for there to be dependence.
>
> 10.12 Fire is dependent on wood and fire is

> independent of wood. Fire is dependent on wood and fire is not independent of wood.[29]

While this would seem to refute the idea of reciprocal implication, it turns out that only a kind of sequential reciprocity is refuted. The final point raised in the chapter is that we would do no better if we reified the relationship of mutuality itself. Such a relationship would again either be the same or different from its component parts:

> 10.16 Those who speak of the unity of soul and entities and [yet teach them as] distinct, I do not consider to be knowledgeable of the (Buddha's) teachings.[30]

Here, Candrakīrti's commentary on this verse demonstrates well the kind of relationship at the heart of

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[29] 10.8 "yadīndhanam apekṣyāgnir apekṣyāgnim yadīndhanaṃ|
katarat pūrva niṣpannaṃ yad apekṣyāgnir indhanaṃ||" *Ibid.*, 207.

10.9 "yadīndhanaṃ apekṣyāgnir agneḥ siddhasya sādhanaṃ|
evaṃ satāndhanaṃ cāpi bhaviṣyati niragnikaṃ||" *Ibid.*

10.10 "yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvas tam evāpekṣya sidhyati|
yadi yo 'pekṣitavyaḥ sa sidhyatāṃ kamapekṣya kaḥ||" *Ibid.*, 208.

10.11 "yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaḥ so 'siddho 'pekṣate kathaṃ|
athāpy apekṣate siddhas tvapekṣāsya na yujyate||" *Ibid.*, 209.

10.12 "apekṣyendhanam agnir na nānapekṣyāgnir indhanaṃ|
apekṣyendhanam agniṃ na nānapekṣyāgnim indhanaṃ||" *Ibid.*

[30] Text: "ātmanaś ca satattvaṃ ye bhāvānāṃ ca pṛthak pṛthak| nirdiśanti na tān manye śāsanasyārthakovidān||" *Ibid.*, 214. Translation, Inada, *Nāgārjuna*, 84.

the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.

> There, "*satat*" means "it occurs with that"; a co-existing entity *(satato*[31] *bhāva)* signifies co-existence *(satattva)*, non-isolation *(apṛthatva)*, non-differentiation *(ananyatva)*, unity *(ekatva)*. Those[32] who describe this co-existence of [one thing with another], the teacher [Nāgārjuna] does not think to be learned *(paṇḍita)* of the Buddha's teaching. For example, the soul is made known through its substratum (*upādāna* = the five *skandhas*), and only as something which is composite *(saha)* it comes into being by means of that substratum. The meaning is that [the *ātman*], without exception, does not exist seperately. Like the pot which is made known by means of the cause -- clay etc.. It exists only as non-distinct from [the clay], not individually. Thus, those who describe coexistence as the essence of entities do not see

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[31] Poussin's correction ("*sa[ta]to*") is confirmed by Tucci's mss. [see De Jong, "Textcritical Notes," 51.]

[32] Schayer identifies Candrakīrti's target here as the Vātsīputrīyas. The Vāsīputrīya belief in 'personhood,' *pudgala* was a belief that the unity of the aggregates that make up a person was the self. Thus, they did not really believe in an *ātman* in the sense that that Tīrthikas did. Nevertheless, Candrakīrti argues that by reifying the unity of aggregates, and seeing that unity as an existent thing, they are missing the point of the teaching of dependent origination. See Stanislaw Schayer, "Feuer und Brennstoff," *Rocznik Orjentalistyczny* 7, (1931): 50, note 29.

the reality of dependent origination which is the greatest profundity, devoid of [the extremes of] eternalism and annihilationism, [and is] the term[33] for dependent designation *(upādāyaprajñapti)*.[34]

Reciprocity does not occur between discrete things nor is the combination a thing in itself. Each component part is what it is only by virtue of the relationship, and would not exist *as that* apart from the relationship. Thus, each component can be neither a unity nor a diversity.

A similar argument occurs in chapter 14, "Samsārga Parīkṣā." The word Samsārga comes from *sam√sṛij* ("to unite", "to combine") and is often used to describe the relationship between the factors that make up the *āyatanas* -- such as eye, vision, what is seen. The notion of *samsārga* is that these are combined into a seamless unity. Given that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* affirms reciprocal implication, we would expect it to affirm the notion of *samsārga*. It does not. Its

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[33] Poussin's manuscripts read "*...opādāyaprajñaptyabhidhāna*" which he corrects to be "*...opādāyaprajñaptyabhidhāna[sya]*." *[Ibid.]* This reading is confirmed by Tucci's manuscript. See De Jong, "Textcritical Notes," 51.

[34] "tatra saha tena vartata iti satat, sa[ta]to bhāvaḥ satattvam apṛthaktvam ananyatvam ekatvam ity arthaḥ| tad etat satattvaṃ ye varṇayanti na tānācāryaḥ śāsanārtha-paṇḍitān manyate|| tadyathā, ātmā upādānena prajñapyate yena sahaiva tenopādānena saṃbhavati| sa na pṛthag avyatirekeṇaiva bhavatītyarthaḥ| evaṃ yena kāraṇena mṛdādinā ghaṭaḥ prajñapyate tadavyatirekenaiva sa bhavati na pṛthak| evamātmano bhāvānāṃ ca satattvaṃ ye varṇayanti na te parama- [215] gambhīrasya pratītyasamutpādasya śāśvatocchedarahitasyopādāyaprajñaptyabhidhāna[sya] tattvaṃ paśyanti|" Text: Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 214-215.

argument is not so much against the idea of *samsārga* itself but the rather against the idea that there are discrete things that exist together forming a unity. In other words, the objection here is not against the relationship but against the idea that unity is the uniting of distinct things. Hence, even in unity there is no sameness nor differentiation.

14.5 An other is an other which is dependent on an other. Without an other which is other it is not an other. Something is dependent on something and therefore this does not produce an other.[35]

14.6 If an other is [in itself] other than "other" then it would also be other without the other one. Yet, without the other an other is not "other." Hence, it [the other] does not exist.

14.7 Otherness is not in the other nor in the non-other. There is no otherness because there is no other any more than there is the "same."[36]

With the examination of chapter 14 we have come fūll circle. Each chapter of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* consists of

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[35] cf. *NyāyaSūtra Bhāṣya* on *Nyāya Sūtra* 2.2.31.

[36] 14.5 "anyad anyat pratītānyan nānyad anyad ṛte 'nyaḥ|
yat pratītya ca yat tasmāt tad anyan nopapadyate||" *Ibid.*, 252.

14.6 "yady anyad anyad anyasmād anyasmād apyṛte bhavet|
tad anyad anyad anyasmād ṛte nāsti ca nāstyataḥ||" *Ibid.*, 253.

terms related to one another by a relationship of reciprocal implication. The entities so related are investigated by means of terms that force the issue of sameness and difference. In this chapter we have shown that each of these pairs of opposites *function* in the same manner as identity and differentiation. Finally, when we look at chapter 14 we can understand why each of these sets of terms is inadequate; sameness and difference themselves are reciprocally implicating terms.

To sum up what has been said so far, there are, in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, sets of terms used to inquire into the subject matter of each chapter. These terms function to highlight either unity or differentiation between a set of reciprocally implicating phenomena. These phenomena exist in such a relationship to one another that any suggestion of identity or difference between them is untenable and so there arises an apparent paradox.

The fact that paradoxes arise when the dichotomous pairs are used to inquire into the nature of such relationships is a strong signal that there is something wrong with such a procedure. Furthermore, the fact that the dichotomous pairs themselves turn out to imply one another reciprocally strongly suggests that the problem lies in the dichotomous pair rather than in the relationship of reciprocal implication. Taking this one step farther, if identification

and differentiation lie at the heart of each of the dichotomous pairs, then the real problem lies in the mental function of identification and differentiation itself. There are, then two levels on which the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* functions -- the level of dependent origination (the mode of occurance in which there is no sameness or difference) and the level of identification and differentiation (the activity of falsification on the part of our cognition).

Identification and differentiation, if put in terms of *abhidharmic* understanding of the human psyche will, in turn, lead us to specific canonical discussions of the three gates of liberation as well as to some early articulations of dependent-origination.

Probably the most basic conception of the person of the Buddhism of Nāgārjuna's day was the conception of the five aggregates or "*skandhas.*" These are form *(rūpa)*, feeling *(vedanā)*, perception *(saṃjñā)*, activities *(saṃskāra)*, and consciousness *(vijñāna)*. Of the three perceptual aggregates *saṃjñā* is the most active. On the one hand, *saṃjñā* is defined according to its six objects (corresponding to the six sense faculties: sight, audition, smell, taste, touch, and thought). On the other hand, especially in Abhidharma works, *saṃjñā* is defined as an active construal of what is perceived as a definite *something*. So in the *Abhidharmakośa* chapter 1:14cd Vasubandhu writes:

> The notion *(saṃjñā* consists in the apprehension of the characteristics *[saṃjñā nimittodgrahaṇātmikā]*. The apprehension of diverse natures *(svabhāva)* - to percieve that something is blue, yellow, long, short, male, female, friend *(śāta)*, enemy *(aśāta)* agreeable, disagreable, etc. - that is the *saṃjñāskandha*… There is room to distinguish six kinds of *saṃjñā*, according to the organ just as for [consciousness].[37]

In his lengthy discussion of this subject, Paul Williams makes the following distinction between the *saṃjñā* and *vijñāna* aggregates:

> In a perceptual act… the blue cup is apprehended but it is not apprehended that the cup is blue, the difference between the vijñāna- and saṃjñā-skandhas largely marks the difference between apprehending a composite thing and becoming consciously aware of the state of affairs marked by that thing.[38]

When we become aware of a thing as what it is, this representation invariably involves identification or differentiation (an insight that would later form the basis for the notion of *apoha* theory). The location of the problematic activity of identification and differentiation

[37] Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*, vol. 1, 28.

[38] Williams, "Some Aspects of Language," 15.

within the function of the *saṃjñāskandha* is particularly significant for soteriology due to the role (or the absence thereof) that *saṃjñā* plays in the levels of absorption (*dhyāna*) in Buddhist meditation. The highest of the "formless" absorptions (directly before cessation) is called "*naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana,*" "the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception." The advantage of this level of meditation is that it is free of the problems that specifically arise from *saṃjñā*. Apparently, it was general consensus in the early canon that the function of *saṃjñā* was a hindrance to spiritual awakening. Again, in the words of Vasubandhu:

> The fourth *ārūpya* [meditation] receives its name from the fact that *saṃjñā*, "notion, idea," here is quite fallible. The *saṃjñā* here is neither clear nor keen[39] (*paṭu*), but he is not completely without *saṃjñā*.
>
> Without a doubt, one prepares for this *ārūpya* [meditation] by thinking: "The *saṃjñā* is a sickness! The *saṃjñā* is an sore! The *saṃjñā* is an arrow! The absence of *saṃjñā* is stupification (*saṃmoha*)! The *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana* is tranquil, it is

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[39] Poussin translates *paṭu* as *vive*. The English, "keen" makes more sense in context.

excellent![40]

The only level of absorption higher than this is the absorption of cessation *(nirodha)*. There are two kinds of *nirodha* in Sarvāstivāda, and while the difference between them does not concern us here, what they both have in common is the cessation of mind and mental concomitants *(citta-caita)*. In addition, one of the common interpretations of this absorption is that it is a state of mind wherein all elements cease. This interpretation is attributed to Vasumitra (one of the principle authors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*) and is referred to in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*,[41] Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā Sphuṭārthā*,[42] as well as in Saṃghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra*.[43] Thus, by all indications this was an interpretation for *nirodha* dating back at least as

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[40] Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*, vol. 5, 144. A similar quotation (though in a different context) can be found in V. Trenkner, ed., *Majjhima Nikāya*, vol. 2, (London: Luzac & Co., 1960), 231: "Tatra bhikkhāva, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā saññiṃ attānaṃ paññāpenti arogaṃ parammaraṇā, tesaṃ eke paṭikkosanti, yepi te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā asaññi attānaṃ paññāpenti arogaṃ parammaraṇā Tesaṃ eke paṭikkosanti. Taṃ kissa-hetu: saññā rogo, saññāgaṇḍo, saññā sallaṃ, asaññā sammoho. Etaṃ sattaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ nevasaññānāsaññanti, tayidaṃ bhikkhave, tathāgato abhijānāti."

[41] Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*, vol. 1, 213.

[42] Yaśomitra, *Sphuṭārthā*, 167.31ff.

[43] Collett Cox, *Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence - An annotated Translation on Factors Dissociated from Thought from Saṅghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra.*, Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series, (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995), 246.

early as the *Mahāvibhāṣa* (and hence, an opinion contemporary with Nāgārjuna), though, as we will see in chapter 6, the idea of the four elements (*mahābhūtāni*) ceasing in consciousness as a goal of meditation occurs much earlier in the "*Kevaddha Sutta*" of the *Dīgha Nikāya*.

Upon leaving the state where one has experienced the *nirvāṇa dhātu,* the next moment of consciousness, which is an effect of the previous moment of absorption, is characterized as empty, signless and wishless. These characteristics are referred to as the three "gates of liberation" *(vimokṣamukha)* or the three "concentrations" *(samādhi)*. They occur to the mind only after coming out of cessation (as a result of the previous moment's contact with the element of nirvāṇa), because in cessation there is no mental activity. Yet, these three terms do not just describe a subjective experience -- they occur because they have as their basis an object (Nirvāṇa) which has these three characteristics. These are most often characterized as *śūnyatā, animitta*, and *apraṇihita*. For the moment, let us focus on *animitta* and *apraṇihita*.

The fact that *nirodha* occurs after the state where *saṃjñā* has ceased means that any kind of identification of something *as a known thing* ceases as well. According to one of the *abhidharma* explanations recorded, the reason why such identification ceases is that the meditator has taken as an

object of meditation that which has no identifiable sign *(nimitta)*, i.e., nirvāṇa. For example, in the *Abhidharmakośa*:

> The absorption associated *(samprayukta)* with the aspects *(ākāra)* of the [noble] truth of cessation (nirodhasatya) - that is to say, the absorption in which the ascetic contemplates nirodha - is called *ānimitta, ānimittasamādhi*.... Why does it receive that name? - Because Nirvāṇa or nirodha, being free of ten *nimittas*, is called *animitta*. The absorption which has Nirvāṇa for an object is such an *animitta*. the ten *nimittas*, marks or characteristics, are: a. the five *āyatanas*, external sources of sensible cognition, color-figure *(rūpa)*, sound, etc.; b. male and female; c. the three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*... arising, persistance-change, death.[44]

Notice the list of *nimittas* that are absent in Nirvāna (or *nirodha*). With the exception of male and female, sense data, arising, staying, and ceasing form the fundamental dichotomies utilized in the majority of the investigations of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (as discussed above). An even closer fit can be found in the parallel discussion of the "signless gate" in the *Prajñāpāramitā Upādeśa*, attributed to Nāgārjuna himself.[45]

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[44] Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*, vol. 5, 185.

[45] Étienne Lamotte has discussed the authorship of this work at some

After these have been examined and considered, he establishes that they are all inexistents *(anupalabdha)*. That it is a question of the character of a man *(puruṣanimitta)* or of a woman *(strīnimitta)*, of the characteristics of identity or of difference, they are nothing but names equivalent to the theory of "me" and "mine." It is why male and female, identity and difference, are really

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length. [See Étienne Lamotte, *Der Verfasser des Upadeśa und seine Quellen*, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, no. 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973).] He concludes that Nāgārjuna was not its author. In the following, I will summarize his findings. His conclusion is based on the following criteria:

a) Style. Nāgārjuna is known for writing in a terse, mostly versical form; the *Upadeśa* is prosaic and encyclopedic.

b) Place. Legend has it that Nāgārjuna lived in Southern India (perhaps in what is now Andhara Pradesh); the *Upadeśa* quite a number of place references, all of which are in Northwestern India, extending into Iran and central Asia. For example, at *Traité* pages 385 and 450-451, the author describes with great detail Lake Anavatapta in the Himalayas.

c) Time. Nāgārjuna is said to have lived sometime in the second half of the second century or first half of the third century. The *Upadeśa* seems to have been written well after the second Kuṣāṇa Dynasty due to its references to the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* and to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. The *Upadeśa* also refers to works of Āryadeva, and Rāhulabhadra who known to be junior contemporaries of Nāgārjuna.

In all, I find Lammote's arguments suggestive but not absolutely compelling. The legends relating the life of Nāgārjuna are hagiography, and not solid enough for us to be sure that he lived in the South during the second century. Indeed, Lamotte himself mentions that the earliest account of Nāgārjuna's life occurs in "Tao-ngan[b]" "The Description Of Western Lands." In this work he claims that Nāgārjuna lived in North Kosala (the capital of Śrāvastī) in the kingdom of Benares. [*Ibid.*, 32-33]. Furthermore, the evidence that he cites to support a fourth century date for the *Upadeśa* is more circumstantial that of the place of its authorship. It should, for example, come as no surprise that Nāgārjuna knew Āryadeva's work. Āryadeva was his student!

inexistants.[46]

Notice that the *Upādeśa* adds "identity" and "difference" to the list of *nimitta* which are absent from the *animitta-samādhi*. What we have in this section of the *Upādeśa* is a list of all of the categories which play a fundamental role in the investigations of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.

If we are to draw any conclusions from the way that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* argues each point, we cannot avoid the fact that each argument of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* consists of the opponent attempting to apply what are here identified as the fundamental categories of apperception *(nimittas)*, via the faculty of *saṃjñā*, to a reality that confounds precisely this application. In this sense, it is not a far leap to say that any relationship of reciprocal implication is *animitta*.

The connection between the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s dialectic and the *animitta* gate of liberation is carried even farther in the *Upādeśa*. Immediately following the paragraph cited above, the *Upādeśa* goes into a lengthy argument about the interdependence of the elements which is virtually identical to arguments in the *Ratnāvalī* and the *Madhyamakāvatāra* which I will discuss in the last chapter. Again, while the signless gate is most often associated with high levels of absorption *(samāpatti)*, it is interesting to

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[46] Lamotte, Étienne, *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāyānaprajñāparamitāśāstra)*. Vol. III, (Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1970), 1216.

note that the *Upādeśa,* like the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and the *Ratnāvalī,* makes *animitta* something to be understood through rational investigation, rather than something to be attained from cessation of consciousness.

So far, all that has been said concerning the soteriological significance of the arguments of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* has dealt with psychological theories concerned with entering a state without thought. There are, however, other ways that soteriology *(mokṣa)* has traditionally been discussed in Buddhism. One may either discuss it terms of where one is released *to* (namely, Nirvāṇa, the unconditioned, etc.); or in terms of that *from* which one is released (namely, defilements). The "wishless" concentration is primarily concerned with the latter.

There have been a number of terms used to designate these defilements, and different lists enumerating exactly what these defilements are. The most common terms are *kleśa, saṃkleśa, saṃyojana, anuśaya, āśrava,* etc. The terms that the Nāgārjuna employs in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* are: *karma, kleśa, and saṃyojana, and prapañca.*[47] There is clearly a connection between them. So we have in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 18.5:

> There is release from karma and *kleśa* [because]

[47] *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 14.2, 17.26-27, 18.5, 23.2-5 & 24-25. The term "saṃyojana" is used in 17.28.

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> *karma* and *kleśa* are [mental] construction *[vikapata]*. These generate from *prapañca*, which, however, is ceased *[nirudhyate]* in *śūnyatā*.[48]

Since the *prapañca* is connected to dependent-origination in the first verse of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, it is the most fundamental of the four. It is a term which is employed early in the Buddhist canon, and yet it is a term whose meaning is not so clear.

What is *prapañca*?[49] There are at least three very different definitions relevant to the present study. Etymologically, the Sanskrit is derived from the verb "√*pac*" (alt. "√*pañc*"), meaning "to cook" or "to germinate." Monier-Williams gives the following definitions for the noun:

> "*prapañca*": expansion, development, manifestation, manifoldness, diversity, amplification, prolixity, diffuseness, appearance, phenomenon; (in rhet.) mutual false praise; (in dram.) ludicrous dialogue, deceit, trick, fraud, error."[50]

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48 "karma kleśa kṣayān mokṣa karmaklesā vikalpataḥ| te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate||" [Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 349-350.]

49 This concept has also been discussed by Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda [in Bhikkhu Ñaṇananda, *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought: An Essay on 'Papañca' and 'Papañca-Saññā-Saṅkhā,'* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971)]. Unfortunately, I received this work only after this section was complete. I cover much of the same textual material that he has treated.

50 Monier-Williams, Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v. "prapañca."

At base, the meaning of the word has something to do with growth, multiplication, speech and appearance (vs. reality).

The closest equivalent in the Pāli canon is *papañca* which Rhys Davids explains:

> Papañca... [in its P. meaning uncertain whether identical with Skt. prapañca... more likely as suggested by etymology & meaning of Lat. im-ped-iment-um connected w/pāda, thus perhaps originally pa-pad-ya i.e., what is in front of, an impediment" ... to delay, obstacle, burden, impediment; illusion, obsession, hindrance to spiritual progress.[51]

These definitions, indeed, do not seem to bear much relation to the Sanskrit definitions. The third definition of *prapañca* comes from the commentators on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, who are fairly consistent in glossing it as "speech"[52] -- a definition that bears more relation to

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[51] Rhys-Davids, *Pāli Dictionary*, s.v. "papañca."

[52] Cf. Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 373: "Ateva tat prapañcair prapañcitam| prapañco hi vāk prapañcayatyarthānīti kṛtvā prapañcair prapanncitaṃ vāgbhir vyāhṛtamtiyarthaḥ|"

Akutobhayā: "prapañcair prapancitam iti abhilāpalakṣaṇasya prapañcopaśamāt|" (T. 83b)

Buddhapālita does not gloss it as such here.

Bhāvaviveka: (T. 237a)

Avalokitavrāta: (T. 16b)

the Sanskrit definition. In the following, I will argue that the meaning of the word *prapañca* in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* incorporates elements from all three sets of definitions and thus any one definition will not be sufficient.

Let us begin with the early canon. In early India, the term *prapañca* seems to have had a colloquial connotation close to "effusive verbosity." If this were the extent of the meaning of the word in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* then statements such as "dependent-origination which is the auspicious pacification of all *prapañca*" become a matter of merely keeping one's mouth shut. In light of this, we should look to the specifically Buddhist literary tradition, for clues as to the meaning of this word.

Though such an endeavor encounters a number of theoretical difficulties, the most obvious place to look is in the literature of the *Sūtra Pitaka*. This brings us to the problem of the *Pāli Dictionary* definition. Because a Sanskrit recension of the *Sūtra Pitaka* no longer exists, we must rely on other recensions, the closest one available being Pāli. But this begs the question, how do we know that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is using the term *prapañca* in the same sense as the Pāli canon uses the term *papañca*? In this matter, the dictionaries will not help. We must retrace the steps of Davids and Stede to re-examine their definition. In so doing, subtle implications become evident when we look at

the use of the term in the early canon. It is only when the use of this term is put into the context of the prior textual tradition that it becomes clear how the word might be used in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and its commentaries.

First of all it should be noted, that the term *papañca* is not an uncommon term in the Pāli canon, although most of the instances of this term are not particularly helpful in determining the meaning of the word. The majority of the references will be of one of two types: a) statements that claim that a good *bikkhu* does not delight in or attach to papañca, and; b) statements that the Buddha (or a Buddha) has cut off all *papañca* and is thus *nippapañca*.[53]

Apart from these references that give only a passing mention of the term, there are a few passages in the canon that provide a more detailed view. First of all, there are a number of other discussions of *prapañca* which discuss its relationship to other factors of our cognitive activity. These passages are reminiscent of later discussions of dependent-origination. Perhaps the earliest such reference occurs in the *Sutta Nipāta* in the "*Kalahavivādasuttaṃ*." The sutta begins with the question:

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[53] "ākāse padaṃ n'atthi, samaṇo n'atthi bāhire| papanncābhiratā pajā nippapanncā tathāgatā" This is echoed in *Lalitāvistara*, 313: "…anālayaṃ niṣprapañcam anutpādam asaṃbhavam| viviktaṃ prakṛtīśūnyaṃ dharmacakraṃ pravartitam||" Something of this same idea is also confirmed in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 22.15: "prapañcayati ye buddhaṃ prapañcātītamavyayaṃ| te prapañcahatāḥ sarve ne paśyanti tathāgataṃ||"

> Whence arise quarrels, disputes, lamentations and grief, together with avarice also pride and arrogance, together with slander too? Whence do these arise? Tell me this I pray.

What follows is a series of answers and further questions of the form, "where does *x* have its origin?" "when what exists, does *x* come to be?" -- the answer being, "when *x* is *y* comes to be." On the level of each verse we have a pattern similar to the formula, "'this' being, 'that' becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that becomes not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases."[54] On the scale of the entire *sutta* we have a chain of causation similar to the familiar twelve-links. The chain can be summarized as follows: "quarrels, disputes..., etc." have their origin *(nidānā)* in what is dear *(piyā)*; things that are dear have their origin in desire *(chandā)*; desire has its origins in the pleasant and unpleasant; decisions *(vinicchayā)* have their origin in "seeing non-existence and existence in forms"; anger *(kodho)*, lying *(mosavajja)*, doubt *(kathaṃkathā)*, and "whatever [mental states] have been spoken of by the ascetic" come into existence when this very pair exist; the pleasant/unpleasant *(sātta/asātta)* existent/non-existent *(bhavam/vibhavam)* have their origin in contact *(phassā)*; contact and possessions *(icchā)* are dependent

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[54] *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, vol. 2, 23. also, *Majjhima.Nikāya*. vol. 1, 262-263.

(paṭicca) on name-and-form *(nāmañ ca rūpañ)*.

At each point, when the origin exists, the originated exists. When the origin does not exist the originated does not exist.

The affinities of this sutta to the more common formulas of dependent-origination has long been pointed out. As early as 1913 Louis de la Vallée Poussin made following reconstruction of the argument:

> One has… the *chanda*, desire, which resides in the agreable and the dissagreable *(sāta, asāta)* that is to say [it resides] on the vedanā, sensation, which in its turn resides in the *sparśa*, contact. The cause of contact is called *nāma-rūpa*, "name and form"… or again *prapañca*, - that is to say the diversity, the development of ideas and words… which belongs to *saññā*, intelligence, conscience, ideation.[55]

I do not agree with Poussin insofar as he equates *prapañca* with *nāmarūpa*. *Papañca* is mentioned only once at the end of the sutta when the series is completed; verses 873 and 874 summarize the whole lesson.

> 873. 'For one attained to what state does form disappear? How does happiness or misery disappear

[55] Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Theorie Des Douze Causes*. (Gand: E. van Goethem, 1913), 3.

also? Tell me how it disappears. My intention is that we should know this.

874. "He is not a perceiver with (his original) perception, he is not a perceiver with deranged perception, he is not a perceiver without perception, he is not a perceiver of what has disappeared. For one who has attained to such a state form disappears, for that which is named '*papañca*' has its origin in cognition."[56]

If there is any pattern being established here, one should expect that the latter passage would read, from the disappearance of *saññā* (Sanskrit *saṃjñā*) there is the disappearance of *nāmarūpa*, not *papañca*. Since this is not the case, it is then more likely that *prapañca* stands for the entire series. Furthermore, *rūpa* in *nāmarūpa* generally refers to the *rūpa-skandha* of the one who is perceiving. *Nāma* and *rūpa* are the two elements that come together to create a living creature. On the other hand, the *rūpa* that is referred to in verse 874 is *rūpa as it is perceived* ; as is the *rūpa* of verse 867 which is perceived (literally "seen" "*disvā*" = a

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[56] Dines Andersen and Helmer Smith ed.,*Sutta Nipāta*, (London: Luzac & Co., 1965), verse 873. "Kathaṃsametassa vibhoti rūpaṃ, sukhaṃ dukhaṃ vā pi kathaṃ vibhoti, etam me pabrūhi yathā vibhoti, taṃ jāniyāma iti me mano ahū.

874. Na saññsaññī na visaññasaññī no pi asaññī na vibhūtasaññī, evaṃsametassa vibhoti rūpaṃ, saññānidānā hi papañcasaṃkhā."

saññā) to be either existent or non-existent.

The final reason comes from the commentaries. There are two Pāli commentaries on this sutta, the latest was written by Buddhaghosa, while the other (the *Mahānidessa*) is much earlier and is anonymous. The *Mahānidessa* commentary glosses the last line of verse 874 as follows:

> "The verbal *papañca* has its origin in perception *(saññā)*." Verbal *papañca* is verbal *papañca* of desire, verbal *papañca* of view, verbal *papañca* of conceit, has its origin in *saññā*, its arising in *saññā*, its birth in *saññā*, its cause in *saññā*. Thus The verbal *papañca* has its origin in perception *(saññā)*."[57]

Here, the commentary glosses *papañca* as three kinds -- *papañca* of desire, *papañca* of view, and *papañca* of conceit. These three would serve well to classify each of the factors mentioned in this *sutta* (from *kalaha* to *icchā*) and would not seem so relevant when restricted solely to *nāmarūpa*.

From this vantage point, *papañca* means the links, but not necessarily the relations between them; it denotes the defilements. Insofar as the defilements are what are

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[57] Louis de la Vallé Poussin and E.J. Thomas, eds., *Mahāniddesa*, vol. 2, (1916-1917; London: Luzac & Co., 1978), 26: "*Saññānidānā hi papañcasaṃkhā* ti. Papañcāyeva papañcasaṃkhā taṇhāpapañcasaṃkhā diṭṭhipapañca-saṃkhā mānapapañcasaṃkhā saññānidānā saññāsamudayā saññājātiyā saññāpabhavā ti, saññānidānā hi papañcasaṃkhā"

produced, they are the products of the productive activity of the mind. In light of this *sutta*, we can assume that *papañca* here is a general term for both cognitive and affective afflictions in reference to the noetic fomentation which produces them. Somehow, this fomentation is responsible for a host of problems.

This particular *sutta* focuses on problems of wrong speech (a major theme in this chapter of the *Sutta Nipāta*). Hence, in the use of the word in this passage we can see the possibility for each of the definitions listed at the beginning of this section: 1) *prapañca* is "proliferation" insofar as is what *produces* the whole chain of afflictions that plague existence, 2) *prapañca* is "defilement" insofar as it is synonymous with the list of defilements, and 3) *prapañca* is "speech" insofar as it is "verbal *papañca*" and leads ultimately to "quarrels, and strife...." At this stage these aspects of the word are not so clear; nevertheless, the nature of the afflictions as well as the process which produces, though hinted at here, becomes clearer in comparison with later *suttas*.

A similar passage to that of the *Sutta Nipāta* can be found in the *Majjhima Nikāya*[58] in the *Madhupiṇḍikasutta*.

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[58] This sutta also exists, with little or no variation in the Chinese canon. For a full comparison of the two verstions, cf. Bhikṣu Thich Minh Chau, *The Chinese Madhyama Āgama and the Pāli Majjhima Nikāya: A Comparative Study*, Buddhist Traditions Series, vol. 15, A. Wayman ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991), 233-239.

Mahākassyapa gives a detailed explanation as follows:

"Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what one mentally proliferates as the source, perceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past future,[59] and present forms recognizable through the eye.[60]

This passage is more technical and precise than the *Sutta Nipāta*. Nevertheless, we can see this passage is occupied with the same concern, namely, the origin of defilements from cognitive activity. The important similarities between the two passages are, firstly, that both are concerned with defilements in general but also specific defilements (especially *diṭṭhi*) as they lead to karma of speech (wrangling, etc.). Secondly, in both passages, emphasis is placed on the relationship between *saṃjñā* and

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[59] Cf. Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 224.

[60] Translation, *Middle Length Sayings*, 203. Text, *Majjhima Nikāya*, 111-112. "Cakkhuñcācakkhuviññāṇaṃ rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhiññāṇaṃ tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso. Phassapaccayā vedanā. Yaṃ vedeti, taṃ [PTS Page 112] sañjānāti. Yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi. Yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti. Yapapañcasaññāsaṅakhānidānaṃ purisaṃ papañcasaññāsaukhā samudācaranti atītānāgatapaccuppannesu cakkhuviññeyyesu rūpesu."

papañca. In both cases *saṃjñā* is the origin of *papañca* (which, in turn is all of the other defilements) and when there is no *saṃjñā* there ceases to be *papañca*. This is explicit in the Buddha's speech of which this is a summary:

> 7. Then a certain bikkhu asked the Blessed One: "But, Venerable Sir, what is [the teaching] that the Blessed One asserts whereby one does not quarrel with anyone in the world...? And, venerable sir, how is it that perceptions no more underlie that brahmin who abides detached from sensual pleasures, without perplexity, shorn of worry, free from craving for any kind of being?
>
> 8. ""Bhikkus, as to the source through which perceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man: if nothing is found there to delight in, welcome and hold to, this is the end of the underlying tendency to lust, of the underlying tendency to aversion, of the underlying tendency to views, of the underlying tendency to doubt, of the underlying tendency to conceit, of the underlying tendency to desire for being, of the underlying tendency to ignorance; this is the end of resorting to rods and weapons, of quarrels, brawls, disputes, recrimination, malice, and false speech; here these evil unwholesome states cease without

remainder."[61]....

Structurally, this passage is set up to remind the reader of discussions of dependent-origination. The Buddha begins by talking about a set of afflictions ("rods, weapons, quarrels) parallel to (suffering, misery...) whose cessation occurs from the cessation of a chain of progressively more fundamental factors of mental activity. The form is of "when *x* ceases, *y* ceases." The difference between the two, of course, lies in the links themselves.

Sutta-Nipāta	***Saṃyutta-Nikāya***
phassa	*phassa*
vedanā	*sadāyatāni*
saññā	*vedanā*

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[61] Ibid., 201-202. Text: *Majjhima Nikāya*, 109-110: "Atha kho tesaṃ bhikkhunaṃ acirapakkantassa bhagavato etadahosi: " idaṃ kho no āvuso bhagavā saṅkhittena uddesaṃ uddisitvā vitthārena atthā avibhajitvā uṭṭhāyāsanā vihāraṃ paviṭṭho: yatonidānaṃ bhikkhū purisaṃ papañcasaññāsaṅkhā samudāvaranti, ettha ce natthi abhinanditabbaṃ abhivaditabbaṃ ajjhosetabbaṃ, esevanto rāgānusayānaṃ. Esevanto paṭighānusyānaṃ. Esevanto diṭṭhānusayānaṃ. Esevanto vicikicchānusayānaμ. Esevanto mānānusayānaṃ. Esevanto bhavarāgānusayānaṃ. Esevanto avijjānusayānaṃ. Esevanto daṇḍādānasatthādānakalahaviggahavivāda tuvantuvampesuññamusāvādānaṃ. Etthete pāpakā akusalā dhammā aparisesānirujjhantīti. Ko nu kho imassa bhagavatā saṅkhittena uddesassa uddiṭṭhassa vitthārena atthaṃ avibhattassa vitthārena atthaṃ vibhajeyyā"ti. Atha kho tesaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ etadahosi: " ayaṃ ceva āyasmā mahākaccāno satthu veva saṃvaṇṇito sambhāvito ca viññūnaṃ sabrahmacārīnaṃ. Pahoti cāyasmā mahākaccāno imassa bhagavatā saṅkhittena uddesassa uddiṭṭhassa vitthārena attaṃ avibhattassa vitthāyenāyasmā mahākaccānonnūna mayaṃ yenāyasmāmahākaccāno tenupasaṅkameyyāma, upasaṅkamitvāāyasmantaṃ mahākaccānaṃ etamatthaṃ paṭipuccheyyāmā"ti.

vitakka	*taṇhā*
papañca =(all anusayas)	*upādāna =(all anusayas)*
	bhava
kalahā vivādā Paridevasokā sahamacchirā ca, mānātimānā sahapesunā	*Jātijāramāraṇa*

There is definitely a parallel between the two passages. The difference, however, is that the emphasis in the left hand column is entirely on the cognitive-perceptual aspect of mental activity while "*upādāna*" can be both affective and cognitive-perceptual. There is an even greater difference between the two passages when we take into account that the common interpretation of *taṇhā* and *upādāna* is incarnational, while *vitakka* and *papañca* focus on the mental activity of the present moment.

There is a close connection between the Mādhyamika project of realizing emptiness and the canonical understanding of the path leading to the cessation of papañca. The connection, although implicit, comes into view in Candrakīrti's commentary on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 18.5 (quoted above):

> There is release from *karma* and *kleśa* [because] *karma* and *kleśa* are [mental] construction *[vikapata]*. These generate from *prapañca*, which, however, is ceased [*nirudhyate*] in

śūnyatā.

[Commy:] Thus, *karma* and *kleśa* occur from mental construction *[vikalpata]*. And these mental constructions, due to continual practice in beginningless *samsāra*, are produced from various *prapañca* with the characteristic of knowledge, that which is known, speech, speaker, doer, what is done, action, deed, pot, cloth, crown, chariot, form, feeling, female, male, attainment, loss, pleasure, pain, fame, obscurity, blame, (or) praise.

And this worldly *prapañca* is ceased without remainder in emptiness which is the view of the emptiness of the nature of all things.

How so? Because, when (something) should grasped as substantial or as they are manifested, there is the net of *prapañca*. Hence, if a daughter of a barren woman were not perceived to have a shapely *(rūpavat)*, and nubile form, those possessed by passion *[rāgiṇa]* would not be made to enter into *prapañca*. And if they do not enter into *prapañca* then the this baseless *(ayoniśo)* object would not cause the entrance into conceptualization *(vikalpa)*. If they do not enter into the net of (mental) construction, *karma* and *kleśa* will not arise because there won't be the root (defilement) of *satkāyadṛṣṭi*

> (belief in a real self) due to the attachment to "me" and "mine." And if the essence of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* does not arise, then they do not create the host of *kleśas* and *karmas*, pure, impure, and neutral....[62]

Clearly, Candrakīrti is expressing the same idea here as the passage cited above from the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* -- namely that it is the function of the mind in identifying things and building conceptual schemes upon these initial identifications that leads to *karma* and *kleśas*. When all things are understood to be empty, the understanding of emptiness works against the normal activity of identification and differentiation and thus undermines the process that leads to the production of *karma*.

The opening salutation of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* connects "dependent-origination" *(pratītyasamutpāda)* with "the blissful quiescence of prapañca" *(prapañcopaśamaṃ śīvaṃ)*. If it is the case that dependent-origination in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is the kind of relationship that admits of neither identity nor differentiation, then the dichotomous categories *(nimitta)* through which we interact with the world and which are tied to the mental function of apperception *(saṃjñā)*, must cease when applied to that which is dependently arisen. Conversely, it is only when emptiness is not seen, that the defilements of greed, hatred and confusion

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[62] Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 350-351.

can proliferate.

Chapter 6: Allusions to Dependent Origination

In the last chapter I demonstrated how the structure of Nāgārjuna's arguments in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* allude to canonical teachings. More specifically, I have shown how the dichotomies raised in Nāgārjuna's arguments allude to canonical teachings about perception *(saṃjñā)* and its role in the production of defilements. On the other hand, the fact that the investigations of all such dichotomies end in paradox, suggests that reality is somehow antithetical to the way perception construes the world. When the dichotomies are seen in this light, Nāgārjuna's negation of dichotomous opposites becomes a way that leads to the cessation of *prapañca*. In these two sides of Nāgārjuna's arguments alone we can see that his method does not contradict the four noble truths. Furthermore, reality removed from this *prapañca* runs parallel to canonical discussions of nirvāṇa, described as empty, signless and wishless.

The arguments of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* gain soteriological significance as well as canonical authority by alluding to the canon. In this chapter I will show that some of the canonical allusions in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* function as double *entendre*, referring to both Mahāyāna and Śrāvakayāna texts. Furthermore, the placement of these references relative to one another and through the mediating activity of the logic presents Śravakayāna canon and Mahāyāna

doctrine as finding their common ground in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* demonstration of emptiness. In doing so, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* expands the doctrinal domain normally allowed to canon among the Śrāvakayāna sects to include the teachings of Mahāyāna.

In the last chapter we looked how each investigation is carried out by way of dichotomous opposites. This led to a parallel between what the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* was doing and canonical descriptions of cessation. This chapter will investigate the way these dichotomies allude specifically to canonical descriptions of dependent-origination. I argue that the way that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* juxtaposes references to cessation against references to dependent origination advocates a reading practice that places the Śrāvakayāna canon and Mahāyāna teachings of emptiness on the same level. The significance of dependent origination for a text being considered to be *buddhavacana* cannot be underestimated. On the one hand, dependent origination plays an undisputedly important role in *sūtra* and on the other hand it is identified with *dharmatā*.

The allusions to canonical dependent-origination do not leave the concept unaltered in the transition. Dependent-origination is constantly juxtaposed with allusions to emptiness in such a way as to merge with the canonical teachings about nirvāṇa. To demonstrate this we have to go

back to the canon itself. I will highlight the important scriptural passages that Nāgārjuna alludes to and then show how he recontextualizes them in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.

Just as canonical descriptions of impermanence and suffering are formulaic, the majority of canonical passages dealing with dependent-origination have a formulaic structure as well. In the canon the passages on dependent-origination occur in response to a question from an interlocutor. Invariably the question is of an "either/or" variety, implying a false dichotomization on the part of the speaker. Often, all possible positions with regard to the dichotomy are denied, producing a kind of tetralemma (two more options than a dilemma: neither A, nor -A, nor both, nor neither). The Buddha responds that A and -A are extreme views and that the middle position is the 12 links *(dvadaśāṅga)* of dependent-origination -- that old age, sickness and death has as its condition birth, birth has as its condition becoming, becoming has as its condition grasping, grasping has as its condition desire, desire has as its condition feelings, feelings have as their condition contact between sense organ and object, such contact has as its condition the six sense spheres, the six sense spheres have as their condition body and consciousness, body and consciousness have as their condition karma, and finally the root of karma is ignorance.

The first clue in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* that these

dichotomous terms bear some relationship to canonical discussions of dependent-origination occurs in the first verse, the *nāmaskāra*. In the works of Indian philosophy in general and in Buddhist works in particular, the most important elements of the entire work are often set out in this introductory verse. The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is no different. It begins with the following verse:

> I pay homage to the fully enlightened one whose true, venerable words teach that dependent-origination, which is the blissful pacification of all mental proliferation, non-cessation, non-arising, non-annihilation, non-eternality, non-unity, non-differentiated, non-coming, non-going.[1]

It is not clear, given the present state of research on the relative dates of the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*, whether Nāgārjuna wrote all of this verse (including the eight negations) or whether "...the fully-enlightened one who taught..." means that the list of eight negations are a quotation from the *Pañcaviṃśati Prajñāpāramitā*:

> "And how does he wisely know conditioned co-production? He wisely knows it as neither

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[1] Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā, 11. "anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam
anekartham ananartham anāgama amanirgamam
yaḥ pratītyasamutpāda prapañcopaśamam śivam
deśayāmāsa saṃbuddhataṃ vande vadatāṃ varaṃ."

production, nor stopping, neither cut off nor eternal, neither single nor manifold, neither coming nor going away, as the appeasement of all futile discoursings, and as bliss."[2]

Regardless of whether Nāgārjuna authored the eight negations or whether he cites them, I will argue that this formulation alludes both to Śrāvakayāna canon as well as to Mahāyāna scripture.

There are four topics introduced in the *nāmaskāra*. The first is central theme -- "dependent-origination." This teaching of dependent-origination is then qualified by three points. First, it was taught by the "fully enlightened one". This refers the reader to the Buddhist scriptures, especially those that teach dependent-origination, and therefore contextualizes the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* within Buddhist scriptural discourse. Second, it is further qualified by the four dichotomies: "non-destruction, non-arising…" etc.. Note that among these are "identity" and "difference" (ekārthaṃ/nānārthaṃ), arising and ceasing, and coming and going -- dichotomies which play an important role in the arguments examined in the previous chapter. Third and last, dependent-origination is associated with the pacification of all mental and verbal-proliferation *(prapañca)*. It is my

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[2] Edward Conze, *The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom With the Divisions of the Abhisamāyalaṅkāra*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 595.

contention that, by providing allusions to a scriptural tradition (of which any educated reader would have been aware), the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* leads us to read the texts that deal with dependent-origination in a new way. In so doing, one of the functions of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is to show us how to understand these scriptures.

The *nāmaskāra* first mentions the eight negations, and then reorients the reader by alluding to the Buddha. The reader is thereby reminded of the connection between this list of negations and the many "extreme" views that are refuted in relation to dependent-origination in Buddhist scripture. Beyond this basic awareness, any further implications the reader might infer will depend on who the reader is. If the reader is an astute Śrāvakayānist, s/he will be aware that nowhere in the discussion of dependent-origination in Buddhist canonical[3] material does such a list occur. While the verse tells us explicitly that there is some kind of reference here ("I pay homage to the Awakened One *who taught…*"), and while the negations remind one of negations in the canon, an astute reader should be alerted at this point that there is something about this list of negations that is important to this specific text precisely because it is idiosyncratic. Hence, to a Śrāvakayānist reader, the

[3] In the following section, "canon" will refer to the Śravakayāna canon, because it was read by both Hīnayānists and Mahāyānists alike. "Mahāyāna texts" will refer to those texts that were revered by Mahāyānists alone.

nāmaskāra will seem to be a reference to earlier texts, but with a twist.

I will argue that this alteration will have a specific meaning for such a reader through its contrast with similar passages in canonical material. After showing what this contrast is, I will show how the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* re-creates this contrast at each point in the text where internal reference is made to the eight negations. The result is that if the reader "buys" the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* then s/he can no longer read the canonical texts alluded to in any way *other* than in the context of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'.

The *locus classicus* for material on dependent-origination is the *Nidāna Vagga* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, or "chapter on cause," which contains 93 sections on dependent-origination. What seems to be the "standard"[4] version of the law of dependent origination can be found in §1:

> What, Brethren, is the causal law?
>
> Conditioned by ignorance activities come to pass; conditioned by activities consciousness, conditioned by consciousness name-and-shape, conditioned by name-and-shape sense, conditioned by sense contact, conditioned by contact feeling, conditioned by feeling craving, conditioned by craving grasping,

[4] Though there were certainly variations, this seems to have been taken as standard by Nāgārjuna and his contemporaries. For a discussion of the variations in the canon, see: Poussin, *Theorie Des Douze Causes*, 1-5.

conditioned by grasping becoming, conditioned by becoming birth, conditioned by birth old age-and-death, grief, lamenting, suffering, sorrow, despair come to pass. Such is the arising of this entire mass of ill. This brethren. is called [causal] happening.

But from the utter fading away and ceasing of ignorance [comes] ceasing of activities; from ceasing of activities ceasing of consciousness; from ceasing of consciousness ceasing of name-and-shape; from ceasing of name-and-shape ceasing of sense; from ceasing of sense ceasing of contact; from ceasing of contact ceasing of feeling; from ceasing of feeling ceasing of craving; from ceasing of craving ceasing of grasping; from ceasing of grasping ceasing of becoming; from ceasing of becoming ceasing of birth; from ceasing of birth ceasing of old age-and-death, grief, lamenting, suffering, sorrow, despair cease. Such is the ceasing of this entire mass of ill.[5]

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[5] Rhys Davids trans., *The Book of Kindred Sayings*, vol. 2, 1-2. Text, Feer, M. Léon, ed., *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, vol. 2, (London: Pali Text Society, 1888), 1-2:

"Bhagavā etad avoca| Katamo ca bhikkave paṭiccasamuppādo| Avijjāpaccayā bhikkhave saṅkhārā| saṅkhārapaccayā viññānaṃ| viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ| nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanaṃ| saḷāyatanapaccayā phasso| phassapaccayā vedanā| vedanāpaccayā taṇhā| taṇhapaccayā upādānaṃ| upādānapaccayā

In some *suttas* this formula is summarized in the following way:

"Thus: 'this' being, 'that' becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that becomes not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases."[6]

These three formulas constitute the classical teaching of dependent-origination in terms of the four noble truths. The first sequence is the arising (*samuppāda* or *saṃbhavati*) of suffering. The second sequence leads to the cessation *(nirodha)* of suffering, and the third is a kind of summary formula.

In the canon, dependent-origination serves two functions. On the one hand, it is an explanation of the way reality/suffering arises and passes away -- the heart of the four noble truths. On the other hand, this presentation of reality is seen as the middle-way between extreme views. It is in the denial of these views that we find the beginning of the "emptying" of dependent-origination.

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bhavo| bhavapaccayā jāti| jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassupāyasā sambhavanti| Evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti| Ayaṃ vuccati bikkhave samuppādo||

Avijjāya tveva asesavirāganirodhā saṅkhāranirodho| saṅkhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho| viññāṇanirodhā nāmarūpanirodho| nāmarūpanirodhā saḷāyatananirodho| saḷāyatananirodhā phassanirodho| phassanirodhā vedanānirodho| vedanānirodhā taṇhānirodho| taṇhānirodhā upādānanirodho| upādānanirodhā bhavanirodho| bhavanirodhā jātinirodho| jātinirodhā jarāmaraṇaṃ soka-parideva-dukkha-domanāssupāyāsā nirujjhanti| Evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hotīti||"

[6] *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, 23; M.N. I. p. 262-263.

Thus, the doctrine of dependent-origination is where ontology and soteriology come together. The connection between these aspects lies in the belief that knowing reality-as-it-is leads out of suffering and that not knowing reality-as-it-is leads to further suffering. Therefore, one meditates on the 12 links in the forward sequence to understand the disparity between one's false views and reality. One comes to see that things arise through a concatenation of causes and conditions -- this is contemplation of "arising." At the root of these relationships is "*avidya*," which turns out to be (among other things) ignorance of dependent-origination itself.

Having understood these relationships, one is then in a position to undo them. Some canonical texts stress cultivating a sense of "revulsion" to *saṃsāra* through meditating on dependent-origination. In any case, by understanding dependent-origination, one has already eliminated ignorance. Without the ground of ignorance the rest of the structure falls. The cessation of the cause of suffering and the path leading out of *samsāra* is contemplated through the 12 links in reverse sequence -- this is contemplation of "extinction."

However, understanding dependent-origination is not so simple. In the early canon, several types of questions are asked and subsequently denied in the articulation of

dependent-origination. In the "*Kaccāyana Sutta*", Kaccāyana asks whether everything exists or not. In response, the Buddha states that "everything exists" and "everything does not exist" are two extremes, and that dependent-origination is the middle between them. At a certain point before the closing of the canon there arises an interpretation that places these types of question as merely subsets of another question. We find an example of this in the *Timbaruka sutta*. After Timbaruka asks his question, the Buddha rewords the question as follows:

> The experience and he who experiences [hereafter] are one and the same: - this, Timbaruka, which you at first called "pleasure and pain brought about by one's self" - I declare this is not so. "The experience and he who experiences [hereafter] are different one from the other: - this, Timbaruka, which by one smitten by the [after-] experience is called "pleasure and pain brought about by another" - I declare this is not so.[7]

Here, the stock question of something originating from itself is taken to be a question that assumes a continuous, unchanging self, while the question of something originating from an other is taken to be a question that assumes a completely discontinuous self. Hence the *suttas* subsume these

[7] *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, 18-19.

two types of question under the categories of "eternality" *(śāśvatā)* and "disruption" *(ucchedatā)*. This connection is made explicit in §17:

> '"One and the same person both acts and experiences [the results]": this, Kassapa, which you called at first "suffering self-wrought," amounts to the *Eternalist [sassata]* theory.' '"One acts, another experiences (the result)": amounts to the *Annihilationist [uccheda]* theory.'... To you, Kassapa, the Tathāgata, not approaching either extreme, teaches the Norm by the middle [way]...." [the twelve links of dependent-origination follow.][8]

The Pāli tradition takes *uccheda/śāśvata* as the overarching category. In his commentary on this verse, Buddhaghosa adds the dichotomy of "being/non-being" as a sub category of *ucchedavāda* and *śāśvatavāda*. A similar commentary occurs on the Kaccāyana sutta. In Buddha's dialogue with Kaccāyana, "right view" is defined as the middle way between the two extremes of being and non-being.

> [Text:] This world, Kaccāyana, usually bases [its view] on two things: on existence and on non-

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[8] Translation, *Book of Kindred Sayings*, 16. Text: *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, 19 "So karoti so paṭisamvediyatīti kho Kassapa ādito sato sayaṃkataṃ dukkhanti iti vadaṃ sassatam etam pareti|| Añño karoti añño paṭisaṃvediyatīti kho Kassapa vedanābhitunnassa sato paraṃkataṃ dukkhanti iti vadam ucchedam etam pareti|| Ete te Kassapa ubho ante anupagamma majjhena Tathāgato dhammam deseti||"

existence.

Now he, who with right insight sees the uprising of the world as it really is, does not hold with the non-existence of the world. But he, who with right insight sees the passing of the world as it really is, does not hold with the existence of the world.[9]

[Buddhaghosa's commentary:] "*This is one extreme*" [means] this is a deceptive extreme, a bad extreme [but] is primarily eternity. "*This second extreme*" [means] this is the second. "*Everything is non-existent*" is the second false and bad extreme, the so-called view related to arising. It is the meaning of "disruption." The rest of this is clear.[10]

Even here, what would seem to be two unrelated extremes (being/non-being) are explained under the rubric of permanence and impermanence.[11] That all false views fall under the heading of eternality *(śāśvatā)* or disruption *(uccheda)*

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[9] *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, 12-13.

[10] Translation [mine]: "*Ayaṃ eko anto* ti, esa eko nikat' anto, lāmak' anto, paṭhamaṃ sassataṃ. *Ayaṃ dutiyo anto* ti, esa dutiyo. *Sabbaṃ n' atthī* ti, uppajjanaka-diṭṭhi-sankhāto nikat' anto, lāmak' anto dutiyako, ucchedo to attho. Sesam ettha uttānam evā ti." Buddhaghosa, *Sārattha-Ppakāsinī: Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, Pali Text Society Text Series, vol. 119 (London: The Pali Text Society, 1932), 34.

[11] Indeed, this may be where Nāgārjuna gets his assumption that "*bhāva*" means that something cannot change! (An idea that seems to have befuddled his interpreters.)

is not so clear in the other Nikāyas, such as the *Dīgha Nikāya*'s "*Brahmajāla Sutta*"; nevertheless, even there it is not completely outside the realm of possibility.[12]

While the *suttas* mentioned above seem to take the two extremes of permanence and impermanence as being the two most fundamental views, there is at least one *sutta* that tries to make this schema more complete by adding "unity" and "plurality" onto the list. Thus, we have in §48, the "*Lokāyatika*" sutta:

> At Sāvatthī a world-wise brahmin came into the presence of the Exalted One… [and] said thus to the Exalted One:
>
> 'What say you here, Master Gotama: everything is?'
>
> '"Everything is" - that, brahmin, is the chief world-wisdom.'
>
> 'Well then, Master Gotama: nothing is?'
>
> '"Nothing is": that is the second world-wisdom.'
>
> 'Well, then, Master Gotama:- everything is a unity ["ekatta"]?'
>
> '"Everything is a unity": that, brahmin, is the third world-wisdom.'
>
> 'Well, then, Master Gotama:- everything is a plurality ["puthutta"]?'

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[12] Cf. Yaśomitra, *Sphuṭārthā*, 265ff. It looks as if he relates all 62 views back to belief in ātman which is in turn a product of the two extremes *(śāśvānta, ucchedānta)*.

'"Everything is a plurality": that, brahmin, is the fourth world-wisdom.'

The Tathāgata, not approaching any of these extremes, teaches you a Doctrine by a middle [way]...[the twelve-links follow].[13]

In summary, the only extremes that are denied to dependent-origination in the early canon are: "from one's self" *(svato)*, "from another" *(parato)*, "existence/ nonexistence" (either *bhāva/abhāva* or *asti/ nāsti*), "same", "different", "eternal" *(śāśvata)*, "disruption" *(uccheda)*. The last two extremes in the series are taken as the overarching categories which include the rest. The fact that Nāgārjuna mentions these last four in his *nāmaskāra* as taught by the Buddha and as relating to dependent-origination, should raise a flag to the reader. For a Śrāvakayānist reader, these extremes alone would allude to dependent-origination, and even to a Mahāyānist reader there would have been some awareness that these negations are shared with the Śravakayāna. Hence, each time one of the above terms is being used in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, it must remind the reader that these terms are important for dependent-origination.

The extremes of eternality, disruption, unity and diversity are acknowledged in Nāgārjuna's *nāmaskāra*, although his use of these terms differs somewhat from their use in the

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[13] *Kindred Sayings*, 53. [Pāli added from *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* 76-77].

canon. The first difference we notice is that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* uses the terms *anekārtha, anānārtha* for "unity" and "diversity". While the Pāli, *ekattan* is the equivalent of the Sanskrit, *ekārthaṃ, nānārthaṃ* is not commonly used in this regard in Pāli canon. The Pāli, *puthuttan* is more often used in this regard (see the "*Lokāyika Sutta*" quoted above) and is synonymous with, but not identical to, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s *nānārthaṃ*. Perhaps Nāgārjuna is quoting from some text that we do not have, or perhaps he changed *pṛthāktvā* into *nānārtha* in order to make it parallel to *ekārthaṃ*. In any case, Candrakīrti seems to be aware of the problem and compensates for it in his definition of the two terms:

> "*Ekārtha*" means this object is one, meaning a non-divided object; a non-individuated object.
>
> "*Nānārtha*" means a divided object; an individuated object *[pṛthagityartha]*.[14]

That *nānārthaṃ* and *pṛthagtvā* were seen to be synonymous in this regard receives independent confirmation in Buddhaghosa's commentary to the above verse which, in true Theravāda fashion, takes these two as synonyms for "eternalism" and "annihilationism."

"*Unity*": He asks [if it is] one essence, a permanent

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[14] "ekaścāsāvarthaścetyekārtho 'bhinnārthaḥ ' na pṛthagityarthaḥ| nānārtho bhinnārthaḥ pṛthagityarthaḥ|" Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 4.

essence. "*Diversity*": He asks [if it is] a different essence *[nānā-svabhāva]* than formerly, after having been first with the state of a human or a god, etc., and then afterwards not (to be) -- after having been destroyed. All this exists, all is unity, these two are also eternalist view: everything does not exist, everything is diversity, these two are disruption view. Thus it is to be understood.[15]

Looking into the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* for instances of the use of these terms is puzzling. Compared to the 20 uses of the term *śāśvata* in the treatise, the term *nānārtha* is used only three times -- once in the *nāmaskāra* and twice in chapter 18. Nevertheless, as we have gone to some length to show in the last chapter, the *function* of identity and difference lies at the heart of all of the dichotomies on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Thus, when the *nāmaskāra* declares that the "Enlightened One" has taught that dependent-origination is "*...anucchedaṃ, aśāśvataṃ...*," we can assume that it is referring to one of the overarching categories of extreme views found in the canon.

From the above discussion, it appears that there are at

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[15] Translation mine. Text: "*Ekattan* ti, eka-sabhāvaṃ. Nicca-sabhāvam evā ti pucchati. *Puthuttan* ti, purima-sabhāvena nānā-sabhāvaṃ, devamanussâdi-bhāvena paṭhamaṃ hutvā pacchā na hotī ti ucchenaṃ sandhāya pucchati. Evam ettha sabbam atthi, sabbam ekattan ti, imā dve pi sassata-diṭṭhiyo: sabbaṃ n' atthi, sabbaṃ puthuttan ti, imā dve uccheda-diṭṭhiyo ti veditabbā." Buddhaghosa, *Sāratthа-Ppakāsinī*, 76.

least two approaches to the canonical formulations of dependent-origination. The first approach is to view it as simply the mechanism of the way that things arise; e.g., *Saṃyutta Nikāya* §20. If one takes it this way, then all of the extreme views that are negated in the suttas are merely other forms of "*śāśvatāvāda*" and "*ucchedavāda*" as in Buddhaghosa's commentary above ("*Evam ettha sabbam atthi, sabbam ekattan ti, imā dve pi sassata-diṭṭhiyo: sabbaṃ n' atthi, sabbaṃ puthuttan ti, imā dve uccheda-diṭṭhiyo ti veditabbā*"). The purpose of this kind of refutation is to eliminate, on the one hand, a belief in *ātman*, and on the other hand to eliminate a belief that there are no karmic consequences. Under this reading, "dependent-origination" refers to a kind of causal dynamism that is the middle position between static existence and complete non-existence (also static). Under such a reading, unity and diversity are secondary to the temporal issue, or the issue of ontological conditionality.

The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, however, in emphasizing the ontological/epistemological issue of reciprocal implication subordinates the temporal issue to the logical issue so that unity and diversity become the two extremes most fundamental to this treatise.[16] Thus, the process of hierarchization evident in the Pāli canon is inverted in the

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[16] Chapter two is a case in point.

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. In fact, while the text makes "sameness/difference" distinctions throughout the first few chapters, the "eternality/disruption" distinction comes late in the text, and is not even mentioned until chapter 15.

> 15.6. Those who see *svabhāva* and *parabhāva*, existence and non-existence, do not see the truth in the teaching of the Buddha.[17]
>
> 15.10. Existence is understood as eternity, non-existence is the view of disruption. Hence, the wise should not rely on existence and non-existence.[18]
>
> 15.11. That which is eternal, by nature, is that which is not non-existent. It follows that "disruption" means that what was previously *(abhūtpūrvam)* does not exist now.[19]

As we can see from the preceding quote, when the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* mentions *śaśvatā* and *uccheda* at the end of this chapter, it is not introducing any new argument; rather, it is making an equation similar to that in the canon itself. The difference is that here the "*śāśvata/uccheda*"

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[17] "svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvameva ca|
ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśasane||" Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 267.

[18] "astīti śaśvatagrāho nāstītyucchedasarśanaṃ|
tasmādastitvanāstitve nāśrīyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ||" *Ibid.*, 272-273.

[19] "asti yaddhi svabhāvena na tan nāstīti śaśvataṃ|
nāstīdānīm abhūtpūrvam ity ucchedaḥ prasajyate||" *Ibid.*, 273.

dichotomy is merely an extension of the "same/difference" dichotomy which, as we have seen, is more fundamental.

Nāgārjuna's reading of dependent-origination as it relates to the early canon is radically different. The reading of dependent-origination, that I believe is shared by the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,* takes as its paradigm §60:

> Ananda: "Wonderful, lord, marvelous, lord, is the depth of this causal law and how deep it appears. And yet I reckon it as ever so plain."
>
> Buddha: "Say not so, Ānanda, say not so! Deep indeed is this causal law, and deep it appears."[20]

I take the beginning of this *sutta* (which is repeated with only sleight variation at the beginning of §15 of the *Dīgha*) as a warning against any simplistic interpretation of "dependent-origination," as well as the beginnings of a rule against any hypostatization. As I argue in the last chapter of this work, the key to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s argument is that things that exist in the status of reciprocal implication do not admit of being either the same or different from one another. If the temporal aspect (*à la* Buddhaghosa) is the primary concern, there does exist a middle position between the two extremes, namely a kind of dynamism. This works well with the characterization of saṃsāra as conditioned versus nirvāṇa which is not. The

[20] *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, 64.

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's emphasis is on the unpredicability of reciprocally implicative terms; therefore it presents terms that admit no middle. Thus, when the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* negates "from self," "from another," and so on, these negations function in his text not just as extremes, but as terms of reciprocal implication.

Taking this as the most fundamental point, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* includes eternality and annihilation only at the end of chapter 15, and even there only by extension from what has been demonstrated about sameness, difference, being and non-being. In short, while the canon and its Śrāvakayānist interpreters deny extremes in order to point out a truth which is squarely located in the middle. For the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, the extremes are negated only to leave a paradoxical position in the middle.

There are four remaining negations in the *nāmaskāra*: "non-ceasing," "non-arising," "non-coming," and "non-going." These negations are understood differently by different Buddhist audiences. If the reader was at all familiar with Buddhist literature, then on reading the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s *nāmaskāra*, they would be aware that while the Buddha claims dependent-origination to be *anucchedaṃ, aśāśvataṃ, anekārthaṃ, anānārthaṃ,* nowhere in the canon works does he say that dependent-origination is "non-arising," "non-ceasing," "non-coming," or "non-going."

On the contrary, dependent-origination is often said to be a description of the way that suffering arises *(utpāda)* and the reverse sequence is the way leading to its cessation *(nirodha)*. It is the fact which describes the entering and leaving of this world. In fact, to a Śrāvakayānist reader, these negations would seem to be more closely related to nirvāṇa, insofar as "arising," "ceasing," "coming," "going," are attributes of conditioned *(saṃskṛta)* reality and nirvāṇa is considered in most Śrāvakayānist schools to be *unconditioned (asaṃskṛta)*.

> Certain schools assert that Pratītyasamutpāda is unconditioned, *asaṃskṛta*, because the Sūtra says: "Whether there is the appearance of Tathāgatas, or whether there is not the appearance of Tathāgatas, this nature of *dharmas* is stable." - This thesis is true or false depending on the manner in which one interprets it. If one wants to say that it is always by reason of ignorance, etc. that there are produced *saṃskāras*, etc., not by virtue of another thing, not without cause; in that sense *Pratītyasamutpāda* is stable, eternal *(nitya)*: we approve. If one wants to say that there exists a dharma which is eternal named *Pratītyasamutpāda*, that opinion is inadmissible. Because *utpāda*, production or birth, is a characteristic of the conditioned

(saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa).[21]

In a footnote to this passage, Poussin cites a variety of sources which claim that this position was held by the Mahīśāsakas, the Vibhajyavādins, and the Mahāsāṃghikas.[22] Exactly how these schools took the passage in question is not clear from Vasubandhu's discussion. All we know is that there was some disagreement over the matter among the Śrāvakayāna schools.

The Mahāyāna interpretation of the unconditioned nature of dependent origination must have been different from the Śrāvakayāna version of the theory. At one point in the *Prajñāpradīpa*, Bhāvaviveka has a "Sautrāntika" claim that the Śrāvakayānists also believe that dependent-origination is "non-arising/non-ceasing," and so forth. He then lists a number of reasons why their claim for the unconditioned nature of dependent origination is different from that of the Mādhyamika.

> "*Objection*: Some of [our] fellow Buddhists (*svaūthya*), who wish to negate the composition (*ārambha*) of [this] treatise, say: Dependent origination, characterized by non origination, etc.,

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[21] Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*, vol. 2, 77.

[22] *Ibid.*, note 1. The sources he cites are as follows: Yaśomitra [Yaśomitra, *Sphuṭārthā*, vol. 1, 294] - Āryamahīśāsaka; *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 23,7 - Vibhajyavādin; *Samayabheda* - Mahāsaṃghika; Yo-ga-lun-ki - Mahāsaṃghika.

is unconditioned *(asaṃskṛta)*. Therefore, it is established for our own position *(pakṣa)* also; and it is not the case that [your] doctrine of dependent-origination is not shared by the śravakas. Therefore it is not appropriate [for Nāgārjuna] to compose [this] treatise.

Bhāvaviveka's response is as follows:

Answer: [Our doctrine of dependent origination is not shared by the śravakas] [1] because [we] teach dependent origination, characterized by non origination, etc., by means of negation, and [2] because there is no inference for showing that unconditioned dependent origination exists. If [you] suppose that origination from definite causal conditions is just unconditioned, [that is not so] because origination has been negated; therefore it is not possible that [being unconditioned] is a property *(dharma)* of that [origination]. [Moreover] [Thesis:] Origination is not unconditioned, [Reason:] because it possesses a cause, [Example:] like continuation *(sthiti)*. By inference, that [unconditioned dependent origination] does not exist; therefore it is not the case that [this treatise] is not appropriate.[23]

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[23] William Ames, "*Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter One Part One," 219.

Thus, while some Śrāvakayānists held dependent origination to be unconditioned, the later Mādhyamikas distinguished themselves from them by pointing out that if origination did exist it would be conditioned. Origination is however, empty, according to the Mādhyamika and therefore it can be unconditioned.

Apart from these interpretations, texts from within the canon itself are fairly clear on the distinction between the conditioned and the unconditioned. Consider the following verse from the *Udāna*:

> There is, monks, that base *(tadāyatana)* wherein there is neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor wind, nor that base consisting of endless space, nor that base consisting of infinite consciousness, nor that base consisting of nothingness, nor that base consisting of neither perception nor non-perception, nor this world, nor the next world, nor both sun and moon. There too *(tad[āyatana]...)*, monks, I do not speak either of coming *(na āgatiṃ)*, or going,[24] or remaining, or falling, or arising. This is (quite) without foundation, (quite) without occurrence, quite without object. This alone is the end of

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[24] "*Na gatiṃ.*" The Commentary glosses this as "*na gamanaṃ*" as in, "not going or coming from life."

duḥkha.[25]

From the standpoint of this *Udāna*, the negations, "non-arising," "non-ceasing," "non-coming," or "non-going," are to indicate the unconditioned nature of nirvāṇa and should not be applicable to dependent-origination. The *Udāna* verse begins with the list of the stages of concentration beginning with elemental *kāṣina* meditations and progressing up through the eight *dhyānas*, or "absorptions." The way that the eight meditations are taught a) one reflects on the unsatisfactoriness of the present situation, b) one enters into the concentration that is empty of those distractions, c) one becomes absorbed into that level of attainment, d) one emerges from the concentration and reflects on the degree of subtlety of the experience. Upon reflection one is to notice two things -- the absence of what was present in the previous state, and the positive qualities of the present state. That which one perceives with regard to the meditative state is the resulting fruit of the concentration.[26]

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[25] Translation: *The Udāna: translated from Pāli by Peter Masefield*, (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1994), 165. Text: PTS, 80."atthi bhikkhave tat āyatanaṃ, yattha n'eva paṭhavī na āpo na tejo na vāyo na ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ na viññāṇānañcāyatanaṃ na ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ na nevasaññânāsaññāyatanaṃ n'āyaṃ loko na paraloko ubho candimasūriyā, tad amhaṃ bhikkhave *n' eva āgatiṃ vadāmi na gatiṃ na ṭhitiṃ na cutiṃ na upapattiṃ, appatiṭṭhaṃ appavattaṃ anārammaṇam* eva taṃ, es' ev' anto dukkhassā 'ti" (*italics* mine)

[26] Cf. the *Cūḷasuññata Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* and also Chapter 10 of the *Visuddhimagga*.

The highest level of meditational attainment in the early canon is the point at which one is no longer cognizant of any characteristic *(nimitta)*, whether it be infinite space, infinite consciousness, neither-consciousness-nor-non-consciousness, or nothingness itself. The idea is for consciousness (which is conditioned) to come as close as possible to the unconditioned *(nibbāna)* in order to be able to perceive it.

There is some discrepancy among *suttas* about the content of this experience, but even elsewhere it is defined in negative terms; many *suttas* describe content of this experience as "signless" *(animitta)* and empty (*suñña* i.e., of self) and some also include "wishless"[27] in the list. At *Majjhima Nikāya* §43.30-33 "emptiness," "signless," and "wishless," are said to be both the same and different depending on the point of view.[28] In the *Udāna*, the list includes none of these. Whatever list of negatives, the canonical tradition interprets nirvāṇa as the cause (the commentary reading "*āyatana*" as "*kāraṇaṃ*"[29]) of the

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[27]Cf. the difference between the account in "*Cūḷavedalla Sutta*" (*Majjhima Nikāya* #44) and *Cūḷasuññata Sutta* (*Majjhima Nikāya* #121).

[28] See, Ñāṇamoli trans., *Middle Length Discourses*, 394.

[29] Peter Masefield trans., *Udāna Commentary*, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, vol 43, (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1995), 1012: "*That base (tadāyatanaṃ)*: that cause *(kāraṇaṃ)*.... For nibbāna is spoken of as a base in the sense of a cause on account of its being an object-condition *[ārammaṇa-ppaccaya-bhāvato]* for the knowledges associated with the paths

experience, much in the same way that an actual barn (relatively permanent) is the cause of the visual perception (relatively fleeting) of a barn. Hence, the canonical tradition maintains the absolute distinction between the object of experience (which is unconditioned) and the subjective perception (which is conditioned).

According to this model, the significance of the negations attributed to nirvāṇa is that they deny all the characteristics of conditionedness, which is the essence of *saṃsāra*. This is made even more clear in the following verse, again from the *Udāna*.

> There exists, monks, that which is unborn, that which is unbecome, that which is uncreated, that which is unconditioned. (*ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṇkhataṃ*) For if there were not, monks, that which is unborn, that which is uncreated, that which is unconditioned, there would not be made known here the escape from that which is born, from that which is become, from that which is created, from that which is conditioned. Yet, since there exists,

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and their fruitions and so on, just as visible forms and so forth constitute the objective-conditions for eye-consciousness and so on. And, thus far, has the Lord made known to those monks the existence, in its highest sense *[paramatthato]*, of the unconditioned element *[asañkhatāya dhātuyā]*. This is a positive inference concerning Dhamma *[dhamma-nayo]* in the present case: since conditioned things are found to exist here, there has to be an unconditioned element too, on account of there (always) being an opposite *[paṭipakkhattā]* of those things that have an own-nature *[sabhāva-dhammānaṃ]*." (Pāli in brackets).

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monks, that which is unborn, that which is uncreated, that which is unconditioned, there is therefore made known the escape from that which is born, from that which has become, from that which is created, from that which is conditioned.[30]

Nirvāṇa and *saṃsāra* are mutually exclusive according to Śrāvakayāna literature. The former is exclusively "unconditioned" while the latter is exclusively "conditioned." The first set (*anucchedaṃ, aśāśvataṃ*, etc.) applies to the conditioned realm of *saṃsāra* which is governed by dependent-origination. The second set (the denial of being conditioned, destroyed, produced, coming-into-being, going-out-of-being) is applied to nirvāṇa in counter-distinction to *saṃsāra*. Since this is so one might expect the attributions which are denied to each of them to be mutually exclusive as well. This, however, is not the case. From a logical point of

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[30] Translation: Masefield trans.,*Udāna*, 166. Text: 80-81: "atthi bhikkhave ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṃkhataṃ, no ce taṃ bhikkhave abhavissa ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṇkhataṃ, na yidha jātassa bhūtassa katassa saṇkhatassa nissaraṇaṃ paññâyetha. yasmā ca kho khikkhavē atthi ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṃkhataṃ, tasmā jātassa bhūtassa katassa saṇkatassa nissaraṇaṃ paññâyatī 'ti."

Also, cf. E. Windisch, *Iti-Vuttaka*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), 37-38: "Jātaṃ bhūtaṃ samuppannaṃ kataṃ saṇkhatam-addhuvaṃ| jarāmaraṇasaṇkhataṃ roganīḷaṃ pabhaṇguṇaṃ| āhāranettippabhavaṃ nālaṃ tad-abhinandituṃ|| Tassa nissaraṇaṃ santaṃ atakkāvacaraṃ dhuvaṃ| ajātaṃ asamuppannam asokaṃ virajaṃ padaṃ| nirodho dukkhadhammānaṃ saṇkhārūpasamo sukho ti||" Étienne. Lamotte also cites the *Udānavarga* as a source for this verse. The text is not yet availible to me, but his reference is: "*Udānavarga*, éd. BECKH, XXVI, 21-24." cf. E. Lammotte, *History of Indian Buddhism*, 41, note 63.

view, *saṃsāra* might not be unarisen and unceasing, but that does not mean that nirvāṇa is either eternal or disruption.

From a different standpoint the Śrāvakayānist is aware that one has to acknowledge *both* the unconditioned *and* the conditioned. While, the Pāli commentaries emphasize that the object of the concentration (*nibbāna*) is completely devoid of, or "isolated" from, conditionedness, knowing the experience itself to be conditioned is as essential for liberation as the presence of the object of experience.

> Again, Ānanda, a bikkhu... attends to the singleness dependent on the signless concentration of mind and acquires confidence, steadiness, and decision. He understands thus: "This signless concentration of mind is conditioned and volitionally produced. But whatever is conditioned and volitionally produced is impermanent, subject to cessation." When he knows and sees thus, his mind is liberated from the taint of sensual desire, from the taint of being, and from the taint of ignorance. When it is liberated, there comes the knowledge: "It is liberated." He understands: "Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being."[31]

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[31] Translation: Ñāṇamoli, *Middle Length Discourses*, 969. text Majjhima Nikāya, vol. 3, 108.

Enlightenment occurs when the conditioned and the unconditioned arise simultaneously (and yet remain distinct) in consciousness. The three gates to liberation are "border concepts" in that they occupy and define the boundary between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. As such they are perfectly appropriate terms to characterize a non-dual reality.

If the reader of the *nāmaskāra* were steeped in Mahāyāna literature s/he would probably be aware of the Śravakayāna point of view,[32] but would also be aware that the negations which are most often applied to the higher states of absorption are claimed to be characteristics of reality (reality being *tattvā*, or *dharmatā*) in Mahāyāna literature. This constitutes one of the most fundamental shifts between the Śrāvakayāna and the Mahāyāna. Whereas the Śrāvakayāna had made much of the dichotomies of *nirvāṇa/saṃsāra* and unconditioned/conditioned, by applying the negations indicative of unconditionedness to that which is conditioned, the Mahāyāna *sūtras* undermined the dichotomy and drew attention to the non-duality of reality which underlay the distinction itself.

This shift, however, did not happen all at once. Though it is difficult to date the early Mahāyāna sūtras relative to one another, we can nevertheless get an idea of the range of

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[32] It seems to be the case that in Mahāyāna literature a basic knowledge of Śravakayāna is assumed, while the reverse is not true.

opinions *circa* Nāgārjuna's time. There seems to be a progression in the thinking of the Mahāyāna sūtras toward the position represented in the nāmaskāra (and also in the *Pañcaviṃśati Prajñāpāramitā*).

When one sees the conditioned as unconditioned (or sees *saṃsāra* as nirvāṇa), one attains "all-knowledge" *(sarvajñatā)* which is the understanding of all dharmas.[33] In the *Aṣṭasahāśrika Prajñāpāramitā*, this "all-knowledge" is described in almost exactly the same terms as nirvāṇa was in the *Udāna* (the parallel section is in *italics*):

> [303]...all-knowledge is immeasurable and unlimited.... That is not attainment *[prāptir]*, or reunion *[abhisamayo]*, or getting there *[adhigamo]*; not the path *[mārgo]* or its fruit *[mārgaphalaṃ]*; not cognition *[jñānaṃ]*, or consciousness *[vijñānaṃ]*; *not genesis [utpatti], or destruction [vināśo], or production [utpado], or passing away [vyayo], or stopping [nirodho], or development [bhāvanā] or annihilation [vibhāvanā]. It has not been made by*

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33 "The Omniscience in regard to the Objects *(vastu)* of the Empirical World, which is possessed by the Buddha and the Bodhisattva, and likewise is accessible to the Hīnayānist saint, - the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha (*sarva-jñata - thams cad śes pa ñid* or *vastu-jñana* - gzi-śes). It is a kind of knowledge which is conformable to the faculty of understanding of the Hīnayānist, and represents the cognition of all the empirical objects from the standpoint of their non-relation to a real and independent individual Ego." E. Obermiller, *Prajñāparāmitā in Tibetan Buddhism*, Classics India Religion and Philosophy Series, vol. 3, H. S. Sobti ed. (Delhi: Classics India Publications, 1988), 56.

anything [kenacitkṛtaṃ], it has not come from anywhere [kutaścidāgataṃ], it does not go anywhere [kvacid gacchati], it does not stand in any place or spot [nāpi kvaciddeśe nāpi kvacitpradeśe sthitam]. … But what is immeasurableness that does not lend itself to being fully known by anything *[na sā śakyā kenacidabhisaṃboddhum]*, be it form, or any *skandha*, or any of the six perfections. Because form is all-knowledge, and so are the other *skandhas*, and the six perfections.[34]

In the italicized section we have the cognition of all-knowledge described as not rising *(utpāda)*, and not ceasing *(nirodha)* (which corresponds to the Pali "*na cutiṃ na upapattiṃ*"), and it is also described as non-coming, non-going, and non-staying (which corresponds to the Pali, "*n'*

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[34] Translation: Edward Conze, *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & Its Verse Summary*, 132, Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1973; 1994), 191. Text P. L. Vaidya ed., *Astāsahasrika Prajñāparamitā: With Haribhādra's Commentary called Aloka*, 4, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, (Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1960), 151: "tat kasya hetoḥ| aprameyā hi subhūte sarvajñatā, apramāṇā hi subhāte sarvajñatā| yat subhūte aprameyamapramāṇam, na tad rūpaṃ na vedanā na saṃjñā na saṃskārā na vijñānaṃ na prāptirnābhisamayo nādhigamo na margo na margaphalaṃ na jñānaṃ na vijñānaṃ notpattirna vināśo notpado na vyayo na nirodho na bhāvanā na vibhāvanā, nāpi kenacitkṛtaṃ nāpi kutaścidāgataṃ nāpi kvacid gacchati nāpi kvaciddeśe nāpi kvacitpradeśe sthitam, api tu aprameyapramāṇamityevaṃ saṃkhyāṃ gacchati|… yā ca aprameyatā, na sā śakyā kenacidabhisaṃboddhum| na rūpeṇa na vedanayā na saṃjñayā na samskārairna vijñānena na dānapāramītayā na śīlapāramītayā na kṣāntipāramītayā na vīryapāramītayā na dhyānapāramītayā na prajñāpāramītayā śakyā abhisaṃboddham| tat kasya hetoḥ? rūpameva hi subhūte sarvajñatā…"

eva āgatiṃ vadāmi na gatiṃ na ṭhitiṃ"). It should also be noted that, like the *Udāna*, these negations apply to a mental state, but unlike the *Udāna*, the experience is indicative of the way that all things *are*.

We have here, then, the beginnings of the context by which the Mahāyāna can claim that all *dharmas* are "emptiness" *(śūnyatā)*, as well as the beginnings of the claim that *saṃsāra* is nirvāṇa. "Emptiness," instead of being a description of one of the content of the three absorptions ("emptiness", "signless", "wishless" absorptions), is now a description of the way that *saṃsāra is*. For example, it is claimed in the *Kāśyapa Parivārta Sūtra*:

> Again, Kāśyapa, there is another elemental-investigation *(bhūtapratyavekṣā)*[35] of all dharmas, because of emptiness dharmas are not made empty -- dharmas are just empty. *Dharmas* as signless are not made signless -- the *dharmas* are just signless. Those *dharmas* which are as wishless are not made wishless -- the *dharmas* are just wishless.… These [investigations] are said to be this investigation which is the elemental investigation of all dharmas

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[35] According to the Unrai Ogiwara ed., *Mahāvyutpatti*, p. 8:"*pratyavekṣa*" is one of the five knowledges for a Buddha: 1) Dharma-dhātu-viśuddhi 2) Ādarśa-jñānam 3) Samatā-jñānam 4) Pratyavekṣaṇā-jñānam 5) Kṛtyānusthāna-jñānam.

[and] is the middle way.[36]

In the *Aṣṭasahāśrika Prajñāpāramitā* we find the example of the five-aggregates (again, something characteristic of *saṃsāra*) being described as being "emptiness", "signless", and "wishless".

Subhuti: Would there be a reason to assume that the skandhas are immeasurable?

The Lord: Yes, there would be. [347]

Subhuti: Of what is that term 'immeasurable' a synonym?

The Lord: Of Emptiness, of the Signless, of the Wishless.

Subhuti: Is it a synonym only of those and not of the other dharmas?

The Lord: Have I not described all dharmas as 'empty'?

Subhuti: As simply empty has the Tathāgata described all dharmas.

The Lord: And, being empty, they are also

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[36] Baron A. Von Staël-Holstein, *The Kāçyapaparivarta: A Mahāyānasūtra of the Ratnakūta Class*, (1926; Tokyo: Meicho-Fukyū-Kai, 1977), 94: "punar aparaṃ kāśyapa dharmāṇāṃ bhūtapratyavekṣā yan na śunyatāyā [sic] dharmā śūnyā karoti dharmā eva śūnyā| yan nānimittena dharmān animittān karoti dharmā caivānimittāḥ yan nā praṇihitena dharmāpraṇihitān karoti dharmā evāpraṇihitāḥ..." The passage goes on to claim that dharmas are just "unconditioned" *(anābhisaṃskṛta)*, "unarisen" *(anutpāda)*, "unborn" *(ajāta)*, "ungrasped" *(agrāhya)*, "without a basis" *(anāśrava)*, "without self-nature" *(asvabhāva)*. This section, however, seems to have been unknown to Candrakīrti (Candrakīrti, 248-249). Although the *sūtra* itself is quite old, perhaps these other negations were not in the original.

inexhaustible. And what is emptiness that is also immeasureableness. Therefore then, according to ultimate reality, no distinction or difference can be apprehended between these dharmas. As talk have they been described by the Tathāgata. One just talks when one speaks of 'immeasurable,", or 'incalculable', or 'inexhaustible', or of 'empty, or 'signless', or 'wishless', or 'the Unaffected', or 'Non-production', 'no-birth', 'non-existence'... 'cessation', or 'Nirvāṇa'. This exposition has by the Tathāgata been described as the consummation of his demonstrations.[348]"[37]

Like the previous passage quoted, this passage describes what would normally be taken as something firmly rooted in *saṃsāra* (the aggregates) and characterizes it in the same way as nirvāṇa (emptiness, signless, wishless).

The section of the *Aṣṭasahāśrika Prajñāpāramitā* which is the most directly relevant to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s *nāmaskāra* is the following where dependent-origination is to be seen as "non-extinction."

271. Subhuti: How should a Bodhisattva consummate the perfection of wisdom?

The Lord: Through the non-extinction *[akṣāyatva]* of form, etc. [469] Through the non-extinction of

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[37] Conze, *Perfection of Wisdom*, 211.

ignorance, of the karma-formations, of consciousness, of name and form, of the six sense fields, of contact, of feeling, of craving, of grasping, of becoming, of birth, of decay, and death, of grief, lamentation, pain, sadness, and despair. In this manner, the Bodhisattva surveys conditioned co-production in such a way that he avoids the duality of the extremes. He surveys it without seeing any beginning, end or middle. To survey conditioned co-production in such a manner, that is the special dharma of the Bodhisattva seated on the terrace of enlightenment. When he thus surveys conditioned co-production, he acquires the cognition of the all knowing.[38]

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38 Text: [Vaidya, 231]: " Subhūtirāha - kathaṃ bhagavan bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitā abhinirhartavyā? bhagavanāha- rūpākṣayatvena subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitā abhinirhartavyā| evaṃ vedanāsaṃjñāsaṃskārāḥ| vijñānākṣayatvena subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitā abhinirhartavyā| evaṃ khalu subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitā abhinirhartavȳā| avidyākṣayatvena subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitā abhinirhartavyā| evaṃ saṃskārākṣayatvena vijñānākṣayatvena vijñānākṣayatvena nāmarūpākṣayatvena ṣaḍāyatanākṣayatvena sparśā[p. 232]kṣayatvena vedanākṣayatvena tṛṣṇākṣayatvena upādānākṣayatvena bhavākṣayatvena jātyakṣayatvena jarāmaraṇākṣayatvena śokaparidevaduḥkhadaurmanasyopāyāsākṣayatvena subhūtebodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitā abhinirhartavyā| iyaṃ subhūte bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya antadvayavivarjitā pratītyasamutpādavyavalokayati| evaṃ vyavalokayan subhūte bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ pratītyasamutpādamanādyantamadhyaṃ taṃ vyavalokayati| ayaṃ subhūte bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasyāveṇiko dharmo bodhimaṇḍe niṣṇṇasya,yadevaṃ

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Just as in the early canon, this passage instructs the aspirant to mentally review the twelve-links of dependent-origination, keeping in mind the negations, so as to avoid the extreme views. Here, however, dependent-origination is seen to be non-cessation. The characteristics that marked *saṃsāra* (i.e., being destructible "*kṣayatva*") are now denied it in the same way that they are denied to nirvāṇa (hence, *akṣayatva*") in the *Udāna* passage. This changes the purpose of the formula of dependent-origination radically. In the early canon, one meditated on the twelve-links in order to see reality as it is and thereby cultivate a revulsion toward it, but never is it denied that dependent-origination describes the arising and ceasing of things.[39] This suggests by implication that, in the Mahāyāna, one is to look on dependent-arising *itself* as nirvāṇa, and hence as non-arising and non-ceasing.

As we have seen in the *Aṣṭasahāsrika Prajñāpāramitā*, all dharmas are said to be non-arising *(na utpāda)*, non-cessation *(na nirodha)*, non-coming *(na kutaścidāgataṃ)*, non-going *(na kvacid gaccati)*. Elsewhere in the same text, dependent-

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praītyasamutpādaṃ vyavalokayati| evaṃ vyavalokayataḥ subhūte bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ sarvajñajñānapratilambho bhavati|"

[39] *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* II, Kaccāyanagotta Sutta: "To him who perceives with right wisdom the arising of the world as it has come to be, the notion of non-existence in the world does not occur. Kaccāyana, to him who perceives with right wisdom the ceasing of the world as it has come to be, the notion of existence in the world does not occur."

origination is said to be non-destructible *(akṣayatva)* -- it is not much of a leap to put the two together (as happens in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s *nāmaskāra*, and in the *Pañcaviṃśati Prajñāpāramitā)*, and to say that dependent origination is not just non-destructible, but is non-ceasing (etc.).

Incidentally, the way that the *nāmaskāra* puts together these extremes not only makes us read the Mahāyāna interpretation of emptiness as dependent origination into the canon (thus making it conform to *sūtra* -- one of the *mahāpadesas*), but such a procedure also has implications for "non-contradiction with *dharmatā*" (the third *mahāpadesa*). Under the usual Śrāvakayānist interpretation of *dharmatā*, *dharmatā* is said to be dependent origination. Under the Mahāyānist interpretation, *dharmatā* is also emptiness.

Lamotte has shown how this interpretation effects the Mahāyāna reading of the "*Gārava-sutta*" of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* in the *Upādeśa*. The author of the text quotes the passage where the Buddha acknowledges that it was by knowing dharma that he was enlightened. The *Upādeśa* substitutes the word *prajñāpāramitā* (a synonym of emptiness) for the word *dharma* in its quotation.[40] Elsewhere, Lamotte quotes the following from his translation of the *Upādeśa*:


The Dharma of the Buddhas is the True Nature of

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[40] Étienne Lamotte, "The Gāravasutta of the Saṃyutta nikāya and Its Mahāyānist Developments," *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 9, (1981): 136-137.

dharmas (dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā). This True Nature is without arising, without destruction, without interruption, without permanence, without unity, without plurality, without arrival or departure, without support, non-existent, the same as Nirvāṇa.[41]

In sum, a) there are four extremes that are taken as both representative and exhaustive of dependent-origination in the early canon. These are: *uccheda, śāśvata, ekārtha, and nānārtha*. b) the remaining four extremes mentioned in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s *nāmaskāra* are either equivalent to, or synonymous with, the terms that signify "unconditionality" in the early canon. These terms are also applied to the way that all dharmas are said to exist in the Mahāyāna sūtras. They are: *utpāda*, *nirodha*, *āgama*, and *nirgama*. If we use these terms as markers which represent the discourses from which they come, we can see the possibility of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* presenting a strategy for reading scripture.



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[41] *Ibid.*, 139.

The early canonical layers deny that dependent-origination is anything other than conditionedness. The Mahāyāna layers deny the conditionedness of even conditionality itself, and in so doing the enveloping negations change the way we understand the center layer by changing the context. Logic and scriptural allusion as two different functions of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* are mutually complementary. The allusions add to the semantics of the logical arguments, while the logical arguments show the relationship (i.e., the recontextualization) between texts (i.e., how we should read them in light of each other).

In light of what has been said above, we can now look at the *nāmaskāra* of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as a model of how dependent-origination will be presented in the entire work. On the one hand, from the Śrāvakayānist point of view, dependent-origination will be *samsāra* and the upper levels of concentration will be nirvāṇa. On the other hand, from the Mahāyāna point of view, the fact that dependent-origination is said to be characterized by all four indicates that the unconditioned lies immanent within the conditioned.

The way that the *nāmaskāra* to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* positions references from opposing sources relative to one another to produce a different reading of both texts, is a practice that occurs throughout the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Though there are many examples of this kind of interplay

between texts, I will focus on an example that has already been discussed in this work -- Nāgārjuna's reference to the *"Kaccānagottasutta"* in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter 15. In order to show how the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s placement of the canonical reference relative to the rest of the argument affects the meaning, I will again refer to Buddhaghosa's Theravāda commentary on the same verse to provide comparison. The text of the *Kaccānagottasutta* itself reads:

> [Text:] This world, Kaccāna, usually bases [its view] on two things: on existence and on non-existence.
>
> Now he, who with right insight sees the uprising of the world as it really is, does not hold with the non-existence of the world. But he, who with right insight sees the passing of the world as it really is, does not hold with the existence of the world.[42]

Buddhaghosa's commentary on this passage clarifies the terms.

> [Commy:] "*This is one extreme*" [means] this is a deceptive extreme, a bad extreme [and] is primarily "eternalism". ... "*Everything is non-existent*" is the second false and bad extreme, a so-called "view related to arising". It is the meaning of

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[42]Translation, Rhys Davids, *Kindred Sayings*, 12-13.

"disruption." (uccheda) The rest of this is clear.[43]

Here, the extremes of being/non-being are explained under the rubric of eternalism and annihilationism.[44] Indeed, as we have seen in the Pāli commentary on the *Nidānavagga* (the chapter of the canon which contains the *Kaccānagotta sutta*), all extreme views fall under these two overarching categories of eternality *(śāśvatā)* or disruption *(uccheda)*.[45] Even in the *suttas* which add "unity" and "plurality" onto the list, such as the "*Lokāyatika*" sutta,[46] the commentary reduces

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[43]Translation [mine]: "*Ayaṃ eko anto* ti, esa eko nikat' anto, lāmak' anto, paṭhamaṃ sassataṃ. *Ayaṃ dutiyo anto* ti, esa dutiyo. *Sabbaṃ n' atthī* ti, uppajjanaka-diṭṭhi-sankhāto nikat' anto, lāmak' anto dutiyako, ucchedo to attho. Sesam ettha uttānam evā ti." text: Buddhaghosa, *Sārattha-Ppākasinī*, 34.

[44] Indeed, this may be where Nāgārjuna gets his assumption that "*bhāva*" means that something cannot change! (An idea that seems to have befuddled his interpreters).

[45] Cf. Yaśomitra, *Sphuṭārthā*, 265ff. It looks as if he relates all 62 views (from "*Brahmajāla sutta*"?) back to belief in ātman which is in turn a product of the two extremes *(śāśvānta, ucchedānta)*.

[46] At Sāvatthī a world-wise brahmin came into the presence of the Exalted One… [and] said thus to the Exalted One:

'What say you here, Master Gotama: everything is?'

'"Everything is"-that, brahmin, is the chief world-wisdom.'

'Well then, Master Gotama: nothing is?'

'"Nothing is": that is the second world-wisdom.'

'Well, then, Master Gotama:- everything is a unity ["ekattan"]?'

'"Everything is a unity": that, brahmin, is the third world-wisdom.'

'Well, then, Master Gotama:- everything is a plurality ["puthuttan"]?'

these extremes again to the extremes of eternality and annihilationism.[47] In short, the Pāli school understood the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism to be fundamental to all the analyses of the *Nidānavagga* and read all of the passages in light of this assumption.

Nāgārjuna's reference to this *sūtra* comes just over half way through chapter 15. Verses 1-5 set up the problem of being and non-being in terms of the reciprocal pair "own-being" *(svabhāva)* and "other-being" *(parabhāva)*. The reasoning of the chapter draws out the various *prasaṅga* arguments in order to demonstrate the radical interdependence (and hence emptiness) between the terms. In these first five verses there is nothing to indicate any connection to the

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'"Everything is a plurality": that, brahmin, is the fourth world-wisdom.'

The Tathāgata, not approaching any of these extremes, teaches you a Doctrine by a middle [way]...[the twelve-links follow]." Rhys Davids, *Kindred Sayings*, 53. [Pāli added].

47 Commentary runs as follows:

"*Unity*": He asks [if it is] one essence, a permanent essence. "*Diversity*": He asks [if it is] a different essence [nānā-sabhāva] than formerly, after having been first with the state of a human or a god, etc., and then afterwards not (to be) -- after having been destroyed. All this exists, all is unity, these two are also eternalist view: everything does not exist, everything is diversity, these two are disruption view. Thus it is to be known."

Translation mine. text: "*Ekattan* ti, eka-sabhāvaṃ. Nicca-sabhāvam evā ti pucchati. *Puthuttan* ti, purima-sabhāvena nānā-sabhāvaṃ, devamanussādi-bhāvena paṭhamaṃ hutvā pacchā na hotī ti ucchenaṃ sandhāya pucchati. Evam ettha sabbam atthi, sabbam ekattan ti, imā dve pi sassata-diṭṭhiyo: sabbaṃ n' atthi, sabbaṃ puthuttan ti, imā dve uccheda-diṭṭhiyo ti veditabbā. Buddhaghosa,*Sāratha-Ppākasinī*, 76.

Nidānavagga.

Verses 6 and 7, however, both allude to the *Nidānavagga.* Verse 6, reads: "[t]hose who see the concepts of self-nature, other nature, existence or non-existence do not perceive the real truth in the Buddha's teaching."[48] Clearly this is an allusion to the *Mahāhatthipadupama Sutta* where the saying "the one who sees dependent-origination sees dharma" is attributed to the Buddha. The second part of Nāgārjuna's verse is merely the negative formulation of the canonical verse.

Verse 7, of course refers to the *Kaccānagottasutta. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 15.7. reads:

> According to the Instructions to Kātyāyana, both existence and non-existence are criticized by the Blessed One who opposed being and non-being.[49]

The placement of the scriptural reference in relation to the argument of mutual dependence provides a context by which one is to understand the quote. In short, logic claims that everything is empty, therefore there is no being nor non-being. The understanding of the absence of being and non-being is placed in the context of liberation *via* its parataxis to the canonical reference. The arguments of the chapter are significant in that seeing reality as devoid of

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[48] Inada, *Nāgārjuna,* 99.

[49] *Ibid.*

essence *(svabhāva)* is made to be synonymous with seeing the dharma by means of the arguments' position in the text relative to the scriptural reference in verse 6.

Significantly, the final two verses of chapter 15 present an interpretation of the verse in keeping with that of the Pāli school; absence of being and non-being implies the absence of eternalism and annihilationism. In doing so, Nāgārjuna doesn't deny what was probably a common Śravakayāna interpretation of this verse. On the contrary, the way that he structures this chapter presents the Mahāyāna teaching of emptiness as the logical ground on which the more common interpretation must rely.

Similar use of allusion occurs elsewhere in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. A brief example can be found in chapter, 17, the "examination of action and its result," where Nāgārjuna begins with reference to a teaching of karma that could have come from any *abhidharma* manual. The middle part of the chapter contains the *prasaṅga* arguments, establishing the emptiness of karma as laid out in verse 21. Finally the chapter ends with what could be a reference to any number of Mahāyāna texts:

> "Defilements, karmans, bodily entities, doers, effects are all similar to the nature of an imaginary city in the sky, a mirage or a dream."[50]

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[50] *Ibid*, 112.

The overall effect of this chapter is not to deny the canonical teaching of karma, not to deny the *abhidharma* elaborations on the canonical teachings, but rather to show that the canonical teaching about karma and the *abhidharmic* interpretation are somehow equivalent to the Mahāyāna teaching of emptiness as taught through the logic of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.

Chapter 7: Allusions to Skandha and Dhātu

Thus far, I have shown some ways that the form of Nāgārjuna's writing alludes to certain canonical doctrines and thereby subverts the common reading of these scriptures. In chapter four, I discussed the way that the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* enables us to reinterpret the four noble truths, *prapañca* (the arising of suffering), and the three gates of liberation (the cessation of suffering). There I showed how Nāgārjuna employs canonical terminology to subvert the doctrine of dependent origination to be read in such a way as to equal both *saṃsāra* and nirvāṇa. There is one further formal characteristic to be discussed in this regard, although I have saved it for last because it is an intertextual relationship which was seen by only one of Nāgārjuna's commentators. Candrakīrti (6th cent) represents Nāgārjuna's philosophy in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* and does so using two kinds of analysis.[1] The first is the analysis of production. This is essentially the analysis of entities in terms of dependent-origination and is fundamentally an examination over the course of time (thus, and examination of dependent origination). The other kind of analysis is an examination of the person. This amounts to a familiar Buddhist meditation technique which analyzes a human being

[1] The overwhelming bulk of this representation can be found in chapter six.

into its component parts in order to demonstrate the doctrine of no-soul *(anātman)*, and which is the arena where the *abhidharma* categories of the five aggregates, the twelve sense spheres, the six elements, and so forth have a function. This meditation analyses an entity within a static framework. The component parts are either the five aggregates (form, feeling, cognition, activities, and consciousness) or the six elements (air, earth, fire, water, space, and consciousness).

As in the case of the four noble truths and dependent origination, Nāgārjuna brings up a meditation used to understand *saṃsāra* and suggests to the reader that s/he will find nirvāṇa/emptiness therein. Discussions of absorption and discussions of elemental analysis do exist in the canon, but never together. By recontextualizing allusions to absorption within the context of elemental analysis, Nāgārjuna makes us read the canon as saying that if we really analyze the way that things are we will see that the state of emptiness is not just a product of our meditative efforts, but is a part of the way that things really are.

Candrakīrti identifies this kind of analysis as one of the fundamental aspects of dependent-origination and links it to Nāgārjuna's term "dependent-designation" *(upādāya prajñapti)* - a term that occupies a rather central position in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. While later Mahāyāna masters

maintained the radical difference between Mahāyāna and Śrāvakayāna schools due to the differences in texts, Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and Ratnāvalī systematically go through the of the Śrāvakayāna categories definitive of the canon and show that the Mahāyāna teaching of emptiness is the foundation on which their possibility lies. We have seen how Nāgārjuna does this with the four noble truths, the 12 links of dependent-origination, the five aggregates and the six elements. Nāgārjuna establishes this foundational status of emptiness through careful allusions to and recontextualizations of canonical passages. The expositions of Nāgārjuna's commentators such as Candrakīrti confirm this reading.

In chapter three, I explained that Nāgārjuna has a certain method of arguing and that he offers us a verbal account of why it works the way it does -- he claims that all arguments are *sādhyasama*. In this chapter, I will argue that there is a related term, another verbal clue, that Nāgārjuna uses to describe his method of argumentation -- *upādāyā-prajñapti*. While *sādhyasama* describes why all propositions raised in light of *śūnyatā* are false, I will argue that, under Candrakīrti's interpretation, *upādāya-prajñapti* describes the nature of the arguments themselves. I will show how Candrakīrti links the structure of reasoning that this term describes to the canonical doctrine of *anātman* and the

highest levels of meditative absorption.

Admittedly, *upādāya-prajñapti* only occurs once in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (24.18), and when it does occur, its usage is puzzling to say the least. Modern translations of this verse abound, and among them the diversity is striking. Consider the following:

Erich Frauwallner

(upādāya prajñaptiḥ) and it is the middle way.[2]

Jaques May

c'est la production par conditions que nous appelons vacuité.

La vacuité est désignation métaphorique. C'est elle qui est la voie moyenne.[3]

Gadjin Nagao

What is originating co-dependently, we call emptiness.

It is a designation based upon (some material). Only this is the Middle Path.[4]

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[2] "Das abhängige Entstehen ist es, das wir als Leerheit bezeichnen. Sie ist bloße Benennung auf irgendwelcher Grundlage (upādāya prajñaptiḥ) und sie ist der mittlere Weg." My translation. Erich Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie Des Buddhismus*, 4th ed., (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), 190.

[3] Candrakīrti, *Douze Chapitres*, 237.

[4] Gadjin Nagao, "From Mādhyamika to Yogācāra: An Analysis of MMK. XXIV.18 and MV, I.1-2," in *Mādhyamika and Yogācāra: A Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies - Collected Papers of G.M. Nagao*, L.S. Kawamura ed., (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 190.

Kenneth Inada

We declare that whatever is relational origination is *śūnyatā*. It is a provisional name (i.e. a thought construction) for the mutuality (of being) and, indeed, it is the middle path.[5]

Fredrick Streng

The "originating dependently" we call "emptiness"; This apprehension, i.e., the taking into account [all other things], is the understanding of the middle way.[6]

Mervyn Sprung

We interpret the dependent arising of all things as the absence of being in them. Absence of being is a guiding, not a cognitive, notion, presupposing the everyday. It is itself the middle way.[7]

David Kalupahana

We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness. That is dependent upon convention. That itself is the middle path.[8]

Alex Wayman

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[5] Inada, *Nāgārjuna*, 148.

[6] Frederick Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), 213.

[7] Sprung, *Lucid Exposition*, 238.

[8] Kalupahana, *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna*, 339.

> Given the Dependent Origination - it is the
> instruction which was received that we call *śūnyatā*
> and this is the Middle Path.[9]

Most of these translations are in agreement about the first two *pādas* and the last -- that dependent origination is claimed to be emptiness and that this is the Middle Way. Where these translations differ substantially is on the phrase "*sā prajñaptir upādāya*." There are three kinds of interpretations among the examples given above. The first, proposed by Frauwallner and May suggests an untrustworthy relationship between the word "emptiness" and whatever its referent may be. The second kind of interpretation is that of Sprung and Kalupahana which suggests that emptiness itself is only provisionally true. Finally, as suggested by Inada's translation, this phrase could mean that emptiness is a word for mutuality (which, under this interpretation, *is* true). Each of these interpretations assumes a fissure between language and the referent of that language due to the fact that the word is based on a non-linguistic substratum. In understanding the *compound* in this way, they assume that *prajñapti* denotes something which is misleading.

Alex Wayman's interpretation of this passage is substantially different. He sees the term *prajñapti* in a more positive light.

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[9] Wayman, *Nāgārjuna's Secret*, 90.

> One feature that [the translations of Robinson, Gokhale, and Wayman] have in common is that these authors, including myself, thought they were correct; but thinking does not make it so! Yet it is no longer guessing to take the first meaning in the Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary for *prajñapti*, namely, 'instruction'. And it is not guessing to notice that '*upādā-*' means to receive', and that *upādāya* is indeclinable and so can be rendered according to the context. Therefore, the phrase can be rendered 'the instruction that was received'.[10]

In translating this term as "received instruction", Wayman shifts the interpretation from *prajñapti* as a negative term to *prajñapti* standing in the place of the teachings of the Buddha. The interpretation that I wish to take is different from those mentioned above, although it has affinities with that of Wayman. I will argue that *upādāya prajñapti* indicates the interdependency of phenomena[11] (words

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[10] *Ibid.*, 89-90.

[11] Here, I will be using the term "phenomena" in a technical sense coming from the Greek, "*φαινεσθαι*" meaning "to show itself". A phenomenon, then, is something in the way that it makes itself known to us. An important part of the way that things are made known to us is through language. For an explanation of this use of the word "phenomenon" see Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson trans., (San Francisco: Harper, 1962), 51-55. In this sense, I am relying on an etymological interpretation of prajñāpti as that which causes ("*pti*") understanding ("*prajñā*").

being an important part of phenomena), and that it not only indicates the relationships of reciprocal implication, but also was seen to be formally reminiscent of the Buddha's teachings on no-self (*anātman*).

In the early Mādhyamika works available to us, little comment is made concerning this "*upādāya-prajñapti*." Furthermore, in other (non-tantric) works ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the term is noticeably absent[12]. Neither the *Akutobhayā*, nor the *Buddhapālitavṛtti*, nor the *Chung Lun* comment on the term at all, while Bhāvaviveka merely glosses the term as "*upādānam upādāya prajñaptiḥ*"[13] ["[It is] a *prajñapti* which relies on what is relied upon"], which is a true statement, but not a helpful one.

The problem that each interpreter of this verse has had

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[12] There are a number of parallel passages in other works ascribed to Nāgārjuna:

Lokatītastava, verse 22:
"yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatā sâiva te matā|
bhāvaḥ svatantro nāstiīti siṃhanādas tavātulaḥ||."[Lindtner, Chr. *Nāgārjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna*, vol. 2, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990), 135.]

Acintyastava verse 40:
"yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatā saiva te matā|
tathā vidhaś ca saddharmas tat samaśca tathāgataḥ||" [*Ibid.*, 152]

Vigrahavyāvartanī
"yaḥ śūnyatāṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ madhyamāṃ pratipadaṃ ca | ekārthāṃ nijagāda praṇamāmi tamapratimabuddham || [Bhattacharya, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, 70.]

[13] Cf. Nagao, "From Mādhyamika to Yogācara," 192-193.

to face begins with a grammatical problem and ends with a philosophical one. Normally, the term "*upādāya*" is a indeclinable gerundive meaning (among other things) "depending-on (something)"; the "something" here must take the accusative case.[14] The verse in question, however, has no accusative noun in it. Thus the problem of translating this verse lies in what to take as the referent of "*upādāya*." One influential view of what exactly this referent is, has been set forth by Gadgin Nagao, who bases his interpretation on Avalokitavrata's sub-commentary *(ṭīka)* on Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*.

> According to Avalokitavrata's explanation of the phrase upādānam upādāya prajñaptiḥ, the word *upādāna* (material cause) means "hetu-pratyaya" (cause and condition): a sprout is so named based upon a seed, its upādāna; Tathāgata is so designated based upon the virtues such as the ten powers, the four convictions, and *[sic]* as His upādāna. Being thus designated as based upon causes and conditions, not only the sprout but also the Tathāgata is empty, devoid of self-being.… Such a revived pratītya-samutpāda is a "designation" *(prajñapti)* for it appropriates, depends upon, or bases itself upon

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[14] As do all of the uses of *upādāya* listed in Edgerton, Franklin. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, s.v. "Upādāya."

(upādāya) something else, or some kind of material *(upādāna)*. In this sense, it is synonymous with *saṃketa* (conventional symbol) and *loka-vyavahāra* (common-practice), terminologies used to designate conventional truth. Thus upādāya-prajñapti means a "designation based on some material."[15]

According to Avalokitavrata's interpretation, it is the fact that a thing relies upon a collocation (*samāgrī*) of causes and conditions that makes it empty. The dependence of a given thing on the factors of its production not only allow it to occur (a case of dependent origination) but this dependence in production is also the means by which we know a thing (a case of *upādāya prajñapti*). Thus, we come to know a seed based upon the fact that it will produce a sprout.

Candrakīrti on the other hand, takes the compound as a technical term (grammatically, something like *upādāyarūpa*) and as such it does not require an accusative object. Philosophically, he deals extensively with the term in his *Mādhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*. He does not see *upādāya prajñapti* as another referent for the canonical conception of dependent origination. Rather, he seems to take it as an allusion to canonical teachings about the five aggregates and the six elements. There is a subtle difference between the interpretations adopted by Candrakīrti and by Avalokitavrata.

[15]Nagao, "From Mādhyamika to Yogācara," 192-193.

In the next few paragraphs, I will give a brief sketch of what I take to be Candrakīrti's interpretation of this term and then compare this with what we have already said about the structure of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s verses. In the examination of Candrakīrti's use of the terms, I will leave both "*upādāya*" and "*prajñapti*" untranslated as much as possible in order to leave open the issue of their meaning.

Beginning with his commentary on Nāgārjuna's verse where the term occurs, Candrakīrti's commentary runs as follows:

> And the emptiness of essence, *(svabhāva)*[16] that is *upādāya-prajñapti*. "That very same emptiness is "*upādāya-prajñapti*". This is established. When there is the *prajñapti* depending on (*upādāya*) the parts of the chariot (such as) the wheel, etc., then for that (thing) which is made known *[prajñapyate]* depending on [*upādāya*] its own parts *[svāṅgāni]*, there is no occurrence as essence. And whatever does not arise as (having) essence, that is emptiness. The emptiness which has the characteristic of the non-arising of essence is established; that itself is the middle path. For the one who (maintains) the non-arising of essence, there is no existence. And for what is not-arisen as essence, there is the no non-existence because there is no existence of

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16 "Svabhāva" is missing in Tibetan.

destruction *(vigama)*. Hence, it has been said that the emptiness which is the middle [way] which has the characteristic of the non-arising of all essence because of the absence *[rahitatva]* of the two extremes of existence and non-existence is the middle path. "*Śūnyatā, upādāya prajñāpti,* (and) the middle way" these are distinctive notions (*viśeṣa-saṃjñā*) of *pratītyasamutpāda*.[17]

This discussion of the term *upādāya-prajñapti* seems straightforward enough. It is simply the "designation" or the "phenomenon" *(prajñapti)* of a thing which "depends" *(upādāya)* on its own parts.[18] Notice also that emptiness, *upādāya-*

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[17]Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 504.

[18]On the one hand, we could look at this statement from the standpoint of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* and say that this is Nāgārjuna's statement that these arguments turn on the relation between parts and a whole ("like a chariot and its parts" = relationship #3 in chapter one). On the other hand, it is probably more likely that Candrakīrti had in mind something more like the discussion of *anātman* in the *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*. In any case, Candrakīrti was not the only one to use this definition of *upādāya-prajñapti* as well as the example of the chariot. Cp. L. de la Valée Poussin, "Caturāryasatyaparīkṣa: Extraits du XXIVe chapitre de la Mādhyamakavṛtti," in *Mélanges Charles De Harlez: Recueil de Travaux D'Érudition Offert A L'Occasion du Vingt-Cinquième Anniversaire.*, (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1896), 319, ftn. 1: "Comp. MINAYEFF, *Researches* [*sur le Bouddhisme*], p. 218 - Dharmasaṃgraha XLII …

> "dvyardhaçatikāyām/ çūnyāḥ sarvadharmā niḥsvabhāvayogena iti/ yā ceyaṃ svabhāvaçūnyā sā prajñaptir upādāya saiva çūnyatā/ upādāyaprajñaptir iti vyavasthāpyate/ cakrādīny upādāya tathāṅgāni rathaḥ prajñapyate/ tasya yā svāṅgāny upādāya prajñaptiḥ/ sā svabhāvenānutpattiḥ/ yā ca svabhāvānutpattiḥ sā çūnyatā saiva svabhāvānutpattilakṣaṇā çunyatā [sic] madhyamā pratipad iti/ vyavasthāpyate/ yasya hi svabhāvenānutpattis tasyāstitvābhāvaḥ

prajñapti, and the middle way are all put on the same level as the special conceptions of dependent origination.

Apart from the few uses of "*upādāya-prajñapti*" in the *Prasannapadā*, there is much more discussion about this in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*[19] where Candrakīrti claims that not only is the chariot merely a *prajñapti* depending on its own parts, but that each of those parts is also not ultimately real (in the sense of having *svabhāva*). Each part is not real due to the fact that it too is composed of further parts (*ad infinitum*).

> (Verse:) That, as reality or as worldly [truth], is certainly not established by seven aspects. It is a designation depending on its own members which exists to [those people of the] world [who are] lacking logical analysis.

> svabhāvena cānutpannasya vigamābhāvā[n] nāstitvābhāva iti/ ato bhāvābhāvāntadvayarahitatvāt/ sarvasvabhāvānutpattilakṣaṇā çū[nya]tā madhyamā pratipan madhyamo mārga iti ucyate/ tad evaṃ pratītyasamutpādasyaivaitā viçeṣasaṃjñāḥ çūnyatā upādāyaprajñapti[r] madhyamā pratipad iti."

Designation depending on its own parts, however, is not the whole story for Candrakīrti.

[19] cf. Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 68, ftn. 4: "La version tibétaine ajoute [T. 26a] : brten nas brtags par rnam par bźag pa 'di yaṅ dbu ma la 'jug pa las rgyas par brtan pas de ñid las yoṅs su btsal bar bya'o| = etad apy upādāyaprajñaptivyavasthānaṃ vistareṇa Madhyamakāvatāre nirdiṣṭam (bstan pa?) iti tata paryavaseyam." "Also, this establishment of *upādāyaprajñapti* is taught at length in the *Madhyamakāvatara*." also cf. Clair W. Huntington, *The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to early Indian Mādhyamika*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 253-4 & 260.

(Commentary:) A "chariot" other than its own parts is not acceptable. If one will search by these seven aspects in this manner, the chariot will certainly not be established as either conventional truth (*saṃvṛti*) or as ultimate truth (*paramārtha*). If this is so, the wheel, is [similarly] a designation depending on parts, like blue, etc., and feeling, etc., [even] among the worldly who have abandoned examination. Because of having accepted *upādāya-prajñapti* just as we accept dependent-origination to be the sole conditionality, there is no consequence of destroying worldly convention in our position.[20]

This discussion bears a number of similarities to the simile of the chariot explained by Vajirā Bhikkhunī, in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*:

[Māra asks:] By whom was wrought this 'being' *[satta]*? Where is he Who makes him? Whence doth a being arise? Where doth the being cease and pass away?...

[Vajirā Bhikkhunī:] 'Being'! Why dost thou harp upon that word? 'Mong false opinions, Māra, hast thou strayed. Mere bundle of conditioned factors, this!

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[20]Tibetan pp. 362b-363a Louis de la Valée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti: Traduction Tibétaine*, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 9 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 277.

No 'being' can be discerned to be. For just as, when the parts are rightly set, the word 'chariot' ariseth [in our minds], So doth our usage covenant to say: 'A being" when the aggregates are there.
Nay, it is simply Ill that rised, Ill that doth persist, and Ill that wanes away.
Nought beside Ill it is that comes to pass, Nought beside Ill it is that comes to pass, Nought else but Ill it is doth cease to be.
Then Māra the evil one thought: 'Sister Vajirā knows me' and sad and sorrowful he vanished there and then.[21]

Candrakīrti's use of the chariot metaphor to explain upādāya-prajñapti is appropriate here in light of this canonical passage. Notice that Vajirā Bhikkhunī not only points out that the chariot has only a nominal existence by virtue of its parts, but that she also relates this kind of composition to the aggregates and to the origin, persistence, and waning of suffering (arising and ceasing are said to be

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21 Translation: (*Kindred Sayings*, vol. 1, 169-170.) Text: "Kenāyaṃ pakato satto kuvaṃ sattassa kārako,
Kuvaṃ satto samuppanno kuvaṃ satto nirujjhatītikinnu satto ti paccesi māra diṭṭhigataṃ nu te|
suddhasaṅkhārapuñjo yaṃ nayidha sattūpalabhati||
yathā hi saṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti|
evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti
dukkham eva hi sambhoti dukkhaṃ tiṭṭhati veti ca|
nāññatra dukkhā sambhoti nāññaṃ dukkhā nirujjhati|| (*Saṃyutta Nikāya*, vol. 1, 135)

characteristic of dependent origination).

The central message of Vajirā Bhikkhunī's speech that one's soul should denied existence in favor of its parts (i.e., the 5 *skandhas*). The crucial difference occurs in the statement, "The wheel, etc.,... is [similarly] a designation depending on parts."[22] The emphasis here is that each part is not ultimate, but is also composite. In short, not only is the composite thing without an ultimate identity *(= "pudgala-nairātmiya")* but its component parts are similarly composite *(= "dharma-nairātmiya")*.

There is only one problem; what is the basis of the designation? In the *canonical* model the *prajñapti* (*paññati*) is what is commonly admitted to be the case (it is *vohāra* = *vyavahāra*), which turns out to be nothing but its parts. In Candrakīrti's account, there is a *prajñapti* based upon something which itself is a *prajñapti*. By invoking such a dependency, and hence by removing any finality of reference, we have merely displaced the problem of identity onto a substratum which has been posited but not yet located. As

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[22] Also, cf. *Milindapañho*: "I, revered Nāgasena, am not telling a lie, for it is because of the pole, because of the axle, the wheels, the body of the chariot, the yoke, the reins, and because of the goad that 'chariot' exists as a denotation, appellation, designation, as a current usage, as a name." [*Milinda's Questions*, vol. 1, translated by I. B. Horner. London: (Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1963), 37.]

The Pāli runs as follows: "Nāhaṃ bhante Nāgasena musā bhaṇāmi, īsañca paṭicca akkhañca paṭicca cakkāni ca paṭicca ratho ti sankhā samaññā paññatti vohāro nāmaṃ pavattatīti" [PTS version, 27]

such, the illustration of the chariot should fail because the existence of the composite cannot be replaced by anything more fundamental. Hence we run into an infinite regress.

From this point there are three obvious solutions to the problem and one not-so-obvious. Either nothing exists at all, in which case the designations are based on nothing; or the names are based on something substantially real (is assumed in the canon), in which case there would be something non-empty. The third option is an infinite regress. The first option falls into the fault of *apavāda*, the second the fault of *samāropa*, while the third is always presented in Mādhyamaka literature as being generally undesirable. Granted, what Candrakīrti has illustrated here is a case where any attempt to establish a chariot, a wheel, and so forth ends in the fallacy of *sādhyasama*. But could Nāgārjuna's statement that all objections are *sādhyasama* mean that he advocates a species of extreme skepticism (questions with no possibility of an answer)? This option would be meaningless from the point of view of Buddhist scripture (Mahāyānist *or* Śrāvakayānist). From what Candrakīrti says at the end of the passage above it is clear that the teaching of *upādāya-prajñapti* and *sādhyasama* are not a kind of skepticism or pyrrhonism. There must be another interpretation, otherwise Candrakīrti would not say that he accepts *upādāya-*

prajñapti and, "for that reason does not contradict worldly convention." In other words, *upādāya-prajñapti* is somehow to be the solution to the infinite regress. This issue is dealt with in an earlier discussion in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*[23] where

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[23] In the following section I intend to discuss Candrakīrti's use of "*prajñapti*" and "*upādāya*" in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*. The obvious problem with this is that we are trying to trace the use of a Sanskrit word through a text that exists only in Tibetan translation. The problem is further exacerbated by certain indications that the translator may have translated the same word in a number of different ways. The task is not impossible, but it requires some care.

In the Tibetan (Peking) version of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 24.18c (Sanskrit "*sā prajñaptir upādāya*") reads: "*de ni brten nas gdags pa ste/*" while the translator of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, renders the same pāda (on Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 228.19): "*de ni rgyur bcas gdags ba ste/*". Both agree on "*gdags*" for "*prajñapti*" but diverge in their translation of "*upādāya*". Despite the quote from 24.18, the term "*brten nas*" is used often in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* in roughly the same sense as "*upādāya*"; "*x* is dependent on *y*". Nevertheless, "*brten nas*" could be used to translate a number of Sanskrit words such as "*pratītya*","*āśrityā*", or "*niśritya*", but considering its consistent use alongside forms of "*'dogs pa*" (related to '*prajñapti*' - see below) it is reasonable to assume that it is also used as a translation of "*upādāya*," or if not it translates some synonym of that term. As far as "*gyur bcas*" goes, there are a number of possible explanations. It could be that the translator of the *Mādhyamakāvatāra* chose "gyur bcas" to make it sound similar to the usual translation of "*upādāya-rūpa*" - "*gyur byas pa'i gzugs*" (cf. *Mahāvyutpatti*, 1845: "*Rgyur-byas-pa'i gzugs*". Another possibility is that this verse is a quotation from someone else's translation of that verse.

While "*gdags pa*" *is* the agreed translation of "*prajñapti*" this term does not often appear in the *Bhāṣya*. A much more common term, which seems to mean the same thing is "*btags pa*". Both terms are forms of the verb "*'dogs pa*": "*btags pa*" is the perfect form and "*gdags pa*" is the future form of the verb. Despite this grammatical difference, there does not seem to be much difference in usage in the *Bhāṣya*. There are two external justifications of this equation. First, "*gdags pa*" is listed in the *Mahāvyutpatti* as a translation of "*prajñapti*" and yet "*btags pa*" is also known to translate "*prajñapti*" (Lokesh Candra lists such occurrences in both the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and the *Samādhirāja Sūtra*; cf. Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v. "*btags pa*"). The second is the statement on 277 that "*brten nas*" is accepted as the sole condition for dependent-origination. Now, there could be any number of interpretations

the object of investigation is a pot.

> Things such as a pot, etc., do not exist in reality. How are they well established in the world? When all entities occur as such (i.e., as not existing in reality), there would not be the fault of being like the son of a barren woman.

[Opponent:] Why? If the substratum (*rten* = either *upādāna* or *āśraya*) of the *prajñapti (gdags pa)* for earth, water, fire, wind, form, smell, taste, and touch, etc., exist, then because of that, it is reasonable to say that the *prajñapti (btags pa)* "pot" has a cause. If accordingly, for the one [who claims] all dharmas are nothing but *prajñapti (btags pa tsam)*, and that there is no substance which is the basis of *prajñapti*, then to that person, there is no diverting *(bzlog pa)* the consequence of [such things] being like the son of a barren woman (i.e., a word with no referent). [Response:] This also is not reasonable: due to the inability to establish the substratum which is the basis of designation. As it has been said:

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of this statement except that it comes too close to 24.18 to be anything other than "*upādāya-prajñapti*". The author of the *Madhyamakāvatāta* does have to demonstrate his proximity to Nāgārjuna's thought. In any case, it is unlikely that Candrakīrti would introduce a different technical term so boldly here and not mention it in the *Prasannapadā*, which was written afterwards.

> Just as, apart from form *(rūpa)*, etc., the pot does not exist; so too, apart from the [element] wind, etc., form also does not exist.[24]

And accordingly:

> Earth, water, fire, wind; each singly does not exist as *svabhāva*[25]. What the three are not, they are not singly. When one does not exist, the three do not. If the three do not exist, each does not exist. When one does not exist the three do not exist. [Hence] each one is not its own existence. In what manner will the assembly arise?...[26].

...Just as it is not supposed that there arises an impermanent thing from something permanent, so too, it is not reasonable for there to be the arising of a substratum which does not exist from a substratum

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[24]Poussin identifies this quotation as coming from Āryadeva's Śatakaśāstra XIV.14.

[25]text: "*sa chu me daṅ rluṅ rnams ni| re re ṅo bo ñid du med|*" For some reason, Poussin leaves *ṅo bo ñid du* (*svabhāvatas*) untranslated. Poussin, translates this sentence as: "La terre, l'eau, le vent, n'existent pas chacun à part." L. de la Vallée Poussin, "Madhyamakāvatāra: introduction au traité du milieu de l'ācārya Candrakīrti, avec le commentaire de 'auteur," *Muséon* 12 (1911): 275.

[26]La Vallée Poussin merely identifies this as "Mādhyamika, Stances de l'école," [Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 427.] Clearly, this is a quotation from *Ratnāvalī* chapter 1, vs. 84-85.

which does.[27]

In this passage the opponent objects to the notion that there are no real substances *(dravya)* out there providing the real basis for our designations. S/he claims that the fact that some things exist as *prajñapti* means that they must be the *prajñapti* of some substance. Candrakīrti responds while a *prajñapti* must be a designation of something else, that "something else" does not necessarily have to exist substantially (i.e., *dravyatas*).[28]

To illustrate what he means, Candrakīrti quotes a passage stating the idea that all substantial things are made of elements which do not exist independently but only through their relationships with other elements. For Candrakīrti this would have been a particularly orthodox Mādhyamikan interpretation, coming as it does from the *Ratnāvalī*, which

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[27]Translation mine. Text: [Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 224-225], Tibetan 344b.

[28]Here, I will be assuming that the alternative to something existing *dravyatas* is for it to exist interdependently (as *prajñapti*). However, there is a verse in *Yuktiṣāṣṭika* that was interpreted in later Mādhyamika as advocating a *citta-mātra* theory. For a discussion of this Cf. Christina Anna Scherrer-Schaub, *Yuktiṣāstikavṛtti: Commentaire a la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseignement de la causalité par le Maître indien Candrakīrti*, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, vol. 25, (Bruxelles: Institut Belge Des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1991), 253-259, note 492.

> vs. 34: mahābhūtādi vijñāne proktaṃ samavarudhyate| tajjñāne vigamaṃ yāti [yadi?] nanu mithyā vikalpitam||
>
> The great elements etc. are taught to be contained in consciousness. If they cease in this consciousness it will not be false imagination.

Candrakīrti assumes Nāgārjuna was the author. This quotation states that in order for any one element to have its proper characteristics, it must be dependent on three other elements -- while these in turn must rely on the other three. If we look at the whole passage from *Ratnāvalī* from which Candrakīrti is quoting, a possible way out of the infinite regress becomes apparent.

> 81. Because of being assembled *('dus pa)* of the six elements, a person is not absolute. Further, these same elements when (taken) individually are not absolute because of being assembled.
>
> 82. The aggregates are not *ātman*. The aggregates are not in the *ātman*. The *ātman* is also not in the aggregates. Without the aggregates the *ātman* does not exist. The aggregates and the ātman are not mixed like fire and fuel.
>
> 83. Earth is not the three elements, they are not in it. It is not in them. Without them it does not exist. Because of this, each element individually is like *ātman*, a falsehood.[29]

In these three verses, the *Ratnāvalī* sets up a parallel between the formulation of the five aggregates and that of the six elements: just as there is no *ātman* because a person

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[29]Michael Hahn, *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī: Vol. 1, The basic texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese)*, (Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1982), 34.

is really a composite of the five aggregates, for the same reason a person is not an *ātman* because of being a composite of the six elements. Just as there is mutual dependence between the five aggregates and the illusion of *ātman*, so too there is mutual dependence between the six elements and any one element.

The next nine verses form the heart of the argument, where the *Ratnāvalī* presents the reciprocity of the elemental relationships by alluding to arguments made in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. This section begins with the two verses that were quoted in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* above.

> 84. Earth, water, fire, wind; each singly does not exist as *svabhāva*. What the three are not, Each *(re re)* is not singly. If one does not exist, the three also do not.
>
> 85. If the three do not exist, each does not exist. When one does not exist the three do not exist. [Hence] each one is not its own existence. In what manner will the assembly arise?[30]

These two verses form the thesis of the argument. Just as the idea of *ātman* in the first few verses was antithetical to the fact of being a composite, so too the idea of having *svabhāva* (the *ātman* of *dharmas*) is contrary to being composite. No element can exist as *svabhāva* because each

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[30] *Ibid.*

relies on what it is not in order to be possible. In other words, it is the reciprocal implication that means that each element is empty of its own nature. The question remains, however, how do we perceive at all? The answer is borne out in the next few verses.

86. Nevertheless, if each one individually is itself (*'on te so sor raṅ yod na)*, then striking, obstruction, aggregation [would not be] accordingly like water, wind, and earth.

87. Still, if fire is thought [to not exist without fuel due to the fact that the fuel isn't perceived][31] then how [is it possible] according to you for [one to be without *svabhāva* and the remaining] three to have *svabhāva*, and by the same token how are they not to be mixed with one another?

88. These individually existing ones. If they exist in such a manner [i.e., interfused], how would they exist mutually? If they don't exist individually, how will they exist mutually?

89. If that does not exist individually, then the remaining ones do not mix (*ma 'dres pa* = *asaṃsṛṣṭa*) with the one, and the one place where the individual ones mix also does not exist.

[31]This verse is very difficult to translate due to so much being elided. What I have added in brackets comes from the commentary.

90. The elements do not exist individually. How does the *svalakṣaṇa* exist for each? The individual parts don't exist (and) the greater part of it (i.e., the whole)[32] doesn't exist. Characteristics are taught to be *saṃvṛtti*.[33]

How is there mutual dependence between the six elements and any one element? These five verses rely on arguments already made in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. The reason that no element can exist in and of itself is that each element has a characteristic, without which it cannot be considered to be that element. Wind strikes something else, earth obstructs something, and water brings things together. Apart from these characteristics the element could not be said to be present. Each of these characteristics would be meaningless to itself. Clearly, the arguments of verses 86 and 90 are parallel to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s discussion of *lakṣaṇa* /*lakṣya* in the "*Dhātu Parīkṣa*." Similarly, the mention of the relationship between fire and fuel assumes the arguments of

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[32] "*so so raṅ med śas cher med*" Hopkins translates this as "What do not themselves individually exist cannot predominate" (p. 30) and on p. 110, note 13, he explains: "The potencies of the four elements are said to be present in everything; the predominance of one element over the others determines what is manifested." This seems to stretch the limits of the text. What is at issue here is the relationship between parts and a whole. Ajītamitra glosses *śas che* as *lhag pa* -- "what remains" or "what is left over." [Ajītamitra, *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī: Vol. 2 Die Ratnāvalīṭīkā Des Ajītamitra*, Okada, Yukihiro, ed., (Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1990), 68] This seems to me to be the composite aspect apart from its components.

[33] *Ibid.*

chapter ten ("Examination of fire and fuel"), but casts the argument in a slightly different light. Here the relationship between fire and fuel becomes the relationship between elemental fire and the rest of the elements that make up fuel. Fire has the characteristic of burning. This fire cannot burn itself, therefore it cannot exist as something apart from its dependence on the other three elements. *Ratnāvalī* verse 88 is roughly parallel to *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 10.11.

> The entity that is established depending on (something), (when) it is (still) unestablished how does it depend? So too, the establishment depends on something and yet the dependence of that is not reasonable.[34]

These last two verses round out the argument by stating that all topics of investigation are to be analyzed in the same manner as this analysis of the elements.[35]

> 91. In this manner also (one examines) color, smell, taste, touch, the eye, (eye) consciousness and form, ignorance, activities and birth.

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[34]yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaḥ so 'siddho 'pekṣate katham| athâpy apekṣate siddhas tv apekṣâsya na yujyate|| cp. Nāgārjuna, *Ratnāvalī*, 35, verse 88.

[35]The verse itself is somewhat abbreviated, but this way of reading it comes out in the commentary: [Ajītamitra, 69] "*'byuṅ ba chen po [171b] med par bstan pa'i* **tshul** *te/ thabs bśad pa gaṅ yin pa'i thabs de ñid* **kha dog** *la sogs pa'i yaṅ yin no* [sic]/"

92. Action, agent, number and conglomeration, cause, effect, time, short, long, etc., consciousness, name and that which is named are the same [*de bźin*].

By invoking this section of the *Ratnāvalī* in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Candrakīrti is suggesting the way the Mādhyamika argument works. Since the Ratnāvalī verses deal with a certain kind of analysis which investigates wholes in terms of their parts in order to establish that ultimately there is no foundation, by invoking it, Candrakīrti answers the opponent's objection *via* shorthand. In doing so, he also places this kind of analysis as representative of all Mādhyamika analysis.

Coming back to Candrakīrti's discussion in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, a pot, or any other object does not exist any more than the *ātman* exists. Neither is ultimately real because each is made known by virtue of a collocation of parts. The non-ultimate nature of the thing is made known through analysis. This much is established in his commentary on 24.18. What the discussion from the *Madhyamakāvatāra* adds to our understanding of *upādāya-prajñapti* is an understanding of the endpoint of the analysis. The endpoint is not some substance *(dravya)* or essence *(svabhāva)*, but is the point at which the component parts imply one another reciprocally (cf. v. 85: "If *the three do not exist, each does not exist. When one does not exist the three do not exist. [Hence] each one*

is not its own existence"). There is no way to analyze further beyond this point of modal reciprocity, but because the relationship is reciprocal, the regress ends at this point. The endpoint of Madhyamaka analysis is not skepticism but an understanding of the universe as devoid of independently existing things. Hence, the opponent's in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* is answered.

From what has been discussed so far, the Mādhyamika method seems to be a matter of merely analyzing things in terms of composite and component parts, just like the *skandha* analysis of the Buddha. This is not quite all of the story. Immediately following the discussion about the elements quoted above, Candrakīrti claims that the relationship between the elements is *upādāya-prajñapti*. He explains that this is because the relationship between the parts of anything by virtue of which something is made known is *prajñapti*. He illustrates this point with a number of other illustrations of *upādāya-prajñapti*.

> Therefore, just as, for example the image in a mirror depending on the collocation of the face etc. which exists as *prajñapti* is understood (*dmigs pa*) to be only *prajñapti*. And[36] the *prajñapti* as a house

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[36]L. Valée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 1970 has "*btags pa nań*" ("*internal prajñapti*"?) which is clearly printed in the original text as "*btags pa dań*." Poussin must not have taken note of this typo because he translates it as *dań* in Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 1911, 275.

depending on a pillar etc. which exists as *prajñapti*. And similarly, the *prajñapti* of forest having the basis of a tree. And, just like, in the case of a dream, one perceives a sprout which has the nature of non-arising (i.e., is empty of *svabhāva*) from a seed which has the nature of non-arising, like that the *prajñapti* of all entities which exist as *prajñapti* is also reasonable to have the basis of an entity which also exists as *prajñapti*.

From these examples, it seems that there are two sides to *prajñapti* for Candrakīrti. The first is, of course, the grammatical meaning of the word. Grammatically, the term comes from the root √*jñā* "to know/to understand"; before which the prefix "*pra*" is added, and after which the suffix "*pti*" is appended. It is the suffix that concerns us here. The "*pti*" ending gives a causative sense to the word. Hence, *prajñapti* is the specific constitution of a thing which brings about "knowledge or understanding." What appears to be idiosyncratically Mādhyamikan in Candrakīrti's discussion is the second aspect -- which is the idea that something is *prajñapti* by reference to its composition. This much has already been said. However, in Candrakīrti's examples we can see two kinds of composition. The first is internal composition such as a house being composed of its parts, or a

chariot being composed of the wheel, etc. The second has to do with what we would normally consider to be external factors necessary to something's composition.[37] These are the examples of the mirror image[38] and the sprout and the seed. The face is external spatially to the image, and yet it is an external thing that is completely responsible for its composition. I will call this external composition. This is the same kind of logical reciprocity as Nāgārjuna invokes in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* in the example of father and son.

If we take the term *prajñapti* in the sense of phenomenon, then we must acknowledge that the location of any phenomenon is merely coincident with what we take to be the thing itself. What the doctrine of *upādāya-prajñapti* indicates is that phenomena are not located on one side or the other of their composite relationships, but rather at the boundary of all such relationships. What is made known to us is not a distinct existence but a set of relationships. For example, we do not know going in and of itself, but rather we know the relationship between what is said to go (*gantṛ*) and what is not said to go (*gamyamāna*). By the combination we know the whole. By implication, then, Nāgārjuna (read through

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[37] Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 225. Compare this with a similar (though modern) list of *paññatti* in Theravāda -- Nārada, *A Manual of Abhidhamma, Being Abhidhammattha Sanghaha of Bhadanta Anuruddacariya*, (Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia): Buddhist Missionary Society, 1979), 379-383.

[38]Also see Candrakīrti's discussion of the mirror image in chapter 20 of the *Prasannapadā* . [see Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 405-406.]

Candrakīrti) is pointing out that the Buddhist doctrine of *anātman* does not just indicate the lack of ultimacy within a certain locus *(pudgala-nairātmya)*, but that the concept of being a locus of a property is itself problematic *(dharma-nairātmya)*.

If *prajñapti* carries with it the connotation of phenomenon as well as being known as the congregation of effects. What does the compound *upādāya-prajñapti* mean? The *upādāya* means "relying-on" or "depending-on." The question remains: how does *upādāya* differ from similar terms such as "*pratītya*", or "*āśritya*"? In general usage, there probably is not much difference between these terms, but for Candrakīrti there is. The difference becomes apparent in his commentary on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 25.9.

> [verse:] The cyclic existence (of *saṃsāra*) is either *upādāya* or *pratītya*. That which is neither *upādāya* nor *pratītya* is taught to be nirvāṇa.

> [commentary:] There, the meaning of cyclic-existence (*ājavaṃjavībhāva*) is the mutuality of birth, death, becoming, *gamaṇa*, and *non-gamaṇa*. And that is this cyclic-existence whenever there is dependence on the collocation *(sāmagrī)* of causes and conditions. This is made known *(prajñapyate)* in the same way as short

> and long. Whenever [it] is produced,[39] [it] is made known in the same way as a lamp and wick, or a sprout and seed. *Everything, whether it is made known (via) upādāya or whether it is produced (via) pratītya, for all these (satvathāsya) that are bound one to another in birth and death, are either pratītya or upādāya.*[40]

In this passage, it appears that *pratītya* is a dependency having to do with actual production while *upādāya* is a logical or modal dependency. While both of these terms can indicate a degree of reciprocity, "*upādāya*" is more appropriate for our purposes because the *upādāya* relationship is more of a logical (and hence atemporal) relationship while "*pratītya*" relates more to a temporal sequence of production.

The advantage of "*upādāya-prajñapti*" over mere reciprocity *(anyonya-bhāva)* as a description of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s method lies in the kind of analysis implied in the word "*prajñapti.*" Consider the moments of analysis which are assumed in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*: For whatever topic that is presented, that topic is analyzed in terms of its internal component parts. So just as a house is made known dependent on its pillars, so too is motion made

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[39] Tibetan "*res 'ga' ni rgyus byas nas 'dogs te*" which Poussin renders as:"*kadā cid upādāya prajñapyate.*"

[40] Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, 529.

known dependent on the goer and that which is presently being traversed. This process of analysis continues until each component part is seen in terms of what it is not, i.e., the pillar functions as a "supporter" insofar as it is acting upon something else which is being "supported." Similarly, the pillar is a pillar insofar as it is solid (i.e., has the characteristic of "obstruction"). At this point we can inquire into the relationship between the characteristic "obstruction" and the characterized "pillar." Note that the endpoint of the analysis occurs at the point where the *prajñapti* is external mutuality *(upādāya)*. Like the chariot being known in dependence on its parts, the character makes known the characterized, but when the composition is external the modal dependence can be reciprocal.

Unfortunately, the term *upādāya-prajñapti* does not seem to be common in Sanskrit literature outside of Mādhyamika works. There is, however, one other instance of it which gives independent confirmation for this reading. The term is found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* by Yaśomitra. Vasubandhu has just begun his discussion of the formations dissociated from thought *(cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra)* and has introduced the dharmas of acquisition and non-acquisition (*prāpti* and *aprāpti*). After Yaśomitra comments on the objections in Vasubandhu's commentary, he adds an objection from Saṃghabhadra.

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Prāpti is the means by which there is non-destruction of the dharma which is acquired *[pratilabdha]* and is the characteristic *[cihna]* of knowledge according to the teacher, Saṃghabhadra. (However,) that this is the "characteristic of knowledge" has not been established. We claim that knowledge of this (occurs) by way of distinguishing the basis (of right knowledge). If *prāpti* is maintained to be the cause of the *dharma* of non-destruction of what has been acquired, (then) there couldn't possibly be abandoning of what has been acquired. It [already] exists. Therefore this *[prāpti]* is not a cause. This is the failure of (Saṃghabhadra)[41] that there is an existing [mental] seed whose characteristic is a distinct function *(śakti)*. How is this particular function different from the mind? It is not different (from the mind). How so? *(kiṃ ataḥ)* If it is different *prāpti* is established. But in the case of "*samjñā*-onl̄ȳ" there is a contradiction. If it is not different (i.e., both are mind) then *[…nanu]* an *akuśala (dharma)* is admitted to be the seed of *kuśala* (fruit). And *kuśala* of *akuśala*. How, namely, will

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[41] Literally: "this causes a fault to be established by way of the Ācarya."

> fire be the cause of heat when it is not different. Heat which is burning will be considered to be not fire. A *kuśala* seed (could) occur in an *akuśala* or neutral mind.… Thus there follows the fault of intermixture *(sāṃkarya-doṣa)*. Here we say: If there exists no difference *sāṃkarya-doṣa* would prevail. However, the seed should be said to be neither different from the mind nor non-different, *due to being of the nature of upādāya-prajñapti*. Hence also the existence of non-difference is also not a fault.[42]

Here we see a number of affinities between Yaśomitra's use of "*upādāya-prajñapti*" and Candrakīrti's. First of all, like *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 24.18, the sentence containing the term ("*upādāya-prajñapti-rūpatvāt.*") does not contain an accusative referent. Second, the examples that Yaśomitra gives (heat/flame, cause/effect) could just as easily have come from a Mādhyamika text. Lastly, the resulting relationship which Yaśomitra characterizes as "*upādāya-prajñapti*" shares the characteristic feature of the Mādhyamika relationships: lack of sameness and difference.

Before leaving the topic of "*upādāya-prajñapti*" I should mention that the interpretation of the term which I am proposing runs counter to most of the interpretations listed

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[42] Yaśomitra, *Sputārthā*, 148-149. (Translation mine).

at the beginning of the chapter. The common interpretation of *prajñapti* is "designation," and its use in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 24.18 has been the occasion of numerous comparisons between Mādhyamika and Western philosophy of language. In the words of Tuck:

> ...as with other intellectual fashions, the dominance of positivism [during the '50's] was not permanent. The urge for representing, defining, denoting, quantifying, and picturing began to wane and the emphasis shifted to more contextualist methodologies. As soon as terms such as "language game" "family resemblance," "private language," "form of life," and " ordinary language" started to filter into the conversations of students of Indian philosophy, Nāgārjuna's name was immediately and repeatedly linked with Wittgenstein's.[43]

The interpretations influenced by this approach tended to present Mādhyamika philosophy not as an investigation into reality but as an investigation into the nature of language in order to show that the inadequacies of language to represent "reality." Certainly, interpretations of this kind must have existed in early Mādhyamika. However, the present generation of Mādhyamika scholars take what available

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[43] Andrew P. Tuck, *Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 75.

evidence that there was for a purely linguistic reading and used that evidence as a justification for reading all Mādhyamika texts in this light. So, for instance, Paul Williams article, "Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka" begins with the following observation:

> The purpose of writing the Madhyamakakārikā, according to a now lost commentary by Devaśarman preserved in fragmentary quotes in Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, was twofold; to destroy adherence to language and secondly to the referents of language. By refuting origination the referents are destroyed, and with the patent impossibility of reference language also must cease as lacking any objective substrata.[44]

The theory that language is a falsification which obscures a "real" reality "out there" reminds one of the Abhidharmist's distinction between *prajñapti-sat* and *dravya-sat*, or Dharmakīrti's distinction between *svalakṣaṇa* and *samanyalakṣaṇa*, where in both cases, the ultimate is defined as atomic. Yet throughout Candrakīrti's discussion of the relationship between the elements in the *Mādhyamakāvatāra* there is nothing to suggest that the dependence of one element on another is merely true in our language. Indeed,

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[44] Paul, M. Williams, "Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 8 (1980): 1.

there are many examples of emptiness from the *prajñāpāramitā sūtras* using the illustration of the contact between the eye and the visual object. To me there is nothing intrinsically linguistic about this kind of relationship. Nor is there anything in Candrakīrti's argument in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* to suggest that the elements in question do not exist in some sense. The only option left is to assume that what is shown to be true in this particular use of language -- i.e., that concepts are dependent upon one another in such a way that they imply one another reciprocally -- is true of reality generally. While I do not dispute that verbal language is an important element of *prajñapti*, when *prajñapti* is reduced to language (as exclusive of "reality") the interpretation becomes unnecessarily restrictive. Language or discourse is certainly instrumental in our knowledge, but not all of our knowledge comes into our awareness *via* language. Looking for a Western parallel, I propose that the term "*prajñapti*" in its Mādhyamika usage is something akin to the Heiddeggerian usage of *λογοζ*.

> *Λογοζ* as "discourse" means rather the same as *δηλουν*: to make manifest what one is talking about in one's discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as *αποφαινεσθαι*.... And only *because* the function of the *λογοζ* as *αποφανσιζ* lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out, can

> the λογοζ have the structural form of συνθεσιζ. Here, "synthesis" does not mean a binding and linking together of representations, a manipulation of psychical occurrences where the 'problem' arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside. Here the συν has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its *togetherness* [*Beisammen*] with something - letting it be seen *as* something.[45]

Similarly, taking *prajñapti* as "mere designation," Frauwallner's "*bloße Bennenung*" leaves us with a gulf between reality as it is *out there* and what we know inside our heads. This would merely replace one dichotomy with another and leave us with the untenable situation (from the Mādhyamika viewpoint) that our representations are empty, but that there is something *out there* that is not empty. Rather, if we take a more positive account of *prajñapti* as "whatever brings about knowledge of the *togetherness* that is the way that things let themselves be seen." This interpretation is more in line with Candrakīrti's idea of entities being made known as a composite/component relationship and puts Nāgārjuna's analysis on par with the aggregate/element analysis of the canon.

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[45] Heiddeger, *Being and Time*, 56.

Summing up what has been said so far, one of the fundamental elements of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*'s arguments is the relationship that Nāgārjuna sets up between pairs of terms where the two terms imply one another reciprocally. Candrakīrti identifies this procedure with the term upādāya-prajñapti in 24.18. The term not only highlights the fact of mutuality and the modal quality of epistemological necessity, but it also implies the aspect of the composite nature of all things (such that ultimacy is not possible). This being the case "*upādāya-prajñapti*," like "*pratītyasamutpāda*," becomes not only a description of the way that things are, but also a technical term by which one should analyze reality in meditation; a topic to which we will now turn.

So far, we have shown that, at least in Candrakīrti's reading, the term *upādāya-prajñapti* is: a) a synonym for *dependent-origination*, b) a description of *dharma-nairātmīya* and thereby *śūnyatā*, and, c) a description of one aspect of the *method* of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* relating to the aggregates. What, then, is the significance of the concept of *upādāya-prajñapti* and its associated method of analysis in terms of Canonical teachings? The most obvious answer is the parallel between this kind of analysis and analyses in the Canon which look at the person in terms of its component parts (i.e., the *skandhas*). The next apparent connection is through the concept of "emptiness" *(śūnyatā)* which, in the

canon and in the *abhidharma*, is one of the three "gates of liberation." But here we have a problem -- the gate of emptiness in the early canon, is usually associated with the more rarefied states of concentration.[46] What exactly is the relationship between the various levels of meditation and the Mādhyamika method of logical analysis?

Again, the most explicit connections are made by Candrakīrti. In the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, he writes the following verse:

> When the carriage doesn't exist, the neither the parts-possessor (the whole[47]) nor parts exist. For example, if the carriage is burned, the parts do not exist. (So too) when the possessor of the parts is burned by the fire of the mind the parts (don't exist).

> For example, if a chariot which possesses parts is burned by fire, then the parts of that [chariot also] become fully consumed. Accordingly, if the body of the chariot (is burned) by the burning ~~of~~ analysis and the fire of non-conceptualization,

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[46] cf. for instance, the "*Cūḷasuññata Sutta*" of *Majjhima Nikāya*, vol. 3, 20-24, *passim*.

[47] Poussin translates "*yan lag can*" (lit. "having parts") as "organisme", perhaps based on verse 158 where the connection between the possessor of the parts and the agent is made explicit. Huntington who otherwise seems to follow Poussin closely does no do so here. He renders it simply as "possessor of parts. cf. Poussin, p, 177.

arising from the friction of the rubbing-stick of analysis (*vicāra*, also 'absorption') then the parts, without causing suffering (of belief in a self) also become the fuel of the fire of wisdom, due to being entirely burnt up (as well). Just as, because of not having dichotomized the truth of *saṃvṛti* and because of causing them to enter into the pleasure in this reality, the yogis think in this manner of analyzing the chariot: (hence) *upādāya-prajñapti* [*brten nas gdags pa*] is established.[48]

In this verse, Candrakīrti is showing the connection between this kind of analysis - culminating in the understanding of *upādāya-prajñapti* and the attainment of certain states of meditative awareness. Exactly what these states are and how they fit into the overall scheme will be left up to a future discussion. At the moment it will be enough to note the parallels between this discussion and a parallel discussion in the *Ratnāvalī*.

93. Earth, water, fire, wind, long, short, thin, fat, happiness, etc. are said by the Śākya to be ceased in consciousness.

94. In consciousness which is without designation *(abhidhāna)*, endless, and predominant over all, there would be no higher place with wind fire water

[48] Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 280. T. 364a

and earth.

95. In this [consciousness] long and short, thin and fat, virtuous and unvirtuous name and form would all be entirely ceased.

96. Previously, for the one who does not know, all of these elements exist in consciousness. For the one who understands, afterwards [these elements] cease in consciousness.

97. [The elements] which are (like) the fuel of[49] the fire of consciousness are said to exist (by) all those whose nature it is to transmigrate [*'gro* = *jagat*].[50] Similarly, these (elements) are burned away by (those who) have light of analysis *(rab 'byed)*.[51]

The first three verses refer to, if they are not

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[49] Reading with Ajītamitra, "*me'i*" for "*me yi*."

[50] Again, according to the Ajītamitra: "*skyes nas 'gro ba gźan de daṅ der 'gro bas na* ***'gro*** *ba'o/... de'i* ***chos*** *ni skye ba la sogs pa'i mtshan ñid do/*" [Ajītamitra, 73.]

[51] 93. "sa daṅ chu daṅ me daṅ rluṅ| riṅ thuṅ phra daṅ sbom ñid daṅ| dge sogs ñid ni rnam śes su| 'gag par 'gyur źes thub pas gsuṅs||"

94. "rnam śes bstan med mtha' yas pa| kun tu bdag po de la ni| sa daṅ chu daṅ me daṅ ni| rluṅ gis gnas thod 'gyur ma yin||"

95. "'dir ni riṅ daṇ thuṅ ba daṅ| phra sbom dge daṅ mi dge daṅ| 'dir ni miṅ daṇ gzugs dag kyaṅ| ma lus par ni 'gag par 'gyur||"

96. "gaṅ ma śes phyir rnam śes la| sṅon chad 'byuṅ ba de kun ni| de śes phyir na rnam śes su| phyis ni de ltar 'gag par 'gyur|"

97. "rnam śes me yi bud śiṅ ni| 'gro chos 'di kun yin par 'dod| de dag ji bźin rab 'byed pa'i| 'od daṅ ldan pas bsregs nas źi||" [Hahn, *Ratnāvalī*, 37-39.]

actually a quotation from, the *Kevaddha Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*. In this sutta a monk asks all of the gods, "Where do the four great elements - the earth element, the water element, the water element, the fire element, the air element - cease without remainder?"[52] Of course, none of them have the answer to his question, and so he returns to ask the Buddha, who tells him:

> Do not ask your question in this way... Instead, this is how the question should be put:
>
> > "Where do earth, water, fire and air no footing find? Where are long and short, small and great, fair and foul - Where are "name and form" wholly destroyed?"[53]
>
> And the answer is:
>
> > Where consciousness is signless, boundless, all luminous, That's where earth, water, fire, and air find no footing, *There* both long and short, small and great, fair and foul, There, "name-and-form" are wholly destroyed. With the cessation of consciousness this is all

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[52]kattha nu kho bhanto ime catkāro mahābhūtā aparisesā nirujjhanti, seyyathidaṃ: paṭhavidhātu āpodhātu tejodhātu vāyodhātu'ti?

[53]Kattha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati| Kattha dīghañca rassañca aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ, Kattha nāmañca rūpañca asesaṃ uparujjhatīti|

destroyed.[54]

The Pāli is of the quoted verses is obviously close to the verse represented in the Tibetan with a few variations; "*bstan med*" could easily translate "*anidassanaṃ*" and "*mtha' yas*" "*anantaṃ*." The relationship between "*sabbato pahaṃ*" and "*kun tu bdag po*" is puzzling, partially due to the ambiguities of the Pāli (elsewhere we have "*sabbato pabhaṃ*"). Perhaps this is merely another version. In any case, I have translated "*bstan med*" as "without distinction" following the Pāli "*anidassanam*" which I think seems more to the point than Hopkin's "undemonstrable consciousness."[55]

It is most likely that the passage from the "*Kevaddha Sutta*" refers to a kind of progression in *samādhi* in which one meditates on a series of increasingly more subtle elements until one attains the state of pure consciousness where all coarseness of the previous meditations has ceased. This idea is parallel to a discussion in the *Udāna*:

> There is, monks, that base *("tadāyatana")* wherein there is neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor

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[54]Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pahaṃ. Ettha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati. Ettha dīghañca rassañca aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ Ettha nāmañca rūpañca asesaṃ uparujjhati. Viññāṇassa nirodhena etthataṃ uparujjhatīti. Translation: Walshe, 179-80. Also cf. Majjhima Nikāya 49.11, Aṅguttara Nikāya 1.6]

[55]cf. Nāgārjuna and Kaysang Gyatso, *The Precious Garland and The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses*, translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, Lati Rinpoche, and Anne Klein (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 30.

wind, nor that base consisting of endless space, nor that base consisting of infinite consciousness, nor that base consisting of nothingness, nor that base consisting of neither perception nor non-perception, nor this world, nor the next world, nor both sun and moon. There too *("tad[āyatana]...")*, monks, I do not speak either of coming *(na āgatiṃ)*, or going, or remaining, or falling, or arising. This [sphere] is (quite) without foundation, (quite) without occurrence, quite without object. This alone is the end of duḥkha.[56]

Just as in the case of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the *Ratnāvalī*'s allusion to the *Kevaddha Sutta* in the context of the analysis of the elements adds soteriological import to what would otherwise be merely a logical exercise. The significance comes from a subtle shift in meaning between the *Kevaddha Sutta* and the allusion to it in the *Ratnāvalī*. The *Keveddha Sutta* is about meditative absorption (*samāttha*); the monk wants to know where the *elements* cease without remainder and is corrected by the Buddha to examine where *consciousness* ceases (implying that where consciousness ceases, the elements cease too). The cessation of consciousness occurs at the higher levels of meditative absorption, especially the state of "neither-consciousness-[*saṃjñā*]-nor-non-

[56] *Udāna*, 165.

consciousness."

The discussion of the elements in the *Ratnāvalī* is more properly considered a kind of insight (*vipaśyana*) meditation[57] insofar as the *elements* are said to cease (*'gag pa)* in consciousness ("*rnam śes la*" or "*su*") -- consciousness is never said to cease. Furthermore, in verse 97 the elements are said to be "burned away by (those who) have light of *analysis (rab 'byed)*." The explicit reference to analysis coupled with the fact that the section in question comes at the end of an investigation of the five *skandhas* and six *dhātus* (usual topics for *vipaśyana* meditation) indicates that the cessation of the elements was to occur as a function of insight meditation not exclusively as a function of tranquillity meditation as in the *Kevaddha Sutta*.

The juxtaposition of a passage known to refer to a state of absorption with a context that is a kind of analysis leads to a reading which claims that a) the cessation of the elements is a state of affairs that already exists - one only needs to discover it through investigation, and b) that meditation on the dependency between all things (and consequently their *nairātmīya*) produces a quiet mind.

Later *Mādhyamikas* were to take verses such as this one from the *Ratnāvalī* and a similar one from the *Yuktiṣāṭika* (verses 21 and 34) as advocating a position of *citta-mātra*

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[57]cp. the "Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta," *Majjhima Nikāya*, vol. 3, 237-247.

(nirākāra). Despite appearances, I do not think that such a reading is necessary here. The primary topic of this section of verses is the mutual interdependency of the *saṃskṛta* elements. If we take into account the discussion of the element of space in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* chapter 5, we can assume that Nāgārjuna would include the so-called *asaṃskṛta* elements in this interdependency as well. Thus, it is not a far stretch to say that mind (though "never-ending..." etc.) is dependent on the other elements just as much as the elements are dependent on it. If any one element stands in isolation, then the *prajñapti* ceases. Thus when the *Ratnāvalī* says:

> 96. Previously, for the sake of one who does not know, all of these elements exist in consciousness. For the one who understands, afterwards [these elements] cease in consciousness.
>
> 97. [The elements] which are (like) the fuel of the fire of consciousness are said to exist (by) all those whose nature it is to transmigrate. Similarly, these (elements) are burned away by (those who) have light of analysis *(rab 'byed)*.

Both the consciousness and that which of one is conscious are seen to be empty due to the fact that, like fire and fuel, they imply one another reciprocally. Through concentration on the elements, analyzing them as described in the *Ratnāvalī*, one is able to reach a point where the

emptiness of all the elements is seen in that their individuality dissolves in their interdependency. Hence, to consciousness they (i.e., their individual natures) disappear without remainder.

Just as much as there is similarity between the Śrāvakayāna concept of emptiness (as a product of absorption) and the Mādhyamikan concept of emptiness, there is also a world of difference. The Mādhyamika analysis shows that the resulting cognition that arises from the state of concentration, is the way that things have been all along. Hence, it is a state that is not just achievable through calm *(samātha)* meditation, but can be known through reasoned analysis *(vipaśyana)* as well. We shall have more to say about this in a later chapter.

In summary, I have shown in this chapter that Candrakīrti understood Nāgārjuna's term *upādāya-prajñapti* as indicative of his method in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. At the same time, Candrakīrti connects this word and the method it indicates to canonical arguments refuting the existence of *ātman* based on the 5 *skandhas*. He takes this further and in his *Madhyamakāvatāra*, relates this type of analysis to canonical discussions of meditation by quoting one of Nāgārjuna's own verses (from the *Ratnāvalī*) which seems to make this connection. In doing so, Candrakīrti makes the intertextual significance of Nāgārjuna's logical method *vis a*

vis Buddhist canonical works explicit by pointing out the connections between the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and *Ratnāvalī*.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

In this work I have investigated the structure through which Nāgārjuna argues on the one hand, and the allusions he makes to Buddhist canon on the other. I have shown that the very form of his argumentation is an allusion to canonical discussions of dependent origination and to certain kinds of insight meditation. Through this procedure as well as through actual canonical references, Nāgārjuna establishes the Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness as the foundation on which all Buddhist scripture rests. Furthermore, by focusing on dependent origination, he is able to establish that what he says "does not contradict *sūtra*" and " does not contradict *dharmatā*." These are two of the three criteria acknowledged on some level by all schools to establish a teaching as *buddhavacana*, or "word of the Buddha."

On a final note, I would like to add that there is strong evidence to suggest that finding the common ground between Mahāyāna and Śravakayāna was a project in which Nāgārjuna was interested. In the *Ratnāvalī*, there is a.rather lengthy section explaining the reasons why Mahāyāna should not be rejected.

> 4.86 The non-arising that [is taught] in the Mahāyāna -- that emptiness is the "extinction[1]" of

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[1]*kṣaya*= Pali *khaya*. In the canon, this term is most often used for the destruction of the "outflows" (āsava) which amounts to becomming an arhant. A typical use of this term in the canon can be found at D.N.

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others [i.e, Hīnāyānists]. Hence be accepting because of the unity of the meaning *[artha]* of cessation and non-arising!

4.87 If emptiness and the great nature of the Buddha are thus looked upon with reason then how should the utterances of the Mahāyāna and [the Śravakayāna] not satisfy[1] the wise?

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iii. 78, "*Kicca bhikkhave bhikkuno balasmiṃ? Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu āsavānaṃ khayā anāsavaṃ cetovimutti paññāvimuttiṃ diṭṭhava dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā saccikatva upasampajja viharati. Idaṃ kho bhikkhave bhikkuno balasmiṃ.*" Translation: Walshe, p. 405:"And what is power for a monk? Here, a monk, by the destruction *[khaya]* of the corruptions, enters into and abides in that corruptionless liberation of the heart and liberation by wisdom which he has attained, in this very life, by his own super-knowledge and realization. That is power for a monk."

[1] The Tibetan reads, "*theg chen cig śos las gsuṅs pa/ mkhas pa rnams la cis mi mñam.*" which is, as Jefferey Hopkins translates it, "How could what is taught in the two vehicles be of unequal value for the wise?" [*The Precious Garland*, 75] The Sanskrit of the same verse reads, "*mahāyānetaroktāni na sameyuḥ kathaṃ satām*|" There is a serious discrepancy between the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of this verse. The problem comes in the last two lines. The problem comes with the word "*sameyuḥ*". For some reason the Tibetan translators took this as some form of the adjective "sama" = "to be the same as (something)." However, here it is clearly a verb -- specifically the third person plural, optative, active (*parasmaipada*) form of the class one verb √*sam* "to be disturbed or agitated". The sentence should then read, "How should the utterances other than the Mahāyāna not disturb the wise?" which contradicts the sense of the preceding and following verses. On this verse, Ajitamitra offers no help whatsoever. The only way that the issue might be resolved is by appealing to a comment by Monier-Williams that √sam, "accord. to some 'to be undisturbed;' cf. √*śam*". [Monier-Williams, s.v. "√*śam*"]. The problem is that if it is being confused with √śam then its grammatical use is still that of √*sam*. In other words, the verb here is conjugated like a class one verb not like a class four verb of which √*śam* is a member. Still, in the context of the strong statements in verse 4.86 that one should be receptive to both non-arising and cessation, and in verse 4.88 that one should protect oneself with indifference, and in light of the Tibetan interpretation, it only makes sense to translate "*sameyuḥ*" as "be not disturb" or "satisfy."

4.88 The utterences of the intention of the Tathāgata are difficult to understand. For this reason, due to the fact that he taught the three vehicles and the one vehicle,[1] gaurd yourself with indifference *[upekṣa]*.[2]

From these statements it is clear that Nāgārjuna was indeed a Mahāyānist (*contra* Kalupahana), and that he saw that Mahāyāna and Śravakayāna had a common basis in the doctrine of emptiness = non-arising = extinction. Furthermore, the wise should find satisfaction in both sets of scriptures. The juxtaposition of allusions to Mahāyāna scripture against allusions to Śravakayāna canon demonstrates implicitly what Nāgārjuna has said here explicitly.

I have been arguing throughout this work that Nāgārjuna delineates the concept of emptiness through his use of logic. The description of emptiness alludes to both Mahāyāna and Śravakayāna scripture and in so doing acts as a medium of translation between the two. As such, emptiness is used as an exegetical device through which we may understand both Mahāyāna and Śravakayāna scripture. While a great deal of

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[1]Ajitamitra comments on this line as follows:"*gźuṅ las* ***theg*** *pa* ***gcig*** *daṅ* ***theg pa gsum gsuṅs pas*** *so*|" "...By teaching the three vehicles and the one vehicle from verses (grantha)." Assumed here is that the texts are the basis from which both the one vehicle and the three vehicles are taught.

[2] Hahn, *Ratnāvalī*, 126.

work has been done on the logical issues of Mādhyamika thought, much more remains to be done on the use of scripture in the works of Nāgārjuna, towards which this work is a first step. The specific textual relationships that have been uncovered here are even more interesting in light of the fact that the methods Nāgārjuna employs to interpret scripture do not find any parallel in the more articulated hermeneutics of the Hindu schools such as Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā that preceded him, or in Vedānta which followed him. The integration of disparate elements to produce a new reading of scripture is perhaps a distinctive feature of Mahāyāna literature[1].

[1]For instance, the splicing in the Śālistamba Sūtra of M.N. vol. 1, 191 and S.N. vol. 3, 120 in the phrase: "Whoever, monks, sees conditioned arising sees Dharma, and whoever sees Dharma sees the Buddha." cf. N. Ross Reat, *The Śālistamba Sūtra: Tibetan original, Sanskrit reconstruction, English translation, critical notes (including Pāli parallels, Chinese version and ancient Tibetan fragments)*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Ltd., 1993), 3-4.

Appendix I

Translation of Chapter 2 with Akutobhayā commentary

"Examination of what has been traversed, what has not yet been traversed, what is presently being traversed[1]"

[Objection:] This is said [by the opponent]: Here the actions [belonging to] the status *(gnas skabs)*[2] of the three times (i.e., past, present, future) are perceived. After giving the status of the three times as evidence by elaborately explaining these: "what has been traversed, what has not yet been traversed, and what is presently being traversed," [due to that explanation] action exists.

This is answered [by Nāgārjuna]:

> **1. What has been traversed is not being traversed. What has not yet been traversed is not being traversed. What is being traversed,[3] apart from what has been traversed and what is not yet**

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[1]For an explanation of the translation of these terms see chapter one.

[2]Interestingly, while the Tibetan word, "gnas skabs" probably translates the Sanskrit word, "avasthā," the Tibetan word literally means "place-time"; such a translation is especially appropriate for this chapter due to the inseparability of the spatial and temporal characteristics of the passive-participial use of the word √gaṃ (see below).

[3]Throughout his translation, Wallser translates gamyamāna as "gegenwärtiges Gehen," obviating the fact that it may refer to the substratum of going. .

traversed, is not being traversed.[4]

[Commentary:]

1a. [Thesis:] *What has been traversed is not being traversed (at present)*

b. [Reason:] Because of completed going *(soṅ zin);* i.e., an action is not admitted to be in what is devoid of action.

2a. [Thesis:] *What has not yet been traversed is not being traversed(at present).*

b. [Reason:] Because that is not traversed [yet].

3a. [Thesis:] There is also no going in what is being traversed (at present).

b. [Reason:] Because there is *no thing being traversed, apart from what has been traversed and what is not yet traversed, which is being traversed*[5] *(at present)..*

c. [Example:] Just like a lamp and illumination

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[4] The Sanskrit from the *Prasannapadā* reads: gataṃ na gamyate tāvad agataṃ na eva gamyate| gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyatė†|

There is some disagreement among the commentaries as to how to interpret this last word, *gamyate*. Buddhapālita glosses it as *gzuṇ du med pa* - *agrāhya* (Lokesh Candra, Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v. "*gzuṇ du med pa*"). This interpretation is followed by Bhāvaviveka, and Avalokitavrata glosses gzuṇ du med (is not grasped) as dmigs su med "is not apprehended" see Ames, (1995), 339 n. 36. The *Akutobhayā* and the *Chung-Lun* have no hint of this interpretation in their commentaries.

[5]The Tibetan translation of the verse takes "*gamyate*" in the sense of "to understand" and thus renderes it "*shes par mi 'gyur ro.*" So does the Peking edition of the *Prasannapadā*. Interestingly, "*shes pa*" appears nowhere in the *Akutobhayā* commentary on this verse.

("snaṅ"[6])

2. **[The opponent contends:] (It may be said that) where there is actual movement (*ceṣṭā*), there is going (*gati*) and to the extent that (*yataḥ* [7]) movement is in what is being traversed, not in what has already been traversed nor in what has not yet been traversed, to that extent (*tataḥ*), going (*gati*) is in what is being traversed.**[8]

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[6]This is Huntington's correction of C, N, and D, "*lnaṅ*."

[7] There appears to be some difference of opinion among the classical commentattaries on this term. The *Akutobhayā*, the *Chung Lun* and Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* take *yataḥ tataḥ* to be relative-correlative. Buddhapālita followed by Candrakīrti take *yataḥ* to be the genitive singular of the present participle of the verb √i (also meaning "to go"), and gloss it as *gantuḥ* = *ḥgro ba po* or "the person who goes." For an extensive discussion of this term and its translation into Tibetan cf. Tachikawa (1974), 10-11 note 6, as well as an excellent atricle by Akira Saito: "Problems in Translating the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as Cited in its Commentaries." In *Buddhist Translations: Problems and Perspectives*, ed. Doboom Tulku. 87-96. Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1995.

[8] Sanskrit ceṣṭā yatra gatistatra gamyamāne ca sā yataḥ| na gate nāgate ceṣṭā gamyamāne gatistataḥ||

After the last verse where Nāgārjuna places the whole discussion on motion as it is implicated in the direct object of motion (the passage or *adhvan*), the opponent wishes to bring the discussion back to the motion itself, by pointing out that going is present in the "movement" (*ceṣṭā*) not in the passive object which is passed over. The distinction that the opponent makes between the *gati* (abstract feminine noun of traversing) as *gata/agata/gamyamāna* and *gati* as the motion itself is reflected in one of the grammar rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*:

A. 2.3.12 "gaty-artha-karmaṇí dvitī́yā-caturthyaú ceṣṭā́yām án-adhvani

[Katre's translation:] The second (dvitī́yā) or the fourth (caturthyaú) sUP triplet is introduced after the object of an action denoted by a

[Commentary:]

Here, *where actual movement (ceṣṭā)* is perceived, *there going exists*. Hence, that *movement* which is evident *in what is being traversed* is not evident *in what has already been traversed. Because of that*[9], (the movement) is also not evident in *what has not yet been traversed. In what is presently being traversed going* also *exists* .

This is explained [in the following verse]:

3. How will a traversing which is [connected to] what is being traversed be suitable[10], when

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verb of movement (gaty-artha-karmaṇí) when an actual movement is involved (ceṣṭáyām) and is not itself a path (án-adhvani)." Katre, 140.

[9]Walleser puts the "*de'i phyir*" (*tataḥ*) with the following sentence, following the usual reading of the verse. This is an unusual reading of the Tibetan since a *tshad* comes after the *de'i phyir*. The "therefore"

[10] There is some disagreement among modern translations concerning the difference between *upapatsyate* and *upapadyate*. Inada ignores the difference and translates both as "is possible." Tachikawa seems to be aware of a difference and translates the verse by using two different definitions of the term *upa√pad* -- "to be possible" and "to exist": "How is it possible that there is [the action of] traversing on the point being traversed? For if there is not [the action of] traversing, the point being traversed cannot exist." (Tachikawa, (1974), 6) *Upapatsyate*, however, is unequivocally of the pariphrastic future, defined by Whitney as follows: "The periphrastic future is defined by the grammarians as expressing something to be doneat a definite time to come.… It is especially often used along with śvás *tommorrow*." (Whitney, William Dwight. *A Sanskrit Grammar, Including Both the Classical Language and the Older Dialects, of Veda and Brahmana*. 2 ed., (Leipzig: Breitkopf and Härtel), 1891,338.). Jaques May is correct in pointing out the rules in Pāṇini [A. 3.3.143-4] stating that a present, future or optative affix used in conjuction with *kathaṃ* "how?" or *kiṃ* "why?" is a rhetorical question denoting censure (May, *op. cit*.55, n. 18) *Upapadyate*, on the ohter hand, is present tense middle voice of the same verb. Hence, the second *pada* should be in the future tense while the fourth *pada* should be in the present tense. This difference is also suggested by the Tibetan "*ji lta bur na 'thad par 'gyur*"/"*bgom pa 'thad pa med phyir*." Both May and Wallesser translate it accordingly:

what is being traversed which is devoid of going is not at all suitable?[11]

[Commentary:]

[Thesis:] Here, *a traversing which is [connected to] what is being traversed* is not *suitable*. Why?[12]

[Reason:] Because *it is not suitable* to grasp ("*mi ṅes par* [sic] *gzuṅ ba*") *that which is presently being traversed* of a *non-existent going*.

[Example:] Like the son of a barren woman.

"*Comment le mauvement s'appliquera-t-il [en tant que prédicat] au mouvement actuel, puisqu'un mouvement actuel sans mouvement [inhérent] est tout à fait irrationnel?*" (May, Ibid.)

"*Wie wird als gegenwärtiges Gehen Gehen als existierend Möglich sein, Wenn als Nicht-Gehen gegenärtiges Gehen nicht möglich ist?*" (Max Wallesser, *Die buddhistische Philosophie in iherer geschichtlichen Entwicklung: Zweiter Teil - Die mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna.* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1911), 16.)

11 Sanskrit *gamyamānasya gamanaṃ kathaṃ nāmopapatsyate| gamyamānaṃ vigamanaṃ yadā naivopapadyate||*

The Sanskrit of this verse according to Poussin's edition reads, "gamyamānasya dvigamanaṃ kathaṃ nāmopapatsyate| gamyamāne dvigamanaṃ yadā naivopapadyate||" However, the version on which the *Akutobhayā* comments is sleightly different. The Tibetan reads: "bgom la 'gro ba yod par ni| ji lta bur na 'thad par 'gyur|| gaṅ tshe 'gro ba med pa yi| bgom pa 'thad pa med phyir ro||" The *Akutobhayā* version of this verse is supported by the *Prajñāpradīpa*, and the *Chung-lun*. Inada also mentions that there is confirmation of this reading in the *Ta-ch'eng-chung-kuan-shih-lun*. These readings as well as Tucci's Sanskrit manuscript supports a reading of "*vigamanaṃ*" instead of "*dvigamanaṃ*" (see Jong, J.W. de. "Textcritical Notes on the *Prasannapadā*." *Indo-Iranian Journal* 20 (1 1978): 36.)

12 The Tibetan actually reads "*ci'i phyir źe na*" which translates something like, "if you should ask, because of what?" Throughout this translation, I have shortened this to simply, "why?" for purposes of brevity.

Furthermore -

4. "For the one who [maintains that there is] a going (gamanaṃ) for what is being traversed, for that one it follows that what is being traversed is devoid of going (gati) because what is being traversed is really not understood.[13]"

[Commentary:]

[Thesis:] Here, in the thesis *of the one* who maintains *there is a going in what is being traversed, for that one it follows that there is no going in what is being traversed.* The significance[14] of what has been said is that (then the

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[13] Sanskrit gamyamānasya gamanaṃ yasya tasya prasajyate| ṛte gater gamyamānaṃ gamyamānaṃ hi gamyate|| Inada choses to translate the derivatives of pra√sañj as 'a fallacy results'. While this may work in context, it seems to me to assume a special definition of the term which is unwarrented. pra√sañj simply means to be connected or to logicaly follow from something. Hence, I follow Walleser's "*zutreffen*" and May's "*conséquence nécessaire*".

The last *pada* of the *Akutobhayā* reads *gamyate* in the sense of "is known" following the interpretation given by the commentary below. This translation is the same as that of *Buddhapālitavṛtti* and the *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ak. 42a l. 4, Bv 190b ll. 5-6, PD. 78a ll. 2-3 "bgom pa khoṇ du chud phyir ro|"). Candrakīrti, without any comment, goes against this interpretation and takes this last *pada* as 'because what is being traversed is traversed.' The *Chung-Lun*, and the *Prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā* also ignore this secondary meaning of the word *gam* (cf. Bocking, pp. 120-121 and Pr. and Pmmk. "bgom la 'gro ba yin phyir ro|") ;

[14] "tha tshig". The only definitions that Das lists relate to it being a kind of religious vow. Jäschke, however, has the following: "…'oath'; but in two passages of [Dzañlun] *ci'i tha tshig* can only mean: 'what signifies?" Walleser, apparently follows this example in translating it as "… das ist der Sinn *(abhiprāya)*."

going) would be independent ("*ma bltos pa*[15]"). Why?

[Reason$_1$:] *Because that which is presently being traversed is understood.*[16] [In other words,] due to the attachment to this statement ("tshig", i.e., latching onto "what is presently being traversed"). That also is not desired.

[Conclusion:] Therefore, "going exists in what is presently being traversed" is not reasonable.

[Example:] Like a cripple.

Furthermore -

5. "When[17] there is a going for [i.e., connected to] what is being traversed, there are two goings which have been concluded. There is

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[15]T. "Ma bltos pa" translates Sanskrit "anapekṣa"; cf. chp. 10.3, (Huntington, *Akutobhayā,* vol. 2, 348). The Tibetan seems to be a literal translation meaning "what is not seen" or perhaps even, "what is irrelevant." Monier-Williams has "disregarding", and "irrelevant" as definitions for "anapekṣa," but Apte's "independent" and Böthelink's "Unabhänigkeit" seem to be more to the point here. Wallesser translates it following Böthelink. Huntington points out that the Cone and Derge editions prefer "*ltos ba,*" while the Peking edition uses "*bltos pa.*" This variation is not significant for our purposes.

[16]The reason here is taken from the last three *pādas* of the verse which in Tibetan reads:"*gaṅ gi phyir bgom pa khoṅ do chud pa'i phyir te.*" Pandeya takes the Sanskrit "gamyate" literally as "being traversed," while the Tibetan translators rendered it in its secondary meaning of "to be understood". This decision was made in conformity to "*mṅon par zhen pa*" ("*abhiniviśyate*") in the next line which is a paraphrase of the previous sentence.

[17]Walleser, following the Tibetan, renders this kārika and the next as if-then ("wenn-so") statements. There is, however, no reason to believe that the Sanskrit differed in any way from the *Prasannapadā* version below. For this reason, I have kept the looser sense of the Sanskrit locative "when there is…".

this going here, and one by means of which there is something being traversed."[18]

[Commentary:]

[Thesis:] Here, if it is maintained that *there is a going in what is being traversed, then there would be the fault of two-fold going*. How so?

[Reason:] There is one going *by which "what is presently being traversed"* is said, and also [a going] *that which will go there*[19].

Further -

6. When two goings are concluded, it would follow that there are two goers. Because, without a goer going is not possible.[20]

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[18] Sanskrit gamyamānasya gamane prasaktaṃ gamanadvayaṃ| yena tad gamyamānaṃ ca yac câtra gamanaṃ punaḥ||

Although the Sanskrit versions apparently agree on this verse, the Tibetan versions of 5c differ (as pointed out by Saito, *op. cit.* p. 92)

PSP. "gaṇ gis de bgom gyur pa daṇ"

Abh. (Peking, 42a), PP. (Peking, 78a) & BP (Peking 190b-191a) "gaṇ gis bgom pa de daṇ ni"

Abh. (Cone, sDe ge, Narthaṅ from Huntington's notes) "gaṅ gi bsgom pa de daṇ ni"

[19] "*de daṇ de la yaṇ 'gro bar 'gyur ba gaṅ yin pa*" There is some ambiguity in this formulation, it could either mean "that which will go to that" or "that which goes in (the one who goes)". Walleser has chosen the latter reading ("was in ihm geht").

[20] Sanskrit dvau gantārau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye| gantāraṃ hi tiraskṛtya gamanaṃ nopapadyate||

[Commentary:]

[Thesis:] Here, *when two goings are concluded, it would follow that there are two goers.* Why?

[Reason:] *Because, without a goer going is not possible.* And a conclusion of two goers and two goings is not desired.

[Conclusion:] Therefore, it is not reasonable to say that going exists in what is presently being traversed.

[Example:] Like a cut height[21].

[Objection:] True, it would not be acceptable (for there to be) a going without a goer -- this is true. Hence, going exists for the goer who depends on the definite existence of the three times (past, present, and future).

This is explained:

7. If apart from the goer, going is not possible, then when there is no going, how will there be a goer?[22]

[Commentary:]

The Tibetan of the *Prasannapadā*, and of the Cone and sDe dGe versions of the third *pada* say, "*gaṇ phyir 'gro ba med par ni*" The Peking of the *Akutobhayā* is correct, "*gaṇ phyir 'gro po med par ni*".

[21]Wallesser, "ein abgeschlagenes Haupt" = T. "*mgo bcad*". This example doesn't make much sense and I have been unable to find it used elsewhere in Madhyamaka literature.

[22] Sanskrit: " gantāraṃ cet tiraskṛtya gamanaṃ nopapadyate| gamane 'sati gantātha kuta bhaviṣyati||" Walleser translates the last two *pāda*-s as "Wenn Gehen nicht zutrifft, wo wird der Geher existieren?" "Where?" is one possible reading for T. *ga la* but the Sanskrit *kuta* suggests a better reading might be "how?"

When *there is no goer,* then *going is not possible.* Then, in this manner: *If going doesn't exist, how will there be a goer?*

There, the one who says "the goer which truly exists in the three times" is not correct.

Furthermore -

> 8. **"First of all the goer does not go nor does the non-goer go; then apart from goer and non-goer, what third goes?"[23]**

[Commentary:]

Here, either a goer will go, or no goer will go; or if it is supposed that[24] some third other than these two would go (then,) in that case -

[Thesis$_1$:] *the goer does not go.*

[Reason$_1$:] Because going [already] exists [vis a vis the goer].

[Thesis$_2$:] *A non-goer also does not go.*

[Reason$_2$:] Because going does not [yet] exist [vis a vis the goer].

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[23] Sanskrit gantā na gaccati tāvad agantā naiva gaccati| anyo gantur agantuś kas tṛtīyo 'tha gaccati|| Poussin's edition has the last *pada* as "*kas tṛtīyo hi gaccati*" but Tucci's mss. has the above reading which is confirmed by Poussin's edition, p. 101.18.

[24] Wallesser consistently leaves *graṇ na* untranslated. Candra Das (s.v.) only lists "cold" as a translation for *graṇ*, but cf. Jäschke, (s.v.).

[Thesis$_3$:] *A third other than* the two[25], *does not go.*

[Reason$_3$:] Because it doesn't exist [i.e., there is no such goer].

[Reason$_{3.1}$:] If it is supposed that such a thing exists, it would either be goer or non-goer.

[Reason$_{3.1.1}$:] Since both are also not admitted to go, therefore this [supposed third thing] is not correct.

Furthermore:

> **9. First of all, how will "the goer goes" be possible when without a going a goer is never possible?[26]**

[Commentary:]

[Thesis:] Here, the one who is attached to (this

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[25]Peking and Narthaṇ have "*de ñid*" which Huntington corrects to "*de gñis*", which makes more sense in context.

[26] Sanskrit gantā tāvad gaccatīti katham evopapatsyate| gamanena vinā gantā yadā naivopapadyate|| While the Sanskrit versions of this verse all seem to agree, there are a number of different Tibetan translations of this verse:

Abh. "re zhig 'gro po 'gro bo zhes| ji ltar 'thad pa nyid du 'gyur| 'gro ba med na 'gro ba po| nam yaṇ 'thad par mi 'gyur ro||"

PP. (81a-81b) "re zig 'gro po 'gro 'o zhes| ji ltar 'thad pa ñid du 'gyur| | nam yaṇ 'thad par mi 'gyur ro||"

BP. (192a l. 4) re zhig 'gro po 'gro 'o zhes| ji ltar 'thad pa nyid du 'gyur| 'gro ba min na 'gro ba po| nam yaṇ 'thad par mi 'gyur ro||

PSP. "gaṇ tse gro ba med par ni| 'gro po 'thad par mi 'gyur na| re zig 'gro po 'gro 'o zes| ji ltar 'thad pa ñid du 'gyur||

sentence) "*the goer goes*" not correct. Why?

[Reason:] Because *without a going a goer is never possible.*

Furthermore -

10. According to [one] position, the goer goes. According to that [position] it follows that there is a goer without going, because the goer [itself] is [also] maintained to go.[27]

[Commentary:]

[Thesis:] Here, it is maintained *in [one] position, the goer goes. [In this position] it follows that there is a goer without going*. Why?

[Reason:] *Because it is accepted that,* on this account, "the *goer goes*".

Furthermore -

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[27] The structure of the Tibetan translation gives a different reading than the Sanskrit. I have translated the verse here according to the Tibetan rendering because this seems to have dictated the order in which the commentary comments on it.

The Sanskrit is as follows: pakṣo gantā gaccatīti yasya tasya prasajyate| gamanena vinā gantā gantur gamanaṃ icchataḥ||

"For a certain person there is the position "the goer goes". For that person [whose position] maintained that going is to be connected to the goer, it follows that there is a goer without a going."

My reading differs slightly from Jaques May: "*Celui qui soutient la thèse: «L'agent de mouvement se meut», postulant que l'agent possède le mouvement, encourt la conséquence nécessaire d'un agent sans mouvement.*" [May, *op. cit.*, 61.] The question is whether *icchataḥ* modifies *yasya* or *pakṣaḥ*.

11. If the goer also goes (then) it would result in two goings; one (going) by which the "goer" is made manifest and that [going] which the goer traverses.[28]

[Commentary:]

[Thesis:] In this position (which maintains) "*the goer goes,*" *there will result in two goings.* How so?

[Reason:] The going *by which the "goer" is made manifest*[29], *and having become a goer* there is another *going* which will go at a subsequent time.

Since this is not acceptable, the one who says that "in that case, the goer is truly established in the three times" is not correct.

[Example:] Like a son of a barren woman.

12. It does not commence to go in what has been traversed, it does not commence to go in what has not yet been traversed, it does not commence to go in what is being traversed, so

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[28] Sanskrit Poussin: "gamane dve prasajyete gantā yady uta gaccati| ganteti cocyate yena gantā san yac ca gaccati||" but Tucci's mss. has "cājyate" which is confirmed by the Tibetan "mṅon pa" [cf. De Jong, 37]. The Tibetan of the last *pada* ("*'gro por gyur nas gaṇ 'gro ba'o*") is perhaps different from the Sanskrit. The Tibetan *nas* denotes the sense of a time sequence which is absent in the Sanskrit but brought out in the commentary.

[29] "mṅon pa" = "gaccati" again, the translator chooses to render √gam by its secondary meaning of "to understand."

how can it begin to go?[30]

Alternately:

13. **Prior to the commencement of going, there exists neither what is being traversed nor what has been traversed nor where going should begin. How will it occur in what has not yet been traversed?**[31]

14. **It is thought, how is there what has been traversed? How is there what has not yet been traversed? How is there what is being traversed? All (of these which are) connected to going are not evident in (their) commencement.**[32]

[Commentary:]

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30 Sanskrit "gate nārabhyate gantuṃ gantuṃ [cf. De Jong, 37] nārabhyate 'gate| nārabhyate gamyamāne gantumārabhyate kuha||"

31 Sanskrit (Poussin) "[na pūrvaṃ] gamanārambhād gamyamānaṃ na vā gataṃ| yatrārabhyeta gamanam agate gamanaṃ kutaḥ||" Poussin's mss. read "agasti gamanārambhāt" for the first *pada*. Since this did not make sense, he suggests "na pūrvaṃ" in keeping with the sense of the passage. However, Akira Saito's work with some additional manuscripts has allowed him to correct the first *pada* to be "prāg asti". His explanation is as follows:"…TD 250, 251, 252, MBB-I, -II *agasti;* R. *gasti*. *Agasti* is most probably due to the misreading of the letter *prā* as *a*. 'Prior to the commencement of going, there exists neither what is being gone over (gamyamāna) nor what has been gone over (gata)'" Saito, Akira. "Textcritical Remarks on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as cited in the *Prasannapadā*." *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies,* 33 (2 1985): 844. I have adopted his reading.

32 Sanskrit "gataṃ kiṃ gamyamānaṃ kimagataṃ kiṃ vikalpyate| adṛśyamāna ārambhe gamanasyaiva sarvathā||"

[Thesis:] [verse 13] *Before the beginning of going, there is nothing being traversed where going could begin, and what has been traversed* also *does not exist.*

[Sub-thesis:] "*It [beginning] will occur in what has not yet been traversed*". If this is thought, it also isn't correct. Why?

[Reason$_1$:] Because what has not yet been traversed itself does not exist [yet].

[Reason$_2$:] Of what use is the beginning of going for what has not yet been traversed?

[Conclusion:] Therefore, [verse 14] if *all (of these) commencements of going are not evident,* then why are these *imagined to begin* in the [so called] *what has been traversed,* and *what is being traversed,* and *what has not yet been traversed?* It is imagined:

[Example:] Like a mental construction.

[Objection:] This has been said: "the goers staying exists."

This is explained:

15. First of all, the goer doesn't stay nor does the non-goer stay. Other than the goer and the non-goer, what third is there that stays?[33]

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[33] Sanskrit gantā na tiṣṭati tāvadagantā naiva tiṣṭati| anyo gantur agantuś ca kastṛtīyo 'tha tiṣṭati||

[Commentary:]

Here, if it is supposed that either *the goer would stay*, or *the non-goer would stay*, or a third *other than these two would stay*.

[$Thesis_1$:] There, a *goer does not stay*.

[$Reason_1$:] Because going exists (there).

[$Thesis_2$:] A *non-goer also does not stay*.

[$Reason_{2.1}$:] Because there is no going.

[$Reason_{2.1.1}$:] The position is the opposite ("contradictory" "mi mthun") of going because it is staying.

[$Thesis_3$:] *The third which is other than* the two also *does not stay*.

[$Reason_3$:] Because it does not exist.

[$Reason_{3.1}$:] If, it is supposed that someone is either a goer or is a non-goer, then, since (it is also) negated like the (previous) two, (Hence,) the one who says "staying exists for the goer" is not correct.

[Example:] Just like [producing] oil from [crushing] sand grains[34].

16. "First of all, the goer stays," how will this be possible when without a going a goer

[34]cp. *Śataśāstra* of Āryadeva:"As no barren woman can have a son and none of the blind men can see rūpa, and no grain of sand can produce oil they cannot do it, even if they are collected together; also the same is the case with regard to the atoms; because each of one [of them] cannot [produce that effect], then, many also cannot (do it)." [Tucci, 1929, 48]

is never possible?"[35]

[Commentary:]

[Thesis:] It is not *admissible* (for one) to attach to (the claim) "*the goer stays.*" Why?

[Reason:] Because *when there is no going a goer is never possible.*

[Example:] Just like (saying) "atoms ("paramāṇu") exist."

Further:

17(ab). It does not stay from what is being traversed, from what has been traversed, nor from what has not yet been traversed.[36]

[Commentary:]:

Now, if it is supposed that the goer *would stay...* (it would be) either *from what is being traversed,* or *from what has been traversed* and *what has not yet been traversed,* then there would also be no staying from a third part (other than the other two). Why?

[Reason:] Because it is not proper that there be staying from the third part.

[Conclusion:] In that case, saying "the staying of the goer exists" is not reasonable.

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[35] Sanskrit gantā tāvattiṣṭatīti katham evopapatsyate| gamanena vinā gantā yadā naivopapadyate||

[36] Sanskrit na tiṣṭati gamyamānān na gatān nāgatād api|

[Example:] Like the son of a barren woman.

Now...

17cd. "Going (gamanaṃ), entering, and leaving are the same as going (gati)."[37]

[Commentary:]

Just as *going* has been extensively considered, so too should *entering* (or activity - "saṃpravṛtti") and *leaving* (or cessation - "nivṛtti") along with going be considered in the same [manner].

Now, it is not possible for going and goers to be either the same or different. Why? It is explained:

18. "That the goer is (the same as) the going is not reasonable. Furthermore, that the goer is other than going is not reasonable."[38]

[Objection:] Here it is said, what fault would there be (in either of these cases)? It is explained:

19. "If goer and going were the same, there would follow the consequence of actor being

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[37]Sanskrit (Poussin) [gamanaṃ] saṃ[pra]vṛttiśca nivṛttiśca gateḥ samā|| Poussin's reconstruction is confimed both by the Tibetan version and Tucci's mss.. For difference between *gamana* and *gati* cf. May, p. 67 n. 26.

[38] Sanskrit yadeva gamanaṃ gantā sa eveti na yujyate| anya eva punar gantā gateriti na yujyate||

the same as the action."[39]

20. **"Furthermore, if the goer is thought to be other than going, then there would be going without the goer and goer without the going."[40]**

21. **The establishment does not exist for these two (the goer and the going) either by means of unity or by means of plurality, how will the establishment exist at all?"[41]**

[Commentary:]

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[39] Sanskrit yadeva gamanaṃ gantā sa eva hi bhaved yadi| ekībhāvaḥ prasajyeta kartuḥ karmaṇa eva ca||

[40]anya eva punar gantā gater yadi vikalpyate| gamanaṃ syādṛte gantur gantā syād gamanādṛte||

[41]Sanskrit ekībhāvena vā siddhir nānābhāvena vā yayoḥ| na vidyate tayoḥ siddhiḥ kathaṃ nu khalu vidyate|| Most translators of this verse have taken the pronoun *yayoḥ* as the direct object either of the verb *vidyate* or as somehow being modified by *siddhir*.

May: "Lorsque deux [entités] ne se réalisent ni comme essences confondues, ni comme essences diverses, comment donc pourraient-elles se réaliser?" (May, 71)

Inada: "As they (i.e., coming to pass and a passing entity) cannot possibly be established in terms of a single character nor of a different character, how could they be established at all?" (Inada, 49)

Walleser: "Die (zwei), welche nicht als ein Ding und nicht als verschiedene Dinge (bhāva) Erreicht werden, wie werden diese zwei erricht?" (Walleser, 20)

While the sense of these translations is the same as mine, gramatically *siddhir* (fem. sing. nom.) must be the direct object of *vidyate* (pass. sing.) because *yayoḥ* is dual (which would be reflected in the verb -- *vidyete*). Hence, the establishment (*siddhir*) is what does not exist.

Like father and son. Further,

[Thesis:] Going is not possible ("mi srid pa").

[Reason:] Because of that ("going") itself[42].

Now the goer is also not established. How so? This is explained:

22. "The goer does not traverse that going (gati) by which the goer is made manifest. This is because (the goer) prior to the going action (itself) does not exists. [After all], someone [must] go somewhere."[43]

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[42]Wallesser leaves this untranslated. "Gehen ist nicht möglich; deshalb wird der Geher auch nicht erreicht. Wieso?..." (Walleser, 20).

[43] Sanskrit "*gatyā yayocyate gantā gatiṃ tāṃ sa na gacchati| yasmānna gatipūrvo 'sti kaścit kiṃ ciddhi gacchati||*" Inada suggests that (from Ui) that the Chinese and Tibetan versions correspond to "*yayojyate*" rather than "*yayocyate*," [Inada, 49]. However, Tucci's mss. reads "*yayājyate*" which is confirmed by the Tibetan "*gaṇ-gis...mṇon*" [De Jong, 38]. Inada seems to have missed the sense of the last two *padas* of the verse. He translates it as follows: "The passing entity which is known or described by passage does not initiate the latter because it cannot exist prior to the latter. Yet, any entity somehow does come to pass." [Inada, 49] I have two objections to this translation. First of all, his, "yet..." contrasts the fact that something goes against the idea that a goer cannot go prior to going. The sense of this translation is something like, "despite the logical difficulties posed by a goer having to exist prior to going, going happens anyway." On the other hand, all of the commentaries take this last *pada* as the *reason* why a goer cannot exist prior to going.

The second objection is that Inada [and Kalupahana following him] seems to be translating the verse from the Sanskrit alone without looking at the commentaries. In the last *pada* of the verse, *kaścit* and *kiṃcit* (both indefinite pronouns of "whomever" and "whatever" respectively) could both function in the capacity of subject or object since the particle *cid* is indeclinable. Hence, Inada translates it by the vague, "any entity somehow does come to pass," while Kalupahana turn it into a question: "... who or what is it that moves?" These translations are possible, but it appears that no ancient writer took it that way. In the

[Commentary:]

[Thesis:] *That going (gati) by which the goer is made manifest*, is marked ("mtshon pa") and is grasped ("gzuṅ pa") - *that going is not moving* the goer[44]. Why?

[Reason:] *Because prior to the going action*, the goer *does not exist*.

[Example:] If for example, there were *someone*, a man or a woman who will go *somewhere*, like to a certain village or town, [they are not a goer] because [that going] does not exist.

Further:

23. "The goer does not traverse a going (gati) other than that by which the goer is made manifest. This is because two goings are not possible in one goer.[45]

Tibetan translation *gaṇ źig* (nominative) translates *kaścit* while *gaṇ du* (terminative or transitive) translates *kiṃcit*. Clearly the Tibetan translators were following the lead of the commentaries. Buddhapālita, Piṅgala, the *Akutobhayā* and the *Prasannapadā*, each have the example of a certain man or woman traversing a certain villiage or town. [cf.: Buddhapālita 197a, *Chung-Lun*, (Bocking's translation) p. 129, *Prasannapadā*, 106] This example serves as a way of showing the cases of *kaścit* and *kiṃcit* through context. Cf. *Prasannapadā*, 106.7:"*kaścid devadatteḥ kiṃcid arthāntarabhūtaṃ grāmaṃ nagaraṃ vā gacchatīti dṛṣṭaṃ*/" This rendering matches that of the *Akutobhayā*.

[44]The commentary elucidates some of the grammar of the verse. 22b says "'gro ba de ni de 'gro min" which the commentary expands to "'gro ba de ni 'gro ba por 'gro bar byed pa ma yin".

[45]Skt, (Poussin) *gatyā yayocyate gantā tato'nyāṃ sa na gacchati/ gatī dve nopapadyete yasmādeke pragacchati//* Tucci's mss., again, gives a different reading: "*gatyā yayājyate gantā tato 'nyāṃ sa na gacchati*/"

[Commentary:]

[Thesis:] *The going by which the goer* is made manifest[46], characterized, and grasped, this going *also does not move* a goer *other than that going*. Why?

[Reason:] *Because two goings are not possible in one goer.*

[Example:] Like two sprouts in one seed.

Further:

24. "An existent goer does not traverse three kinds of going, nor does a non existent (goer) traverse three kinds of going."[47]

25. Nor does (an existent and non-existent goer) traverse the three-fold going. Hence, going, goer, and what is to be traversed do not exist.[48]

[Commentary:]

Like a mirage.

The "*existent*" (sadbhūtaḥ") means: "establishing of

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and "*gatī dve nopapadyate yasmād eke tu gantari*" which is closer to the Tibetan *'gro po gcig pu la*. This is also the version on which the Commentary seems to be commenting.

[46]The verse has *mṇon pa* wheras the commentary has *mthuṇ pa*.

[47] Sanskrit "*sadbhūto gamanaṃ gantā triprakāraṃ na gacchati|| nāsadbhūto 'pi gamanaṃ triprakāraṃ sa gacchati||*"

[48] Sanskrit "*gamanaṃ sadasadbhūtaḥ triprakāraṃ na gacchati| tasmād gatiśca gantā ca gantavyaṃ ca na vidyate||*"

something (as) independent." "*Going*" means: "what is to be traversed" (*bgrod par bya ba - gantavya*). "*The three-fold*" means: "*gata*", "*agata*", and "*gamyamāna*." "*Not going*" means "the negation of going." "also *asadbūtaḥ*" means "non-existence" ("yod pa ma yin pa"). The remainder ("hlag ma") is as has already been explained. "*Sadasadbhūtaḥ*" is also explained as a thing ("dṅos po") which is a mixture of the two aspects explained earlier. The remainder is as has been explained earlier. "*Because of that*" means the conclusion ("mjug bsdu"). Going, goer, [and] what is to be traversed; these three also do not exist because they are not acceptable if they are fully investigated in this manner. Like a fire-circle ("*ālāta-cakra*").

The examination of "what has been traversed, what is presently being traversed, and what is yet to be traversed" from the *Akutobhayā*, a commentary ("*'grel pa*") of the Mādhyamika (as) explained ("*mdzad pa*") by Ācāryā Nāgārjuna.

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